means no more than the oaths in use before it was established, and above all, which has nothing to do with the consideration of matters that the lawgivers who framed it declared to be to them objects of the greatest solicitude! Can any rational person think it probable that this is a correct view of the matter? It must surely bear upon its face demonstrative evidence of its falsity and absurdity to every mind which long-indulged prejudice, and the misrepresentations of faction, have not rendered " proof and bulwark against sense!"

There is another view of the subject taken by many persons, which is entitled to more respect. It is not denied by them that the Oath may be in itself an obligation imposed by the State upon its chief functionary, to maintain that line / of policy in the distribution of political power which has hitherto characterized our Constitution. But whether it be so or not they hold to be a matter of no importance; the only question being, they think, the expediency of departing from that line of policy. That all political questions are to be determined by their expediency, may be a sound rule if the doctrine of expediency be understood and acted upon in the most extended sense of which it is capable. If, however, it be taken in the narrow sense which men generally put upon it, in considering the advantages to be derived from any given

line of conduct, it leads to false and perilous conclusions. How far the doctrine of expe

diency is applicable to the present case, may appear from this consideration. When a rule of action has once been prescribed by a competent authority, and the agent whose conduct is the subject of that rule, has bound himself to a strict observance of it, the proper subject of inquiry is, its nature and extent. If a specific course of action be proposed to that agent, the first consideration with him must be, whether it come within the rule; for should it appear morally certain that the thing which the rule was designed to restrain him from doing, is that proposed to be done, it is unnecessary, it is wrong to go further. further. While that rule exists no principle of action which is adverse to it can be adopted-no act destructive of the object of its institution can be done, without a flagitious violation of those principles by which alone governments can be supported, and human society holden together. No political measure, we may be sure, which would be attended by such a consequence can be expedient.

These preliminary observations will not perhaps be deemed irrelevant, when it is recollected that this question of the Coronation Oath has usually been treated as unnecessary to be considered. It would therefore have been a futile task to go into evidence in support of the posi

tions here advanced without previously suggesting some reasons to doubt whether the sneers by which the Coronation Oath has been "disposed of" in Parliament, and elsewhere, have so irrefragably proved, as some appear to imagine, that there is no room left for argument upon the subject.

SECTION II.

THE DESIGN OF THIS WORK.

THE object attempted in the following pages is, to suggest a mode of interpreting the Coronation Oath, which seems to be the only one consistent with the principles laid down for the investigation of truth in similar cases; and to demonstrate, by reference to indisputable authorities, the nature and extent of the obligation which it imposes upon the Sovereign. This object we shall endeavour to effectuate by the establishment of the following positions :

That the intention of the Legislature in establishing the Coronation Oath at the Revolution, is the criterion by which we are to judge of the nature and extent of that obligation.

That it appears from the public declarations of the several branches of the Legislature at

that time, that one principal object they had in view in all their proceedings, was to secure the country in future from the danger of having the Established Religion undermined or overturned by Roman Catholic influence.

That the Legislature, by its acts and proceedings in carrying that object into effect, extended and permanently established the principle, that it is necessary to the preservation of the Constitution in Church and State, that the Government of this country be in the hands of Protestants exclusively.

That the Coronation Oath was at the same time remodelled and established by law, principally as a means of binding the Sovereign to maintain, in the exercise of all his political functions, the same principle of Government.

That the Coronation Oath is a barrier to the concession of the demands of the Roman Catholics, is at present, it is conceived, the whole subject of dispute respecting it. To that point therefore only will it be necessary to require the attention of the reader. The question how it might be removed-that is, whether by an act of the Legislature operating immediately or prospectively, is one which it is obvious does not at present arise; because it pre-supposes the admission of the proposition in dispute.

However unsuccessful this attempt may appear to the candid reader, let it not be forgotten,

that as truth is in its nature wholly independent of the means by which it is sought to be elucidated, a proposition may really be consonant with truth and justice, though the reasons adduced in its support be not so, and though the proposer prove incompetent to his undertaking,

SECTION III.

THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN ESTABLISHING THE OATH, IS THE RULE BY WHICH IT IS TO BE CONSTRUED AND PERFORMED.

Ir may seem superfluous to refer to the definitions which have been given of an oath,—but as it is impossible to arrive at a right conclusion, without a clear understanding of the premises from which it is to be deduced, it may not be amiss to remind the reader, that ethical writers have distributed oaths into two classes, promissory and assertory. Their use is either to confirm a promise, or to establish a doubtful fact; and it is necessary to be observed, that they do not of themselves produce a new and peculiar obligation, but are only applied as an additional bond to an obligation, in its nature valid before, though the principal obligation, and the additional bond of the oath, are often comprehended in one form