projet which he had received from your lordship, and his observations on the objections that had been made by me to the projet which he had delivered.

I have now endeavoured to give your lordship a faithful account of the substance of my conference with M. Otto. The very ample instructions with which I was provided, and which (as I have mentioned in the beginning of this letter) I read to M. Otto, precluded me from adding many observations; and as I have promised to communicate to that gentleman extracts of such part of my instructions as relate to the 4th and 5th articles, the two essential subjects of difference between us, he will have the means of re-tracing in his recollection the precise grounds of the objections to his proposal which have occurred to his majesty's government.

Before I conclude this letter, I cannot avoid mentioning, that in the course of our conversation, M. Otto threw out the most pointed assertions of the determination of France, in the event of the naval armistice not being concluded, to pursue the course of her victories in Germany and in Italy, and of the facilities that the conquest of Naples and Sicily (events which he regarded as speedy and inevitable) would afford to the French government of obtaining by force those objects relative to Egypt and Malta, which it had expected to acquire through the naval armistice. Of these assertions, though frequently repeated, I judged it proper to take no notice, but to re-call his attention to the subject immediately under discussion. I have, &c. GEO. HAMMOND.

1. The fourth article in granting 10,000 rations per diem to the garrison of Malta, has not only in view the effective troops of the republic, but all the persons attached to the garrison, and even the inhabitants of the place. The citizen Otto does not think that it is possible to diminish that quantity; nevertheless, in order to remove, as much as possi ble, the objection which has been stated to him, and to accommodate himself as much as possible to the manner in which the subject is viewed by the English government, he consents to limit that estimate to the first month, a period necessary to afford to the respective commissaries, the means of agreeing upon the amount which may be necessary for the support of the garrison of the place.

The second point contained in the fourth article, respecting the liberty of dispatching six frigates to Egypt, appears to have given still more uneasiness than the preceding one, and has given rise to a more animated discussion. Upon this subject citizen Otto cannot avoid again remarking, that if the French government proposed to assimilate the places in Egypt to those of Ulm and Ingolstadt, it could only do so, and has in truth only done so, from the analogy that there is between these places with respect to the blockade; for, in every other respect, the comparison is inexact; in fact, nobody is ignorant that the places of Egypt are not, like Ulm and Ingolstadt, in want of being victualled, since they cannot be prevented from drawing from the surrounding countries all the subsistence they require; that, besides, those places are not blockaded in such a manner as to make it No. 40.-TRANSLATION of a Letter from M. probable that they should fall into the hands Otto to Mr. Hammond; dated Hereford-fore it could only be meant that there should of the enemies. By that comparison therestreet, 4 Vendemiaire, 9th Year, Sep-be granted to the places blockaded by the tember 26, 1800.

Sir;-I lose no time in sending you the substance of the observations which I had the honour of making to you upon the principal contested points; I most sincerely wish that your ministry may think them satisfactory. I beg of you, at the same time, to have the goodness to address to me, as was agreed upon between us, a copy of the reasonings to which these observations are in answer. I have,

&c.

Отто.

No. 41. TRANSLATION of a NOTE from M.

Otto-in M. Otto's Letter of September 26. Citizen Otto having observed, in the remarks made to him by Mr. Hammond, three points only which appear to him to be really of a nature to retard the conclusion of the proposed armistice, reserved them for future consideration, and an answer in writing.

After having maturely reflected upon the object of the maritime truce, upon the actual position of France and of her enemies, upon the influence which this negotiation must have with regard to a general pacification, he feels it his duty to make the following observations upon the disputed points:

forces of the enemies, advantages analogous to those which have been granted to the places in Germany, which advantages can only be ascertained by the special stipulations of the convention which it is proposed to conclude. The free passage of six frigates cannot add any considerable strength to the army of Egypt; it will only serve to prove to that army that the French government takes an interest in its fate, until it shall be definitively settled by a treaty of peace. In review the capitulation signed by sir Sidney Smith, ing the circumstances which have followed citizen Otto cannot perceive the impropriety of such an arrangement, relatively to the Porte, and he sees with regret that the obser vations made to him by Mr. Hammond, de not offer any adequate motive for relinquishing that demand; the acquiescence in which can alone establish any kind of analogy betwen the places of Egypt and those of Ulm and Ingolstadt.

2. The fifth article of the new projet differs in several respects from that of the counter projet of the British ministry; but it differs much more still from the first projet

Otto, that the observations contained in his note this day, received by Mr. Hammond, have been laid before his majesty's government.

The king's servants regret that M. Otto's instructions are not sufficiently extensive to enable him to furnish the means of accommodation on those points which prevent the conclusion of a naval armistice.

which citizen Otto had the honour of presenting, inasmuch as it admits that no ship of the line now at anchor in the ports of Brest and Toulon, shall go out thereof during the continuance of the armistice. The French government is of opinion that this concession, and more especially in the present season, goes as far as it can go, and that by admitting that no armed vessel should go out of the said ports, they would leave those ports really in the same state in which they are at present; indeed in a state even less favourable since the time is perhaps not far off when the British forces will not prevent those vessels from going out. All that citizen Otto can concede, with regard to this article is, that no naval stores shall be imported by sea into the ports of Toulon and Brest; but he must insist upon the free egress of frigates and sloops. If this concession gives to France the advantage of an effectual communication with her colonies, it is an equivalent to that

derived from this armistice to the commerce of England; which, under the protection of this convention, can extend itself to all parts of the world, without being molested by French privateers.

The only object which his majesty has had in view in this discussion, has been repeatedly stated, as well as those considerations which appear to him necessarily to limit the extent of the concessions which it is possible for him to make in this respect.

It is not conceived that any advantage can arise from a new statement of the same topics, especially as it is not doubted that M. Otto, in his report of the different arguments stated by Mr. Hammond in their conference, will bring them in the fullest manner under the consideration of his government. In offering these concessions, his majesty has given a strong proof of his willingness to make a considerable sacrifice to the particular interests of this country, in order to facilitate those negotiations for general peace in which he has That, besides, if a reference were made to expressed his readiness to concur. He still the comparison between the continental ar- perseveres in the same dispositions, and will mistice and the maritime truce, that compa-be willing to join in any proper steps to be rison would be found to be entirely to the taken for that purpose. disadvantage of France. Upon the continent, :the French and Austrian armies reciprocally enjoy the same liberty of taking, within the line of demarcation, those positions which appear most advantageous to them: by the maritime armistice, on the contrary, England preserves alone the right of disposing of her Esquadrons, whilst the French ships of the line remain in their ports, and cannot enter into any hostile combination against Great Britain.

8

N

3. The sixth article of the new projet, respecting the English troops which may be allowed to land in Italy, has been considered as a new pretension on the part of France, since she had made no mention of it in her first projet; but this pretension (if it can be called so) is only the natural consequence of a concession alike new made by France, in offering to include in the armistice the allies of Great Britain. It would indeed be impossible to allow the king of Naples to enjoy advantages from this truce, and to leave him also the power of re-inforcing and of preparing fresh means of attack against the republic.

Citizen Otto confines himself to these observations, which he deems of most importance. Other objections which have been made, and which in great measure relate to the form of drawing up the proposed convention, might be easily obviated.

No. 42.-NOTE from Mr. Hammond to M. Otto; dated Downing-street, September 26, 1800.

No. 43-TRANSLATION of a Letter from M. Otto to Mr. Hammond? dated Hereford-street, 6 Vendemiaire, 9th year, Sep. tember 28, 1800.

Sir; I have received the note, which you did me the honour to address to me on the 26th, and I lost no time in forwarding the contents to my government; and also the observations contained in the piece which I have now the honour to return inclosed.His majesty's ministry has done justice to my intentions, in being persuaded that I would send to France a detailed and exact account of the conversation which I had the honour of having with you. I have done every thing in my power to make the First Consul acquainted with the whole extent of the observations which you were directed to communicate to me.-Whatever may be the result of this attempt of the two governments to re-establish the general tranquillity of Europe, I ought to congratulate myself for having been, to the ministry of his majesty the organ of the pacific dispositions of France; and for having been charged to transmit to my government the assurance of the equally conciliatory dispositions of his majesty. I have, &c. Отто.

No. 44.- TRANSLATION of a Letter from
M. Otto to Mr. Hammond; dated Here-
ford-street, 14th Vendemiaire, 9th year,
October 6, 1800.

Sir;

Downing street, Sept. 26, 1800.
Mr. George not being yet returned, I
Mr. Hammond is directed to acquaint M. have the honour to address myself directly to

I

(L. S.) (Signed) KLEBER, APPENDIX, D.-TRANSLATION of a Letter from M. Baudot to the first interpreter of the Sublime Porte; dated camp of Jaffa, April 15, 1800.

Baudot, first aid de camp to general Kleber, At the camp of Jaffa, 15th April, 1800. commander in chief of the French army in Egypt. To the first interpreter of the Sublime Porte.

Prince; In all my conversations with you, have continually repeated to you, that the firm and clearly expressed intention of general Kleber has always been, scrupulously to execute the treaty of El Arish. I add, with con

fidence, from my knowledge of the loyal and open character of that general, and the real wish which he has to give to the supreme vizir the most positive proofs of his good faith, that, whatever may be the fortune of war, the French army shall evacuate Egypt immediately after the arrival of the necessary passports from the English government, and of the number of vessels stipulated for the transport of the troops. I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) BAUDOT.

Debate on Mr. Jones's Motion relative to the Evacuation of Egypt.] Nov. 18. Mr. Jones said, that when the late correspondence between his majesty's ministers and the government of France had been laid upon the table, he expected that, at the desire of the ministers themselves, they would have been taken into consideration. Since that expectation had been disappointed, he hoped he should stand excused if he begged the attention of the House to the subject of the evacuation of Egypt, now become, by the incapacity of ministers, the bone of contention between England and France, and the stumbling-block of peace. The French were now firmly in possession of Egypt; and of what detriment to the country that possession was, the papers on the table of the House fully evinced. The object of his motion was, the production of a letter, on the subject of which almost the whole of the volu. minous correspondence he held in his hand turned. Mr. Jones here referred to the letters marked No. 7, No. 15, No. 18, No. 24, No. 25, No. 28, No. 32, and to No. 38, Mr. Hammond's instructions to confer with M. Otto on the 2nd projet. On these instructions, Mr. Jones asked if sir Sidney Smith was not joined with his brother, Mr. Spencer Smith, as joint plenipotentiary of Great Britain at the court of Constantinople? Had he not power to treat at Acre? Did not ministers know that, in conjunction with Ghezzar Pacha, sir Sidney offered to convey the French out of Egypt, individually or in the aggregate? Did ministers, previous to January 24, 1800, after the convention with Kleber, countermand the orders under which it is presumed he acted from the beginning of May in the preceding year, as if not warranted in his conduct? Did they, to prevent a repetition of it, express their anger within the eight following months, or even some time after he had acceded to the convention? Did not lord Elgin, before and since the present year, instruct sir Sidney to get

the French out of Egypt by every possi ble mode and means? Was it not the intention of the court of London not to ratify the original treaty sent immediately to general Kleber in the first instance? Ought it not to have been sent to the French general through sir S. Smith? Ought not the Ottoman Porte, our ally, to have had the earliest notice? But furthermore, did not La Constance galley deliver the letter of lord Keith, first to Kleber at Alexandria, and then proceed with the same instructions to sir Sidney Smith, who was on duty at Cyprus? What was the consequence? Did not 8 or 9,000 of our good allies perish in the field? Was not the very existence of the Ottoman government threatened at its centre? Might not the proud tartan have been supplanted by the tricoloured cockade of France in Constantinople?Mr. Jones then referred to No. 39 of the correspondence, viz. Mr. Hammond's let ter to lord Grenville after the conference with M. Otto, particularly on the 4th and 5th articles being repeated. Mr. Jones observed, that these articles comprehended Egypt as the stumbling-block to peace. He then referred to No. 41-Otto's note to Mr. Hammond, proving sir Sidney Smith's signature to the treaty of El Arisch, before denied to have existed. He trusted ministers would not deny their own official document. He then lastly referred to the Appendix C, general Kleber's letter, alluding to the letter of lord Keith, which letter he now requested to be laid on the table of this House. The letter he referred to was the one which was the stumbling block to peace, and which had laid the foundation of the breach of the negotiation. This letter (exclaimed Mr. Jones), was issued in an evil hour, and ought to have had the superscription from the sublime Milton"Woe to the inhabitants on earth!" This letter is a new war-whoop to the bleeding world; it has gone forth to recommence the work of blood-shed. But for this let ter, there might have been peace on earth. This letter has put Buonaparté in firm possession of Egypt; nay, so firm,: that, if my information be right, the French Copts and Mamelukes under Abdallah Menou are marching into Syria 60,000 strong. This is not all: our territorial possessions in India are endangered: Egypt is the darling child of Buonaparte, the corner stone of his power. By the glaring incapacity of ministers, a new