In this posture of affairs, both new and delicate, I resolved to adopt general rules, which should conform to the treaties, and assert the privileges, of the United States. These were reduced into a system, which will be communicated to you. Although I have not thought myself at liberty to forbid the sale of the prizes, permitted by our treaty of commerce with France to be brought into our ports, I have not refused to cause them to be restored when they were taken within the protection of our territory, or by vessels commissioned or equipped in a warlike form within the limits of the United States.

It rests with the wisdom of Congress to correct, improve, or enforce, this plan of procedure; and it will probably be found expedient to extend the legal code and the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States to many cases which, though dependent on principles already recognized, demand some further provisions.

Where individuals shall, within the United States, array themselves in hostility against any of the Powers at war; or enter upon military expeditions or enterprises within the jurisdiction of the United States; or usurp and exercise judicial authority within the United States; or where the penalties on violations of the law of nations may have been indistinctly marked, or are inadequate: these offences cannot receive too early and close an attention, and require prompt and decisive remedies.

Whatsoever those remedies may be, they will be well administered by the judiciary, who possess a long established course of investigation, effectual process, and officers in the habit of executing it.

In like manner, as several of the courts have doubted, under particular circumstances, their power to liberate the vessels of a nation at peace, and even of a citizen of the United States, although seized under a false color of being hostile property, and have denied their power to liberate certain captures within the protection of our territory, it would seem proper to regulate their jurisdiction in these points; but if the Executive is to be the resort in either of the two last mentioned cases, it is hoped that he will be authorized by law to have facts ascertained by the courts, when, for his own information, he shall request it.1

trality.

On March 24, 1794, Washington issued a second proclamation of His second proclaneutrality directed against the military expeditions which were being mation of neuformed in Kentucky. The warning contained in the proclamation is more specific than that in the proclamation of the preceding year. Instead of the general statement in the earlier document, that prosecutions would be instituted against all persons who should violate 1Am. State Papers, For. Rel., I, 21.

2For the text of the proclamation, see App., p. 172.

Act of June 5, 1794.

Summary of

its provisions.

the law of nations, the President mentions the different acts of either enlisting others or enrolling oneself in such expeditions.

The desired legislation was furnished on June 5, 1794. In the debates before the House of Representatives preceding the adoption of the act, the discussion was mainly confined to the advisability of adopting a provision forbidding the sale within the United States of vessels or goods captured from a prince or state with whom the United States was at peace, when the vessel or goods had been captured by the enemies of such prince or state, unless the vessel or goods should first have been carried to a port or place within the territory of the state to which the captors belonged. The question was whether the Treaty of 1778 with France restrained the United States from forbidding the sale within its ports of prizes captured by France, and if not, whether it was expedient to refuse France the privilege of selling her prizes in American ports. But in spite of the urgent pleas made in favor of the provision, it was ultimately rejected.1 The act which finally passed embodied the instructions issued by Hamilton to the collectors of customs, and supplemented them in accordance with the recommendations contained in the President's message. The provisions of the act are as follows:3

Sec. 1 prohibits the acceptance by citizens of the United States within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States of commissions to serve a foreign prince or state.

Sec. 2 prohibits all persons within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States from enlisting or hiring other persons to enlist in the service of any foreign prince or state. An exception is made of citizens of a foreign state who are transiently within the United States, and a further exception exempts from punishment under the statute such persons as, within thirty days after enlistment, discover upon oath the person by whom they were enlisted.

Sec. 3 prohibits the fitting out and arming of vessels within the ports of the United States with intent that such vessels shall be used in the service of a foreign prince or state in a war against a prince or state with whom the United States are at peace; also the issuance or delivery of a commission to such vessel for the aforesaid purpose.

1Annals of Congress, 3rd Cong., 745-757.

2The bill passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 48 to 38. In the Senate the opposition of the Republicans was even stronger, and it was only by the deciding vote of the Vice-President that the bill was passed to the third reading. Annals of Congress, 3rd Cong., 67, 757.

The text of the act is given in full in the App., p. 173.

Sec. 4 prohibits all persons from increasing or augmenting within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States the force of any ship of war in the service of a foreign prince or state.

Sec. 5 prohibits all persons from setting on foot directly or indirectly within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on against the territory of a foreign prince or state with whom the United States are at peace.

Sec. 6 confers jurisdiction upon the district courts to hear complaints in cases of captures made within the territorial waters of the United States.

Sec. 7 empowers the President of the United States in all cases in which the foregoing provisions shall be violated to employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States as shall be judged necessary to enforce the provisions in question.

Sec. 8 confers similar powers upon the President to compel the departure from the United States of any foreign vessel which by the law of nations or the treaties of the United States ought not to remain within the United States.

Sec. 9 provides that the act shall not be so construed as to prevent the prosecution of treason and piracy as defined by treaty or by law of the United States.

Sec. 10 provides that the act shall be in force during the term of two years and from thence to the end of the next session of Congress.

The act was entitled "An Act in addition to the act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States." It was continued in force for a period corresponding to its original duration by the Act of March 2, 1797, and was made permanent by the Act of April 24, 1800.

set by it.

The scope of the act was not only more comprehensive than any of High standard the previous temporary neutrality edicts issued by the nations of of neutrality Europe earlier in the century, but it went considerably beyond what was considered the duty of a neutral nation. It was the first attempt ever made on the part of a neutral nation to pronounce definitely that certain acts would be considered by it a violation of neutrality, and to incorporate those acts into its criminal code and enforce their observance in favor of any friendly prince or state without distinction. No higher tribute to the statesmanship of Washington and his advisers could be paid than that rendered by Mr. Canning in 1823 in a speech before the House of Commons against the repeal of the British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819. "If I wished," he said, "for a

First conviction

under it.

guide in a system of Neutrality, I should take that laid down by America in the days of the presidency of Washington and the secretaryship of Jefferson." In later years an eminent writer on international law, Mr. W. E. Hall, gave the following estimate of the high standard of neutral duty adopted by the United States:

The policy of the United States in 1793 constitutes an epoch in the development of the usages of neutrality. There can be no doubt that it was intended and believed to give effect to the obligations then incumbent upon neutrals. But it represented by far the most advanced existing opinions as to what those obligations were; and in some points it even went further than authoritative international custom has up to the present time advanced. In the main however it is identical with the standard of conduct which is now adopted by the community of nations.2

The first conviction under the Neutrality Act was that of Étienne Guinet who was indicted under Sec. 3 of the act "for being knowingly concerned in furnishing, fitting out and arming Les Jumeaux in the port and river Delaware with intent that she should be employed in the service of the French Republic, to cruise, or commit hostilities, upon the subjects of Great Britain, with whom the United States are at peace." The facts of the case were as follows: The vessel entered the port of Philadelphia and registered at the custom-house as a merchantman. The owners then employed a carpenter who opened up new port-holes and made other preparations for an increase of armament. The suspicions of the government being aroused, the Secretary of War ordered that all the recent equipments of a warlike nature should be dismantled. The vessel then cleared from port, but when about sixty miles below Philadelphia she stopped and took on board cannon, ammunition and a number of men. When a further effort was made to obtain more guns from Philadelphia, the authorities were informed and a cutter was sent to arrest the vessel, which however escaped. The trial of Guinet was held in the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania. In his charge to the jury, Justice Patterson said: "Converting a ship from her original destination, with intent to commit hostilities; or in other words, converting a merchant ship into a vessel of war, must be deemed an original outfit; for the act would otherwise become nugatory and inoperative. It is the conversion from the peaceable use, to the warlike purpose, that con

1Phillimore, III, §CXLVII.

2International Law, 587.

stitutes the offense." The jury recommended a verdict of guilty and Guinet was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and a fine of $400.1

In several cases the district courts restored prizes to their owners Case of the Cassius. where it was proved that the captor had illegally augmented its force. in the ports of the United States. The case of the Cassius deserves special mention because of the discussion to which it was subjected in connection with the fitting out of Confederate ships in English ports during the Civil War in the United States. This vessel was at first named Les Jumeaux and the history of its acts in the port of Philadelphia has been described above in the trial of Étienne Guinet. After escaping from the Delaware the vessel proceeded to San Domingo and was there sold by her owners to the French government. Her armament was completed, and she was regularly commissioned as a ship of war under the name of Le Cassius. Some months later, she captured the brig William Lindsay and took it into a French port where it was regularly condemned as a prize of war. In August, 1795, she came to Philadelphia and upon her arrival at that port was libelled by the owners of the captured brig. Following the issue by the District Court of Pennsylvania of a process of attachment against the Cassius, a motion for a prohibition upon the District Court was filed in the Supreme Court of the United States. The question before the court was not whether the vessel had been illegally fitted out in the ports of the United States in violation of the neutrality act, but whether the decision of a foreign prize court could, at the instance of the owners of the captured vessel, be reviewed in the courts of the United States, and whether, in such cases, the public vessels of war of a belligerent are amenable to suit before the tribunals of a neutral power. The Supreme Court decided both points in the negative, and the prohibition was accordingly issued. The vessel was, however, immediately held to answer for an information which had been filed against it in the Circuit Court of the United States on the ground that it had been illegally armed within the jurisdiction of the United States and was therefore subject to forfeiture. The government refused to take the case from the judiciary and the proceedings dragged on until the following April, when an effort was made to obtain evidence from the French minister of the bona fide transfer of the vessel

United States v. Guinet, 2 Dallas, 321.

2See The Nancy, 4 Fed. Cases, No. 1,898; The Betty Carthcart, 17 Fed. Cases, No. 9,742.

United States v. Peters, 3 Dallas, 121.