LAWS, CUSTOMS, PRIVILEGES, &c.

Absentees. When a plaintiff is absent, a power of attorney to some person in the island, duly proved and recorded in the Court Register,must be produced, if required, before the cause can proceed to trial or judgment. Foreign powers of attorney under a notarial seal, and recorded are sufficient. It is held that the person acting under a power does not become individually liable for costs; the assets of his constituent only being subject for the same. A person who has never been in the Island can be sued if he has a power of attorney upon record, or effects within the jurisdiction, and no representative, because in the latter case an Administrator is appointed to him. The Code says: "In causes where there are several defendants or persons interested, if any of them shall be absent, the Viscount shall be appointed party for them, to answer peremptorily without delay for them in case of default." If an inhabitant of Guernsey be absent from the island, though only on a tour to Jersey, whatever may be his respectability or fortune, if a Court day intervene, his property is liable to be arrested, permission taken at Court to call over his name at the Church of the parish where he resides he may be dispossessed of all his personal property, an auctioneer called in, not only to take an inventory of his effects, but to displace them, and all this without even the pretended creditor's making an affidavit for the supposed claim. All the favor allowed by law to the absentee is, that before the definitive sale of his property would be effected, the Queen's Sergeant would write to him, acquainting him what had taken place, a term varying in length, according to the distance of the place whither the debtor had gone, being allowed him for that purpose.

Accessories.-By the English law, he who kills another upon his desire or command is as much a murderer, as if he had

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done it merely of his own head; [Rex. v. Sawyer. 1. Rus. C. and M. 424. And see Rex. v. Dyson. R and R. C. C. 523 ; post 7385] for if a man encourages another to murder himself and is present abetting him while he does so, such person is guilty of murder as principal. [Rex. v. Dyson. R and R. C. C. 523.] Again, if two encourage each other to murder themselves together and one does so, but the other fails in the attempt upon himself, he is a principal in the murder of the other. [Ibid]. Now contrast with this the practice in Jersey: In the case of Louis Marin, charged with having rendered himself guilty of the crime of murder upon the person of Mary Ann Bethell, by aiding, assisting, and encouraging her to poison herself, by procuring her the poison, preparing it for her, giving and making her take it, from the effect of which she died, Monday, Nov. 16, 1835, or about that time, and in being, the said Marin, present, consenting, and par. ticipating in the poisoning, which caused the death of the said Mary Ann Bethell. The facts having been clearly proved, the Petty Jury unanimously found the prisoner Rather Guilty than Innocent," which is tantamount to the English verdict of Guilty; but the Grand Jury to which the prisoner appealed, having arrogated the right of judging the law as well as the fact, returned the following verdict :-" Mary Ann Bethe having formed and declared her intention of destroying herself, and having commenced alone to put it in execution, by taking landanum which she had found in a drawer at Mr. Barber's lodgings, and that without the participation of any other person-the Jury are of opinion that the accused is guilty of the crime of Homicide on the person of the said Mary Ann Bethell, with circumstances of aggravation!

Accusation, mitigating of.-It would appear by several verdicts that have been given, that a Jury having a prisoner in charge on a certain crime, may find him guilty of another, or rather of that in a modified degree, by judging the law as well as the fact. On the 15th of May, 1799, under the presidence of Lieut.-Bailli Pipon, Charles James Barrow, John Edward Lee, and Michael Chadwick, accused of murder, were found guilty of manslaughter, and con◄ demned to an imprisonment. On the 20th of February, 1800, William Wood, accused of murder, was found guilty of manslaughter, and was pillored and banished. These two cases took place whilst Thomas Pipon, Esq., was King's Procureur-General. On the 8th of May, 1820, Thomas Thompson, accused of murder, was found guilty of having caused the death of Daniel Patterson, without premedita

tion, and he was condemned to an imprisonment: this af fair was judged under the presidence of Sir Thomas Le Breton; Johu Dumaresq, Esq., the son of Sir John Dumaresq, was then King's Procureur-General. On the 8th of October, 1824, Charles Le Sueur, accused of murder, was declared by the Petty Jury of St. Helier, guilty of culpable homicide, and was condemned to an imprisonment. On the 16th July, 1825, Daniel Gallaghan. accused of murder, was found guilty of manslaughter, and punished accordingly. These three last prosecutions took place under the presidence of Sir Thomas Le Breton, and at the suit of the present Procureur-General. On the 7th of October, 1828, James Marshall, accused of murder, was found guilty of homicide under aggravated circumstances, and punished accordingly. In 1836, Louis Marin, indicted for murder was found guilty of komicide under aggravated circumstances, and was transported to New South Wales for life. In 1839, Amelia Spencer was indicted for murder, and found guilty of excusable homicide, and forthwith discharged! The two latter cases were tried under the presidence of Sir John De Veulle.

Acquittal.-A prisoner when acquitted is immediately set at liberty, and is not liable to any charge for fees, as the Queen's Receivers pay all expenses of the prosecution out of the Crown Revenues.

Actions are of a civil and mixed nature. The preliminary processes for debt are a summons before the Cour du billet, of an Ordre de Provisoire for the Cour du Samedi. Those for personal wrongs are instituted by a Remonstrance or an Ordre de Justice.

Acts of the Court.-These are records of the Judgments drawn up by the Greffier or his clerk, who makes a minute of the decisions of the bench, on scraps of paper, and places them on a file. These minutes in some cases are very brief uch as defaut, when judgment has been given by default, and a.b.c. for aux bien sans contredit, when an attachment has been confirmed without opposition. When pleas have been put forth, the judgment is put down at length, and read to the Bench, and after it has been approved of, it is read aloud to the parties concerned. After the Court has broken up, these minutes are collected and framed into Acts and copied into the public records. These latter comprise four books, for the four Courts, and are lettered according to their kinds, and numbered according to their dates. The records are not si either by the President or the magistrates, who give ments, nor are they verified in any manner

original minutes are not even preserved. Any person may obtain a copy of the record, by giving a day's notice, and pay. ing for the same. The charge is for any number of words not exceeding 100, one shilling and sixpence, and for every hundred words above that number, one shilling. The amount is usually endorsed on the back of the document, and the authenticity of the copy is certified by the signature of the Greffier. The fees are payable in British sterling. If the record refers to a political cause and the applicant is one of the right stamp, the copy is furnished to him gratis.

Acts of the Court, suspension of.-Acts of the Court are sometimes suspended from being enrolled or recorded, on the requisition of a Jurat, or intimation that he has found reason to alter his judgment.

Acts of the States.-The States must send their acts to the Lieut..Governor, but their representations in opposition to his conduct, they may send direct to the Council office, and let his Excellency become acquainted with them by means of copies through that source.

Acts of the States, suspension of.-Acts of the States may be suspended by the Bailiff,[see Dissent] or by the Governor, [see Veto] or by an Order in Council.

Acts of Parliament, when they extend to the Colonies and other Possessions abroad.-Acts passed since the acquisition of a country, or at least subsequent to the establishment of its legal constitution by royal commission, or Act of Parliament do not extend to it, unless they appear to have been passed with the intention of being so extended. [I Chal. Opin. 197, 220; 2 id. 202; 4 Mod. 225; Com. Dig. Navigation G. 3; 2 P. Wms. 75; 1 Black. Com. 108; 2 Ld. Raym. 1245, 1246; 2 Salk. 411; Stokes's Law of Col. 5 et seq.] This intention however, may appear either by mentioning the country by name or by general designation, such as the "Colonies," or "the West Indies," or "the dominions of his Majesty," or "the British Possessions abroad," or by reasonable construction, as in the case of navigation acts, acts of revenue and trade, and acts which relate to shipping, all which in general are obligatory on the Colonies and other Possessions, though not in terms extending to them. And acts of Parliament which alter other acts in force in the Colonies, or other possessions, are also considered by inference as applying themselves there. [Dioarris, 1st Rep. p. 5.] With regard to this latter point, we find by a late decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council :-" Where a statute for regulating the trade of the Isle of Man, prohibited all

goods prohibited in the United Kingdom, the prohibition was held to vary from time to time with the prohibitions in the United Kingdom, and the repeal of a prohibition of any particular goods as to the United Kingdom, is a repeal of the prohibition as to the Isle of Man, although not named in the repealing Act.-[Knapp's Reports.]

Acts of Parliament, how extended, when the Islands are not included in them.-There are two ways in which an act can be extended one is by a supplementary act, or by a clause grafting it upon a subsequent act, as was the case by 5 and 6 W. IV. c. 23 s. 10, which extended the 10 Geo. IV. c 56 as amended by 4 and 5 W. 4 c. 40; and the other way is by an Order in Council. The former is the only effectual mode, because an Act of Parliament has force independent of all contingencies, whereas an Order in Council has not, for its force can be restrained by the Jersey authorities, and be rendered absolutely powerless. There can be no question raised as regards the competency of the Crown to enact laws for the Channel Islands, because the power of the sovereign over the ancient duchy of Normandy was absolute, being that of a thorough despot, whose will was the law; that power however in course of time has been graciously yielded bit by bit, and paired down by Parliamentary interference to a decent standard, so as to become sufferable by the people. Hence, the Queen has a legislative jurisdiction both in Jersey and Guernsey, and indeed in all the British possessions abroad; but then it is only in such cases, as where Parliament leaves a void, by non-legislation. That is the reason why Orders in Council so often have this singular provision: as far as the same are consistent with the constitution and provisions of any Act of Parliament which relates to them.' The Queen as our legislator may then originate laws; and by the advice of her Council may adopt any act of Parliament passed exclusively for England or the United Kingdom, and by an Order or mandate, extend the same to the Island, and such an Order in Council would, but for an ontoward event, have force of law. But it so happens, that one of her Majesty's predecessors of glorious memory, lest peradventure he should legislate too fast for the Islanders, issued an Order, by which he put a bridle on his propensities and conceded to the Royal Court of Jersey,the power of restraining the force and operation of such laws, emanating either from himself or his successors." See Orders, Warrants and Letters.

Acts of Parliament, how exemplified.-In 1679, it was ordered that acts of Parliament in which the island was