the

The Earl of Darnley rose to make his promised motion, and, after a few introductory observations, said: -My Lords; in stating the grounds upon which a motion of inquiry must necessarily rest, the first and most prominent appears the conduct of the war; but with respect to this first and leading topic, I beg leave to remind your lordships, that although I have always been fully convinced of the necessity of present war, I have taken occasion, from time to time, to assert the right and duty which belongs to a member of this House to animadvert upon such parts of the conduct of ministers as appeared reprehensible, at the same time that their general system received my most decided approbation. I never subscribed to that system of blind confidence, which has so long and so fatally prevailed; but, on the contrary, have at all times asserted the right which I now assume, of giving my free and unbiassed opinion in this place. My present object, however, is not to recapitulate whatever may appear reprehensible

[VOL. XXXV.]

in the conduct of the earlier stages of the war, but to call the particular attention of the House to the circumstances which have taken place since a great disposable Imilitary force was raised, by breaking down and almost annihilating the militia, our most efficient and constitutional de-, fence, and disgusting the country gentle-. men, and men of property engaged in that service, by whose means alone it can ever be maintained in conformity with the genuine spirit of its constitution. These inconveniencies were, however, generally supposed to be counterbalanced by the great advantages which were expected to result from so large an augmentation of the regular army. The first expedition undertaken in consequence of this augmentation was, the attempt upon Holland. An inquiry into the failure of that expedition was proposed last year, and opposed by me; not because I thought no apparent blame attached to ministers, or that no grounds of inquiry existed, but because it had in part succeeded, and because I felt a considerable degree of delicacy towards the illustrious commander of that army, who had been placed in a situation singularly critical, great part of the army having been thrown together without discipline or order, and absolutely unfit for service; so that, taking all the circumstances into consideration of the disadvantages under which that army was brought into the field, it is not matter of surprise that it performed so little, but rather that it performed so much. But one of the principal reasons which induced me to resist that inquiry was, an assurance on the part of ministers, that it would tend to disclose secrets necessary to the accomplishment of farther plans of military operations which they had in view; and, I confess, I entertained a sanguine expectation, that, profiting by their former errors, they would have taken advantage of the winter, to discipline and arrange this army, composed, as it was, of such excellent materials, and, by a well-concerted plan of operation, give it an opportunity of essentially promoting the interest and glory of its country. How miserably I have been disappointed, I need scarcely state to your lordships. But I must beg leave to call your particular attention to the manner in which this unfortunate army has been employed during the last year. The first attempt upon Ferrol has already been so much the object of discussion, that I shall not [4 F]

trouble the House with a detail with which it must be acquainted. The next object was an attempt upon Cadiz; begun and relinquished under circumstances still more extraordinary and degrading than that upon Ferrol. Upon the whole of this transaction, as far as it has come to our knowledge, there is something so inexplicable, and so disgraceful, that I cannot adequately express the indignation I feel; but will venture to state, that if no other ground of inquiry existed, this alone imperiously demands it. Of this singular expedition to Cadiz we have no regular nor official account, nor indeed any that I know of, except what appeared in the foreign gazettes. I will read to the House an extract from a French paper, which is of a nature so humiliating to this country, that it cannot too soon or too solemnly be contradicted. The account I allude to is as follows: "There can be no doubt that it was the dreadful epidemic disorder, which has raged in Cadiz and its vicinity, since the beginning of August, which suggested to the humanity of the English the desire of paying us a visit, on the supposition that the vessels in the roads might be easily carried, and that they could penetrate to the old arsenal in order to set it on fire; for it is not probable, that such preparations should have been made merely to bombard Cadiz; and they must have known that they could not obtain possession of it without meeting a number of obstacles." Here follows the correspondence between our commanders and the Spanish governor, and then," The Eng. lish have sent in two flags of truce to demand a sum of money, and the vessels moored in the harbour, but they will get neither money, nor vessels, and there is no reason to think they will disembark, any more than they have done at Leghorn, Belleisle, &c. and if they do disembark they will be received as general Bernadotte this year received them at Quiberon, and Brune last year in Batavia. The English ministry seem to have adopted a new system of tactics in continental war; their armies are sent every where, except where they can be useful to their allies; they at once menace to make a diversion in Batavia, Britany, Provence and Spain, and no where do they excite the smallest apprehensions. The Emperor may flatter himself truly with having a very useful ally. But if it be their object to accustom their land

forces to the sea, they have pretty well succeeded, as for upwards of a year, these poor fellows, crowded upon each other in transports, have been tacking about in the Mediterranean and the (ocean. This may indeed be called the art of throwing money into the sea, and it is certainly a noble way of swallowing up 14,000,000."

Now, my lords, I allow much for the exaggeration of an enemy, but part of the account is undoubtedly true; and if such suspicions can be entertained by our enemies, will your lordships hesitate to enter into an inquiry, by which alone the wounded honour of the country can be vindicated? As it stands, the British name and the British army are disho noured, and the authors of our disgrace are not only unpunished but unknown. In addition to what I have stated, how has this unfortunate army been employed? or in what manner has it been useful to us or to our allies, cooped up in transports as it has been for so many months, its energy and spirit broken, by a long series of inactivity and disappointment, and its health impaired by subsisting constantly on salted provisions. I will not assert that any effort of ours could have saved Italy, but no one will deny that if 20 or 25,000 of the flower of the British army, had joined the Austrians before the battle of Marengo, a very dif ferent turn might have been given to the campaign. Instead of this, all our prepa rations, as usual, were too late; a part of this army it is true reached the coasts of Italy, but not till Genoa was again in possession of the French, and instead of being useful to our allies, narrowly es caped falling into the hands of our enemies. And at this moment, how is our great disposable force employed? A part is returned home, to recover from the fatigues of its long and fruitless voy age, and the remainder is sent to attempt to recover Egypt from the French. That it may at length succeed in this project, I most sincerely hope, but confess I am by no means without serious apprehen sions. But for the manifest misconduct of ministers, this important object of rescuing Egypt from the French, might have been effected without loss. On this subject enquiry has already been refused, but in my mind there is none which so strongly demands it. By what has come to our knowledge, it appears, that a con vention was concluded. Ministers re fused to ratify this convention till it was

At least the matter is worthy of inquiry, and ministers owe to us a justification of their conduct in this respect. But I must repeat that in other respects our conduct to neutral nations appears to me highly culpable and disgraceful. We have uniformly, during the present war, insulted the weak, and conceded to the strong. In the late instance, at the time of our menacing conduct to Denmark we were crouching at the feet of Russia, who was loading us with insults, and evidently only waiting for the opportunity of committing the outrage which we have since witnessed. I call upon ministers to explain their conduct in this respect, and to inform us why they did not show the same disposition to Russia that they did to Denmark. Why the fleet which was sent to menace and overawe Copenhagen, did not proceed to Petersburgh to demand reparation for the insults that were then offered to us in dismissing our ministers and agents, and even in laying a temporary embargo on our ships? At that time it was perfectly evident that the emperor Paul was only waiting for the opportunity which the shutting up of the Baltic by the ice must necessarily give him, and which we know he immediately seized, by taking possession of our ships and their cargoes. If, instead of temporizing and flattering this great potentate, we had treated him while we had the power in the same manner as we treated the inferior state of Denmark, we might possibly have prevented the degrading consequences which have ensued. Ministers, however, showed no disposition to assert the honour of the country, by resisting those hostile and insulting proceedings of Russia, till they were at length obliged to notice them in the king's speech, and then they advise his majesty to hold strong and menacing language to Sweden and Denmark as parties to the northern confederacy formed on the principles of the armed neutrality of 1780, and on that ground in effect to declare war upon those powers, but at the same time to pass over in silence another power Prussia, a party, as it evidently appeared, in the same confederacy. I then contended, and still must contend, that it was unbecoming the dignity and honour of this country, to temporise and flatter Prussia, because she had more the means of injuring us, at the same time that we denounced vengeance upon other states less able to injure us, or to resist our power.

It happens rather singularly, that almost at the same time that the contrary was implied by the silence of his majesty's speech, his minister at the court of Berlin, was officially stating his knowledge of the circumstance of Prussia's being a party to the northern league; and, while his majesty was advised to declare that this very league induced him to consider Sweden and Denmark as his enemies, his minister was telling Prussia that the same circumstance convinced him they were his friends. [To prove this the noble earl read an extract of lord Carysfort's note, presented the 27th of January to count Haugwitz, and also the answer of the count thereto]. Now, my lords, I must contend, that upon the face of the whole of the conduct of government, with respect to neutral nations, there appears strong ground of blame, or at least of enquiry.

I must now advert to the state of things at home. With respect to finance, far be it from me to depreciate our resources, or undervalue our means of exertion, which have already exceeded the expec- >> tations of the most sanguine; but I cannot help referring to the serious consideration of your lordships, the accounts on your table, which prove that in the branches of customs and excise only, the revenue of 1800 falls short of the preceding year near two millions. There is another subject, with respect to our internal situation, the most serious and important of all. I mean the high price of provisions, to which I must again advert, as a strong ground of enquiry under the present circumstances of the country, and the conviction impressed upon my mind, that in this respect ministers have much to answer for. In what I am about to state, I beg to be considered as intending nothing disrespectful to the legislature, which, undoubtedly has been misled, by persons whose authority has been supposed unquestionable; but who, by their conduct on this occasion, have proved that whatever their abilities may be on other subjects, in this they are equally ignorant and presumptuous. Of this charge they stand self-convicted in the measure to which I principally allude, I mean the Brown Bread act; an act which has rather raised than lowered the price of flour, and created much discontent among the lower orders of the community; and all the other mea sures adopted to remedy these evils have either been decidedly mischievous or absolutely nugatory. If then, as I think,

this calamity has been much aggravated by the misconduct of those in power, is it not incumbent on this House to enquire into such misconduct, before it agrees to continue to them its unlimited confidence?

Upon such grounds as I have endeavoured to state, the question principally rested, when I first gave notice of my intention of bringing it forward, at the opening of the session. Since that period other grounds have arisen so extraordinary in their nature, that on them alone I think I might safely venture to rest the motion I shall have the honour to make, and call upon your lordships to clear up the mystery in which the present situation of the country, and the conduct of the late ministry is enveloped. Amidst the general feeling which was more or less impressed on the minds of all men, at the meeting of the united parliament, that the country was in a most critical situation, there was one topic on which all appeared disposed to dwell with satisfaction, and with perfect unanimity to offer congratulations to their king and country, I mean the union with Ireland. Whatever difference of opinion might have prevailed during its progress, and however little worthy of praise some of the means by which it was effectuated may have been, when once concluded, there appeared but one feeling of a sincere wish to make it turn out to the advantage of the empire; and at that time, amidst all our anxieties and calamities, to this part of our situation we thought we might look with complacency and hope. Ministers, however, as if anxious that no ground of satisfaction should remain to the country, have since taken care to deprive us of this advantage, which we imagined we possessed, and by a conduct, the most unaccountable, have, as far as depended on them, deprived us of this only remaining source of consolation. Why ministers should have been in such extreme haste to introduce the question of Catholic emancipation I cannot imagine. I do not even believe the Catholics of Ireland desired or expected that it should have been so prematurely brought forward. They would, I think, have been contented to have suspended their expectations till the Country might have been extricated from some of the difficulties of its critical situation. But after having brought the question forward gratuitously, and in the manner, of all others, most likely to in

flame and irritate, after having themselves made the discussion a matter of necessity ministers deprecate all discussion upon this delicate subject. But will your lord, ships therefore refuse to investigate their most extraordinary conduct in this respect; or if they are conscious of having acted right, as they say they are, will they not themselves endeavour to dissi pate the cloud which hangs over the whole transaction? As it appears to the public, they have deceived every description of persons in Ireland, and here they have deceived their sovereign himself. And after having done so, they have the audacity to publish to the world, that he is in the wrong, and they are in the right; inverting thereby, the salutary maxim of the constitution, and almost directly stating, that the king may do wrong, but that the ministers cannot. My lords, I should be extremely sorry to impute any thing like high treason in this place to any man or any set of men, without positive and direct proof. I am not sufficiently acquainted with the law to define exactly what is, or what is not treason; but I will venture to state, that a paper, circulated in the public papers, and purporting to be the sentiments of his majesty's late ministers, addressed to the Catholics of Ireland borders closely upon it. The circumstances of their retirement from office, are, in every respect, inexplicable. Some inquiry into this is at least necessary to justify them if they can be justified; or to consign them to censure and even to punishment if they should appear to deserve it. The only construction which at present it is possible to put upon their retirement, the only point of view in which the public, uninformed as they are, can see it, is an unfavourable one. For either it must appear to them, that it is a trick or juggle, and that the leading members of the late cabinet found it convenient to retire for a time, in order to resume their situations with more effect hereafter, or that having brought the country, by their misconduct, into a most critical situation, they desert their posts in the hour of danger. That they do leave their situations in a time of unexampled peril and calamity is manifest, and this alone, if other reasons were wanting, would imperiously demand inquiry. What the merits of their successors may be we know not; there is, however, every reason to believe that they will tread in their steps, and act upon the same plans and