slaughter of thousands of men, was more consonant to his glory and the true interests of France" than peace and the throne of Louis XV., according to the "indecent" proposals of the Allies, -it is certain that this is mere misrepresentation, and that the French Emperor had very different ideas at this juncture. Immediately after the battle of La Rothiere, he gave Caulaincourt carte blanche to treat, even on the terms proposed at Châtillon; not, as M. Thiers tells us, "in self-deception," or in the hope "that great sacrifices would not be agreed to," but, as he wrote distinctly, "in order to save Paris." After the victories which ended at the conferences of Lusigny, he desired his plenipotentiary to "sign nothing but on authority;" and although he added that "he still adhered to the basis of Frankfort," it is well known, from the testimony of bystanders, that he was dreaming already of a campaign in Germany. But, when the capitulation of Paris had overthrown the Empire, he again gave Caulaincourt "full powers;" and at this time he knew well that his minister was ready to accept any peace compatible with the continuance of the Empire, though M. Thiers would lead us to believe that this mission was merely a diplomatic stratagem. All this policy had obviously one object only,-to shift according to the chances of war;-and it requires no little boldness to characterize it as "the heroic termination" of a "reign of wonders.”

M. Thiers describes with much clearness the state of Paris at the approach of the Allies-the terror and imbecility of the Administration-the apathy and despair of the inhabitantsthe slow fermenting of a Bourbon movement-and the adroitness of Talleyrand in the game of treachery. His narrative of the battle of Paris is also good; though, as usual, he misstates the proportion of the combatants, who were not "twenty-four thousand to a hundred and seventy," but, during the greater part of the day, were nearly equal on the points of attack. As for his account of the wonderful events which followed, it is very full, vivid, and elaborate; but, in some respects, we object to it, for it omits several important particulars; it neglects some very plain considerations; and we doubt the correctness of not a few of its statements. M. Thiers refuses a word of praise to the magnanimity of the Allies, who, in the hour of triumph and vengeance, when Paris was prostrate at their feet, forbore to retaliate upon her the conduct of Napoleon to Berlin and Vienna, and treated her with the most merciful courtesy. He also conceals, as well as he can, the exultation which greeted their entry, how that entry was hailed as a national deliverance, and what a pregnant commentary it forms upon the fickleness of the French nation, upon the disloyalty caused by revolution, and upon the abhorrence felt for Napoleon. When such were

The Capitulation of Paris in 1814.

159

the sentiments of the Parisians, he is obviously in error in his assertion, that a patriotic resistance on the streets was possible; that it was madness to have fought outside the barriers; and that, had barricades been erected-is he thinking of the days of July?—and arms placed in the hands of the citizens, the Allies could not have made good their entry. The testimony of Marmont is conclusive on this point: he declares, not only that the people of Paris were indifferent as to the result of the contest, but that even the National Guard did not assist him when he was struggling on the heights of Belleville. We should like, too, to know on what authority M. Thiers denies that Ney and the Marshals were "violent" in resisting Napoleon at Fontainebleau ; that Macdonald was wrong in the supposition that the Emperor intended to march on Paris, and even to destroy it, if necessary, for his projects; that Marmont was "at heart a traitor," in dealing with Schwartzenburg for the surrender of his post; and that the shameless desertion of Napoleon by Berthier, "was, in some degree, by his master's orders." On these particulars, the statements of M. Thiers are at variance with every account we have read; and it is evident that, as is natural perhaps, he strives to throw a kindly veil over the recklessness and treachery of the fall of the Empire.

The worst part of this volume, however, is the narrative of the Peninsular war from July 1813 to April 1814. There is nothing in Livy more reckless and unscrupulous than M. Thiers' treatment of this memorable struggle. In the first place, he depreciates its importance by noticing it only as an insignificant episode in the great epic of Napoleon's downfall. In the next place, while he cannot deny the excellence of the army of Wellington, he attempts to damn it with faint praise: he has the audacity to assert that the army it vanquished "was unrivalled in respect of military qualifications;" and he assures us that the unfortunate issue of the encounter was owing to our generals, and not to our soldiers." Finally, he misrepresents every battle in the campaign; disparages Soult and Wellington alike, for the purpose of screening his favourite Suchet; misstates or conceals the strategy of these great captains, and indulges freely in his pleasant habit of falsifying the numbers of armies and losses according to his ideas or fancies. A few words will be enough. to expose his errors in these important particulars. In July 1813, after the battle of Vittoria, the army of Spain, with Soult in command, which lay on the French side of the Pyrenees, exceeded one hundred and thirty thousand men; and those of Arragon and Catalonia, which occupied these provinces under Suchet, were somewhat more than seventy thousand. It is true that deductions should be made for the sick, the inefficient, and

the troops in garrisons; but Sir William Napier has shown conclusively that the two armies at this period could bring one hundred and thirty-eight thousand good soldiers together, not to speak of thirty thousand conscripts. Opposed to these veteran and powerful arrays was the Anglo-Portuguese army of Wellington, just seventy-seven thousand of all arms, which, between Pampeluna and San Sebastian, confronted Soult on the Spanish side of the Pyrenees, and the Anglo-Sicilian army of Lord William Bentinck, which, perhaps, was seventy thousand on paper, but was so ill-organized and badly provided, that Wellington had written that "Suchet could have tumbled it back to the Xucar." Unquestionably, therefore, at this period, the advantage in strength was with the French, and that in an immense proportion; and, although this ratio was afterwards changed, and during the campaign of 1813-14 the force of Wellington was usually about seventy thousand, and that of the Anglo-Sicilians nominally about the same, while that of Soult fell at length to forty-five thousand, and that of Suchet to about fifty, yet for several months this advantage remained with the marshals. It should be observed, too, that the French armies of Spain were the best troops in Napoleon's service, excepting only the Old Guard; that, even when reduced to their lowest strength, they outnumbered the Emperor's army in 1814; and that at no time, considering the irregulars in them, and their heterogeneous composition, could the Anglo-Portuguese and the Anglo-Sicilian armies be counted as really much stronger than their opponents. It is evident, therefore, that a campaign, in which a force, at first inferior in strength, and afterwards scarcely superior, if at all, defeated the formidable enemy opposed to it, and prevented him from throwing his weight into the scale when the Emperor chiefly needed his support, was of the very greatest importance; and that the events of the Peninsular war in 1813-14 are scarcely less momentous than those in the east of France.

Any fair account of the Peninsular campaign of 1813-14 will explain the causes of these events, and place them in their proper significance. No blame certainly can be laid upon the strategy of the Duke of Dalmatia, nor upon the valour and stubbornness of his soldiers. His re-organization of the army of Spain, in a few weeks after the desperate shock which it had encountered at Vittoria, and his bold irruption on Wellington through the passes of Roncesvalles, for the purpose of relieving Pampeluna, have justly received the admiration of tacticians. The lines which he drew on the Bidassoa and the Nivelle, and the camp which he entrenched in front of Bayonne, attest his energy and resources in defence; and his sudden attack upon Wellington on the Nive, when that general had extended his line

161

The Campaign in the South of France in 1814. towards the Adour, and in fact had divided it on the former stream, has been characterized as worthy of the genius of Napoleon. His grand scheme of attracting Suchet into France, of combining their armies at the pass of Jaca, and of bursting through it on Wellington's flank, has been justly praised by Sir William Napier; and perhaps it might have changed the fate of the contest. His blows at Orthez were all but successful; his retreat on Toulouse was a masterly move; his struggle outside that town was worthy of a great captain; and the steadiness and tenacity which he showed in resisting and striking his enemy hardly to the last, were fine specimens of a general's energy. Nor, in truth, were his soldiers unworthy of him; for, although they were almost always defeated, and occasionally shrunk from contact with troops whose terrible weight they had learned to dread, they fought with desperate valour at Sauroren, distinguished themselves greatly at Orthez, and contended with steady heroism at Toulouse, not to speak of many minor combats. On the other hand, if not always perfect-and no general can be infallible, the strategy of Wellington in this campaign was a model of vigour, rapidity, and caution; and the conduct of his army entitled it to rank as decidedly the best army then in Europe. If disconcerted for a moment at the attack by Roncesvalles, with what vigour he struck the counter-blow, and drove Soult on a line of retreat which well nigh proved that marshal's ruin! His passage of the Bidassoa, and forcing of its lines, will always be cited as examples of quick, brilliant, and resolute generalship. The same may be said of the passage of the Nivelle; and if for an instant he was in peril on the Nive, with what prompt energy he recovered himself, and overthew his nimble antagonist! So it was at Orthez and at Toulouse,he invariably baffled the finest combinations, and seized the occasion to retaliate on his antagonist with a weight and force which overbore resistance. Of his army, it is enough to say, with Sir William Napier, "that what Alexander's Macedonians were at Arbela, Hannibal's Africans at Cannæ, Cæsar's Romans at Pharsalia, Napoleon's guards at Austerlitz, such were Wellington's British soldiers at this period." And it was the work of this general and this army that the ablest marshal of France, with a force superior at first, if inferior at last, was chased out of Spain to the interior of France, defeated in every attempt he made, and completely prevented from lending his aid to Napoleon struggling against the Coalition. In fairness, however, it must be said, that probably this great result would not have been gained had Suchet acted with proper zeal, and really seconded the Duke of Dalmatia. In truth, as Sir William Napier more

VOL. XXXIII. NO. LXV.

L

than hints, it was the incapacity or jealousy of this marshal which ruined Napoleon in the south of France, and, indirectly, in the north and east, and which paralysed Soult when contending against Wellington. For Suchet, with the armies of Arragon and Catalonia, had about seventy thousand men under his orders; and, allowing for those he left in the fortresses, he could have brought fifty thousand good troops to his colleague. Opposed to him was a heterogeneous force, which could scarcely have followed him over the Pyrenees, and which had been greatly weakened in efficiency by the departure of Lord W. Bentinck for Italy. Had he, therefore, in the autumn of 1813 retreated from Spain into France by Toulouse, and effected a junction with Soult at Jaca, from whence the two marshals might have fallen on Wellington, the fate of the war might have been altered; and, even in March 1814, had he joined Soult on the line of the Garonne, it is the opinion of Sir W. Napier "that the French army would have been numerous enough to bar Lord Wellington's progress altogether." From these considerations, therefore, it is evident that the Peninsular campaign of 1813-14 was of the very greatest importance; and that the French lost it not through want of numbers, nor because the Duke of Dalmatia was incompetent, but because Suchet committed great errors, and the genius of Wellington and the heroism of his troops were able to bear down everything before them.

A few lines will suffice to show how M. Thiers has dealt with this contest. He strives to depreciate its importance; and, though he cannot deny that the operations of Wellington effected a strong diversion against Napoleon, he slurs over those operations completely. He informs us that, in July 1813, the forces of Soult and Suchet together did not exceed one hundred and ten thousand men, against a hundred and seventy thousand; and that, afterwards, their antagonists kept their numbers, while they were reduced to sixty-five thousand. While he extols the excellence of the French troops, and reluctantly calls the British "good," he carefully conceals the wretched composition of the Anglo-Sicilian force in Catalonia against Suchet. He says not a word about Soult's reorganization of the army which attacked Wellington at Sauroren; but he sneers exceedingly at the Marshall's dispositions for the attack, and insists that they were entirely erroneous. On the other hand, he withholds the important fact, that Soult, when driven backward by Wellington through the passes of Dona Maria and Echallar, was nearly destroyed, with half his army; and he describes the battles of the Pyrenees "as combats where we had lost about ten or eleven thousand men, against twelve thousand of the enemy,"-the true proportion being fifteen to seven thousand, as he might have seen in the