Buch great importance, that it will take up the whole man); and for that it is found, by long experience, that their intermeddling with secular jurisdictions, hath occasioned great mischiefs and scandal both to church and state." He had no wish that the clergy should be admitted to sit in the House. He did not feel much attachment to them: at the same time he did not wish them to be treated with disrespect. The great body of the clergy he knew well. They were like all other great bodies of men, an heterogeneous mass, of whom some were even as worthy, and others as worthless, as any men in the creation; many of them were wise, learned, and honourable men, and many others were men neither designed by nature nor education for the sacred function-men who somehow contrived to procure ordination, but who would have been much more fitly employed in making hob-nails. But why the rights of a whole body of men should be struck off upon the ground of mere assertion, unsupported by precedent or authority, he was at a loss to reconcile either to consistency or justice. A learned gentleman, at the same time that he denied holy orders to be a sacrament in the Protestant church, yet maintained the indelibility of the clerical character, by arguing, that if it was not quite a sacrament, it was at least half a sacrament, as it had, like matrimony, the outward and visible signs of one. He had heard of casuists splitting hairs, but this was the first instance he ever heard of a casuist splitting sacraments; and he was sure the learned gentleman must have borrowed the idea from a learned casuist in divinity, of whose intense research and perspicacity he would relate an anecdote. The Divine alluded to wished to investigate the mystery related in the Scripture of the legion of devils entering into a herd of swine; and, in order first to ascertain the number of devils composing a legion, he applied to his glossary, and found that a legion in the Roman army meant a certain number of men, more or less, in different reigns; but he took as his medium the number as it stood in the reign of Tiberius. He next set about inquiring into the number that composed a herd of swine; and for this purpose he directed his investigations into Syria, and other countries; and having taken the swineries of Mesopotamia as the most probable standard, he divided the number of a herd there by the number he had before ascer

"His majesty, taking into his most serious consideration the imminent danger with which the kingdom of Portugal, the ancient and natural ally of his crown, is threatened by the powers now at war with his majesty, as well as the importance of the commercial relations subsisting be tween the two kingdoms, and relying on the known zeal and affection of his faithful Commons, recommends it to them to consider of empowering his majesty to afford, by way of subsidy, to the Queen of Portugal, such assistance as may enable her most faithful majesty to take such measures for the defence of her dominions against her enemies, as the exigencies of affairs may appear to require. G. R."

Debate in the Commons on the Subsidy to the Queen of Portugal.] May 18. The House being in a Committee of Supply,

Lord Hawkesbury said, that whatever opinion the House and the public might entertain respecting subsidies, the question now before them stood upon distinct grounds. It was not his intention to dis cuss whether foreign subsidies were right or wrong. The propriety of having re course to them must always depend upon particular circumstances. If it was stated that subsidies were wrong, with reference to British objects, he should answer, that the only war in which, in the course of the last century, this country had failed, was that in which it had no continental alliances, and, consequently, no subsidies to grant; he meant the American war. Whatever had been the result of the measures on the continent, the conduct of this country towards its allies had always been of dictated by a large and broad system policy; and it would ever be a consola tion to reflect, that it had endeavoured to.

for the defence of her dominions, against her enemies as the exigencies of affairs may appear to require."

save the rest of Europe from the power of France. He could easily conceive that many gentlemen might object to subsidies for offensive operations, such as those to Austria and Russia, who yet would admit that a subsidy to an old ally, not for of fensive but defensive operations, might be right. The power for which he rose to propose a subsidy had, for more more than a century, been an ally of this country; a power which, during the whole of the war, had behaved with fidelity towards us, and had afforded us its assistance and cooperation. The only reason that could be stated against the motion was, that it was equally the interest of Portugal and of this country that the former should make a separate peace with France. He was ready to admit that his majesty had thought it right to absolve Portugal from any engagement not to make a separate peace, if it could be obtained on terms consistent with its honour; but it was impossible for any one to look at the state of the continent, and the conduct of the French government towards Naples, and doubt whether Portugal could make peace on any terms consistent with her honour and independence. Under these circumstances, he would leave it to the House to say, whether, if such assistance as he should propose, might have the effect of enabling Portugal to negociate on better terms, or in case of failure, of preparing for more effectual resistance, there could be any objection to it? Every motive of policy demanded such a subsidy, whether we wished Portugal to make peace or not. It had been stated as an objection to this subsidy, that the sum was so small that it could really be of no use. The sum certainly was smaller than, under other circumstances, he should have proposed; but, from the state of the money market, arising from the great sums of money sent out of the country for corn, it was inconvenient to grant a larger sum. He was, however, far from supposing that such an assistance would not be very material. As it was only intended to enable Portugal to maintain an army of 20,000 men, it might not be inadequate. It was not granted that she might continue war if she could make peace, but only to put her into a situation to negociate with more effect. He concluded by moving, "That a sum of 300,000l. be granted to his majesty, to enable him to afford such assistance to the queen of Portugal as may enable her majesty to take such measures

Mr. Grey said, I, for one, Sir, must dissent from the motion. I do not deny that Portugal is of great importance to this coun try; and that it is our duty to adhere to our ancient ally in the day of distress. But these are points, upon which the present question by no means turns. I admit that it is of importance to preserve Portugal from being over run by the French. I admit that she has the most powerful claims to our protection; but I disapprove of the assistance which is proposed to be sent to her, because I doubt of its efficacy. I lay down no universal position with regard to subsidies. I think that the policy of each must be determined by a consideration of its own circumstances. But from the conduct of the predecessors of the noble lord, and his bold defence of all their measures, they seem to think that subsidies are politic in all possible cases, and that nothing is so desirable as an opportunity to grant one. Examine the history of the present war; calculate the extravagant amount of the sums they have thus squandered; observe the injudicious manner in which they have been applied; see the fatal consequences which they have produced, and say, whether the inference is not fairly drawn, and the charge such as cannot be repelled? For what purpose is this subsidy to be granted?— not to stir up Portugal to make war, we are told, but to enable her to negociate with advantage. There are two ways in which this may be done; money may enable a state to buy off an invading enemy, or raise troops to oppose him in the field. If the difference between France and Portugal is now to be settled as it was formerly proposed to settle it, our subsidy might not be without effect, though it would certainly raise the demands of the invader. But recollect, that if our assistance is effectual in this way, we actually vote 300,000l. into the coffers of Buonaparté. Ministers, we are told, are now obliged by the most sacred obligations, to succour our ancient ally. Since when has this obligation begun? Is the threat new? Is this the first time that an invasion has been threatened? Last summer, general Berthier went to Madrid, and no one doubted the object of his mission. In the beginning of winter the brother of the chief consul was dispatched to that

capital, and he was soon after followed by a general of no mean fame. A numerous army was assembled on the frontiers of Spain, and every thing indicated a fixed resolution to attempt an invasion. Yet ministers remained inactive, and took not the smallest notice of the danger which thus threatened our ally. Now, when it is doubtful whether our money will arrive before the enemy is in possession of Lisbon, they manifest the greatest zeal, and affirm that we should incur eternal disgrace were we not to send assistance without delay. When twenty or thirty thousand French are joined to the troops of Spain, will any one say that Portugal has the least chance of success? What effect, then, can our subsidy produce? Had the Portuguese spirit to enlist and fight for their country, there is now no time to bring them into a state of discipline, or even to raise them. When Portugal was not threatened with invasion; when Spain showed dispositions rather friendly; when every soldier that could be raised in France was sent to Italy and the banks of the Rhine, then a formidable British force was kept up in Portugal under sir Charles Stewart. When the continental war was over; when our enemies had the ability, and testified the strongest inclination, to attack our ally, what did we do for her? Portugal was left, without a single British soldier, an easy prey to the conqueror. Our ancient and natural ally does not want money, but a well-disciplined army. With that she might have had some chance of safety; without it she has none. This leads me to consider how the army destined for the protection of Portugal is now employed. I am little disposed to detract from the glory of our victory in Egypt. I believe no troops ever displayed more coolness, steadiness, and gallantry, than the army under sir Ralph Abercrombie, in resisting the attack of the French on the 21st of March. But, Sir, why are they so employed? why are they not now defending our ancient ally? Because the convention of El-Arisli was perfidiously broken. All the bloodshed that has happened is ascribable to the authors of this disgraceful measure. We might have regained Egypt to our ally without one shilling, or one drop of hlood, and Portugal might now have been secure from invasion. This, like all the policy of the late ministers, was impolitic, and has turned out disastrous. A new obstacle is

thrown in the way of peace. While we are struggling for Egypt, and shedding our best blood in the struggle, Portugal is certainly ravished from us—an old, and faithful and valuable ally is over-run and ruined on our account. We may re-conquer Egypt, an event which, I am sorry to say, appears still most doubtful; but in the mean time we are suffering a still severer loss. In the conquest of Portugal by France, as severe a blow is aimed at our interests, and as complete a bar is thrown in the way of negotiation. Al though our boasted conquest were ef fected, our relative situation is not improved. Sir, I feel the importance of the object; but, feeling that the means proposed are inadequate to gain it, I must negative the motion.

Mr. Pitt said:-The subsidy which is now proposed, the hon. gentleman who spoke last complains, was opened upon general grounds; and that the reasons assigned for it are insufficient, he is pleased to allege. I think, if ever I heard a plain, distinct statement, on clear ground, laid intelligibly before the House, so as to leave no doubt what we are called upon to do, either in point of faith, policy, or honour, it was the statement of my noble friend; but I must say, that the hon. gentleman, in the course of his speech, went into an argument that proceeded to the extreme, although in the beginning of his speech he maintained that it is a subject on which the extreme will not apply, that each case of a subsidy should be decided on its own circumstances; and yet he thought fit to say, that all the grants of parliament were without any motive, except the pleasure of granting subsidies; that this pleasure was to us a sufficient reason to grant a subsidy, and that we never looked at the consequences. Now, Sir, if any gentleman will look back to the history of this war, he will find, that whatever has been the fate of the continent, we have given to the different powers the best chance for their safety. The hon. gentleman says, he has no objection to the present subsidy; but, under the semblance of discussing this question, he renews his attacks on his majesty's late ministers. He takes the opportunity of collaterally making charges against us, though notice has been repeatedly given of a specific motion on that subject, which motion has never yet been brought forward. With respect to the situation of Portugal, he connects it with the expedi

us to have permitted so many of the veteran troops of France to have been landed in Italy, at a moment when the fate of the campaign, of Europe, of every minor state, and especially of Portugal, was at stake? If any rational man at that moment had been asked, whether the security of Portugal was most likely to be maintained by keeping these veteran forces in Egypt, or by suffering them to land in Italy, it is impossible to entertain a doubt with respect to his answer. The battle of Marengo was decided against the cause of Europe and the world; but let it be recollected, that that battle was nearly gained, and that cause which was so nearly balanced without the French army from Egypt, would have been rendered desperate had they arrived. Therefore, I say, that the measure which he wishes to connect with the state of Portugal for the purpose of criminating us, is, as far as it is connected with it, a proof of the good policy by which our conduct was governed. We never did cease, in any one period of this arduous contest, to give to our allies that assistance and encouragement which afforded them the best chance of saving themselves, and of affording security to Europe. We postponed the consideration of Egypt, though an object of great importance to us, as long as there was any chance of success in the general cause; but when the Austrians were defeated, though we lamented their reverses, we did not neglect our own interests, and the expedition to Egypt took place. - But the hon. gentleman thinks this proposal comes too late, and is too small for the purpose of affording effectual relief to Portugal. If that is really his opinion, he might censure ministers for not bringing it forward sooner; but he ought, if he was consistent with himself, to accelerate that which he thinks too tardy, and to increase that which he thinks too small, instead of opposing it altogether. The hon. gentleman thinks this sum is advanced to Portugal to induce her, against her judgment, to continue the contest This language has been used upon other occasions; but I think the explanation given by my noble friend, completely preciudes the observation in the present instance. We do not desire Portugal, to brave danger; but we say, if for their own sakes they think it more wise, more manly, more dignified, and more safe to meet the danger, rather than to agree to

tion to Egypt, and says, that if the latter had not been attempted, Portugal would have been safe; but in the latter part of his speech, he says, that even if the Egyptian expedition had not been undertaken, he would not recommend that the forces engaged in it should be employed in the defence of Portugal. Leaving, then, the importance of Egypt out of his consideration, he makes it a charge against the king's late ministers, that we are prevented from assisting Portugal, because so large a force has been sent to Egypt; and he says, that if that force had not been sent to Egypt, he would not now recommend their being employed in the defence of Portugal. This is the enlightened, the vigorous, and the statesman-like policy which he would recommend, in opposition to that employed by the late administration, who from the delays of which they were guilty, he says, uniformly failed; but who, I say, notwithstanding those delays, and their uniform failures, have somehow or other contrived, amidst the desolation of Europe, to deprive our enemies of almost all their colonial possessions to reduce, almost to annihilation, their maritime strength to deprive them of, and to appropriate to ourselves, the whole of their commerce, and to maintain in security our territories in every part of the globe. These, Sir, are the successes with which the tardy efforts of the last administration have been crowned. It is to these successes that the hon. gentleman owes the opportunity he now makes use of, to talk in this place with retrospective criticism of the conduct of the war. But I wish to ask the hon. gentleman, how we could avoid sending a force to Egypt, unless we determined to give it up to France? He does not deny that it is an object of the greatest importance to this country; but he says the expedition would have been unnecessary if we had agreed to the convention of El Arish. Sir, this subject has been discussed more than once[Here Mr. Jones called out -Hear, hear!]-Sir, I beg leave to assure that hon. gentleman, that I will never interrupt any of his speeches with-Hear, hear! nor, if I can avoid it, will I undergo the mortification of hearing any more of his declamations upon this subject. Sir, the question which his majesty's late ministers had to consider at the period to which the hon. gentleman alJudes, was, whether it would be wise in

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