an express obligation or restriction, with reference to a specific object, could be imposed upon one branch of the Legislature, that (as it would prevent the enactment of a law inconsistent with that object) would operate indirectly during the existence of it, as a restriction upon the Legislature itself, and thus the case proposed would come within the axiom above mentioned. Now if this be really an impossible case, as being irreconcileable with the power of Parliament, of course no other case agreeing with it in principle can exist. If, however, such other cases, or one such, do exist, of course this may exist also; and it becomes evident that they who have deduced from the doctrine referred to the opposite conclusion, have understood it in a sense which is inconsistent with the actual constitution of Parliament. It will be sufficient for the present purpose to refer to a clause of that memorable statute which has been so frequently mentioned in the foregoing pages-the Act of Settlement, and to some subsequent enactments made in corroboration of it. By that statute it is declared, that "no person born out of these kingdoms, although naturalized or made a denizen, except such as are born of English parents, shall be capable to be of the Privy Council, or a member of either House of Parliament, or to enjoy any office or place of trust, either civil or military." The legislative

will is here as distinctly expressed as in any provision relating to Roman Catholics.

According to the construction we are considering of the doctrine of the power of Parliament, consonantly with the assertion that the notion is absurd of the Legislature's attempting to perpetuate any enactment or the principle involved in it by restricting one of its branches from lending itself to the repeal of that enactment, nothing further could have been done. But what is the fact? By the 1st Geo. I. stat. 2. c. 4. s. 2. “ For the better preserving the said recited clause entire and inviolable," it is enacted, "That no person shall thereafter be naturalized unless in the Bill exhibited for that purpose there be a clause, or particular words inserted to the same effect, and that no Bill of naturalization shall be received in either House of Parliament, unless such clause or words be first inserted or contained therein." Upon what principle can it be contended that the notion of the King's being restrained from assenting to a particular measure is at variance with the doctrine that "Acts against the power of Parliament bind not," and this provision for preventing either House of Parliament from instituting another specific measure, not so? The effect of this restrictive provision is, during its subsistence, to prevent the enactment of any law conflicting with the object contemplated in the

tical power.

imposition of the restriction-namely, the admittance of a certain class of subjects to poliThe effect ascribed to the Coronation Oath is the same. It is obvious therefore that the notion of that Oath's having such an effect, is not inconsistent with the actual constitution of Parliament-which is the proposition denied in the objection we have here considered.

If it be said that the Legislature may repeal the restriction, the answer obviously is, that the point in dispute respecting the Coronation Oath is not how the difficulty may be removed, but whether any such exists. The repealing power of the Legislature cannot indeed be urged without a tacit admission of the existence and of the efficacy of the restriction.

SECOND OBJECTION,-THAT THE OATH IS NOT NOW BINDING IN ITS ORIGINAL SENSE, EXAMINED.

IN considering in a former part of this work* the question, where are we to look for the intention of the Legislature in imposing the Coronation Oath? the grounds were stated, upon

* Vide ante page 10.

which it is conceived we must look for that intention to the Records of 1688. It will now be proper to notice the reasoning, by which the only conclusion deducible from these sources of information has been attempted to be got rid of. Reasoning indeed has been but little resorted to; a witless jest, or an irrelevant assertion, dogmatically advanced, has generally been employed to dispose of " that idle objection" the Coronation Oath. To descant with flippancy upon the folly of being guided by " antiquated notions," has been found easier than to discriminate between such institutions of former times as were primarily founded in error, or merely designed for temporary purposes, and such as, having their foundations on immutable principles, remain unshaken by the circumstances which agitate and change the surface of society. In a review of this publication in the "Christian Remembrancer,"* a popular notion on the subject of the Coronation Oath is put into the shape of an argument, by which (as the Reviewer is pleased to say) "the author's whole pamphlet of fifty-six elaborate and learned pages is disposed of. The Legislature of the 1 William and Mary we have no doubt did intend the exclusion of Popery by virtue of the Coronation Oath, and the perpetual exclusion too, if they were simple enough to suppose that * September, 1826.

they were legislating for all future generations. That they were indeed so foolish we have too much respect for them altogether to admit, but neither do we deny it." There is here a singular degree of caution evinced, in declining either to admit or deny that a provision was intended by its framers to be permanent, which was declared * on the face of it to be instituted "to the end that one uniform Oath might be, in all times to come, taken by the Kings and Queens of this realm." The reviewer, in thus acting up to his resolution of offering " no other reply to the author's reasoning" than such as his calm judgment might suggest," exhibits much of that independence of sentiment which characterises the answer of Costard (in Love's Labours Lost) to Biron's startling proposition that “three times thrice is nine."

66

"Not so, Sir; under correction, Sir; I hope it is not so: You cannot beg us, Sir; I can assure you we know what we know."

As no one, of whose perceptive faculty prejudice has not produced a total eclipse, can doubt that the Legislature of 1688 did intend this provision for "the exclusion of Popery" to operate in future times, we have only to consider what foundation there is for the charge, that, "in that case they most egregiously overrated their own authority and im

* Vide Preamble ante p. 56.