232

A GREAT DISASTER.

enemy was distinctly seen. Going to a projecting angle of the works, General Cox mounted the parapet, and with his field-glass took a long look at the large bodies of troops that were being massed at the foot of the hills; then mounting his horse, he rode to every point of the line, to see that all was ready for the attack. He had not long to wait, for already the troops were in motion. The day was nearly done, but enough remained to gain an immortal victory, and at that moment the dropping of a flag by General Cheatham gave the signal for the whole line to advance.

The battle began on the extreme left with a premature attack, which failed from its very precipitation. Gen. Bate (afterwards Governor of Tennessee, and now Senator) was a dashing soldier, and, being eager for the combat, pushed forward his division only to discover, as it came within range of the enemy, that it was in advance of connecting lines. As his men looked to the right for a support, they saw that the other divisions were far behind; and as they had to take the whole fire, they retreated. Major Vaulx was an eye-witness of the attack and the repulse, and could not but regret, while he admired, the too impetuous valor of his brothers-in-arms.

But the fortune of war changed as the Confederates advanced in tremendous force, and it was now the turn of the Federals to experience a great disaster. In arranging the defences, two brigades had been placed outside of the town, across the turnpike, not as a position to be held, but simply to check and delay the attack. They were to fire a few rounds of artillery, and then to withdraw within the works and take their place in the line of defence, or to be held as a reserve. But as the approaching columns drew nearer, the officer in command, more brave than wise, (who seems to have thought it the proper thing for a soldier to fight the enemy anywhere, and with any odds,

WHO WAS IT THAT BLUNDERED?

233

even unsupported and alone,) ordered his infantry to open fire, as if the battle were to be fought on that ground.*

*That it was the commander of the division who blundered at this awful moment, is but too evident. The author of "The Retreat from Pulaski to Nashville," thus reports what he himself saw and heard: "The writer was standing on the parapet of the 100th Ohio Regiment, urging the men to strengthen their works, and talking with General Wagner. The General was reclining on his elbow, with a staff or crutch in his hand: he had fallen with his horse and was lame. We remarked that the musketry firing was becoming more rapid, also from the two guns in front. By-and-by a staff officer rode fast from one of the brigades, and reported excitedly, 'The enemy are forming in heavy columns. We can see them distinctly in the open timber and all along our front.' Wagner said firmly 'Stand there and fight them,' and then turning to me, said, 'And that stubbed, curly-headed Dutchman,' meaning one of his brigade commanders [General Conrad], 'will fight them too.' General,' the officer said, 'the orders are not to stand, except against cavalry and skirmishers; but to fall back behind the main line if a general engagement is threatened.' In a short time another officer rode in from the right in great haste, and told him the Rebels were advancing in heavy force. He received the same order. The officer added, 'But Hood's entire army is coming.' Then Wagner struck the ground with his stick, and said 'Never mind: fight them!' Soon we heard the Rebel yell and heavy firing."

'But,

It was a dreadful mistake, for which he had to suffer in the way that a soldier feels most: for in less than a week, General Thomas, after careful investigation, relieved him of his command, and that was the end of his military career. But soldiers are generous in their judgments, and quick to forgive the mistakes of one who has been brave, and so the writer of the above adds: "Wagner was a great fighter. It is said that bullets rattled out of his clothes for a month after the battle of Stone River. . . . . He is now dead; his soul is in heaven with the heroes; and let us draw over this one error the mantle of charity, and cherish the memory of his personal valor and dauntless courage on the hard-fought battlefields of the West."

....

234

WHY WERE THESE BRIGADES THERE?

The only explanation of his thus acting, not only without orders, but against orders, is that he "lost his head"bad thing to lose in a battle.* It were better that

a very

*This terrible disaster at the opening of the battle has often led to the inquiry, why these brigades were placed in such an exposed position? And gentle home critics think that they detect here a fault of strategy. A word of explanation, with the help of the map, may relieve their minds, and show them that there was no mistake at all in the disposition of the Union army.

The reader must bear in mind the position of Gen. Schofield on that morning. He had not planned for a battle at Franklin, but had intended, in accordance with the orders of Thomas, to continue his march to Nashville, as he would have done if he had found bridges or pontoons to cross the Harpeth river. Disappointed in this, he had to change his plan, and prepare for the contingency of battle where he was. As yet he was wholly in the dark as to the intentions of the enemy. Judging from the movement of Hood at Columbia, in crossing the river and endeavoring to get in his rear, it seemed probable that he would repeat the same movement at Franklin; and instead of attacking in front, where the Twenty-third corps held a strong line of defence, would cross the river, and making a circuit, move round the town, so as to take the Federal army in the rear, and cut off its retreat to Nashville. In anticipation of such a movement, one division of the Fourth corps, to be followed by others, if necessary, had been got across the river to the bluff on the other side, where General Schofield, from the earthworks (designated on the map as Fort Granger, the only point of sufficient elevation to command a view of the whole field), was able to watch the advance of the enemy, and change his own movements to meet the attack from whichever quarter it might come.

It was with an eye in both directions, that the two brigades had been placed in front, to observe the movements of the enemy; and if he should turn towards the river, to swing round with him, keeping in his front, and fending off the attack till the interior lines could be reformed to meet the tremendous shock that must follow. The plan was perfect in every detail. As Gen. Cox, repelling the criticisms which had been made on his com

236

CONFEDERATES DRIVEN BACK.

he had lost his life, for by this act of madness he lost a thousand men! The result was what might have been expected. As the enemy's line of battle overlapped these brigades on both sides, it instantly closed in upon them, and poured in such a fire that in a few moments they were utterly broken, and rushed at full speed back to the entrenchments, the Confederates following in hot pursuit. This was a double disaster. Not only were the brigades themselves overwhelmed, but the whole line had to hold its fire for fear of killing its own men; and so when the column rushed into the works, their pursuers rushed in after them, and were inside of the Federal lines, where they seized the shotted guns, and whirled them about to pour their contents into the flying crowd. But in the wild uproar, even the horses had caught the panic, and tearing away fled down the road, with the limbers containing the primers, so that the guns could not be discharged; and in the midst of this confusion, the tide of battle rolled back again, and all was recovered.

But this was not accomplished without a terrific conflict. In the rear of the line the ground descends in a gentle slope, and here a reserve brigade of two thousand men, under Colonel Opdycke, had been ordered to lie down, that they might not be exposed till they were needed. They had been warned of the danger of a break in the line, and now, at the call of their leader, they sprang to their feet, and rushed upon their assailants with the bay

manding officer for this disposition, as also for his being at Fort Granger instead of being with him at the front, said with emphasis, "General Schofield was exactly where he ought to have been, and the orders issued were exactly what they ought to have been." He might have added, that if those orders had been strictly obeyed, the result would have been not only the defeat but the entire destruction of Hood's army.