ing that, is it not wonderful that they should have issued this fatal letter, by which they favoured the desperate views of the enemy, and endangered, by their horrible incapacity, the peace and happiness of the whole world? I move, Sir, "That the Letter alluded to in general Kleber's letter to the Kaimakan of the Sublime Porte be laid on the table of this House." field is open to the gigantic pride and ambition of that great and wonderful man, Buonaparte. Who can tell the calamities this blunder may beget to this realm? Proud as Buonaparte now sits on the throne of France, proud as he rules there, this has increased the projects and fired the leviathan-like ambition of that phenomenon Buonaparté. He sees new fields of conquest and of glory; he burns with the anticipation of the newly-acquired territorial possessions of India; he pants to sit (in the language of the sublime Milton)" High on the throne of Ormus or of Ind," and to rule ere long the kingdoms of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa. Can he forget the wonderful siege of Acre, which foiled his grand career? that event where sir Sidney Smith repelled him who was deemed unconquerable! Of sir Sid. ney Smith I never can speak but with enthusiasm. Will he not be eager to wipe way this disgrace, and to prove that in no quarter of the world are there bounds set to his conquests? Sir, by a singular coincidence, there appears as it were an ominous circumstance attending the whole of this affair of Egypt as connected with India, and more particularly as to Buonaparté, who calls himself the "Child of Fortune:" and when I consider how whole countries and states, much more individuals, have been affected and carried on by similar instances of superstition, I will mention it. We all remember the famous battle of the bridge of Lodi, where the character of Buonaparté first blazed forth to the astonished world. Now, Sir, it does so happen, that there is a tribe of Lodi in those regions, a commercial people who carry on a trade between Persia and Hindostan. Might not the vast and capacious mind of the First Consul be worked upon by this singular coincidence of circumstances? But, I repeat, while there is a single Frenchman in Egypt, India is in danger; and the letter I am about to call for is the cause of our alarm at this moment: and I call on the people of England well to consider this dreadful event, inasmuch as I reckon India to be the corner-stone of Great Britain, and that her interests and welfare are interwoven as it were; and I believe from my soul her salvation and existence are involved in the evacuation of Egypt. Furthermore, Sir, we all know, that the invasion of Egypt has evermore been a favourite object with the French government for above 100 years; and ministers know E Mr. Pitt said, it would be hardly possible for ministers to comply with the object of the motion. It would be a very difficult thing for government to undertake for the production of a letter referred to in one from general Kleber to the Kaimakan, supposing even the representation given of it to be true. But the motion appeared to be altogether unnecessary. He was not aware of any good end that could be answered, nor of any inculpation which could apply to ministers, in consequence of a French general having referred to a letter which evidently, on the face of the transaction, must have been written before government knew that the convention alluded to had been signed by any British officer. The letter, therefore, could state no new fact. As soon as it was known in England, that the French general had the faith of a British officer pledged to him, and was disposed to act upon it, instructions were sent out to have the convention executed, though the officer in question had, in fact, no authority to sign it. The contents of lord Keith's letter was far from being a secret. It was printed, quoted, and universally known in July last, and no novel circumstances were disclosed which could induce the House to contradict the decision which it then came to. The next thing for the House to consider was, the manner in which the hon. gentleman endeavoured to connect this subject with the late correspondence between France and this country, relative to an armistice. By the observations which accompanied the motion, it was shown, that, in making the proposal, the French government meant to derive great advantage from the relief it might be enabled to send both to Malta and Egypt; a relief which it could neither expect nor hope for, while our fleets and armies pursued their operations against them; and thus it was evident, that France set considerable value upon reinforcing those places, which we had an equal interest in preventing them from doing. Mr. Grey defended the motion. He said, it was evident, from the correspondence on the table, that those councils which opposed the evacuation of Egypt by the invading army, at present opposed a very serious obstacle to the conclusion of a peace. By the papers it appeared, that, of the two points most insisted on by France, and which operated as impedi When the House considered the conduct | distressing the French army in Egypt, of ministers, in refusing to accede to a and preventing it from receiving any reconvention which they did not know to inforcement, we were now in a more ad. have had the sanction of a British officer, vantageous state than at any period since it should discuss that conduct with a the expedition landed there. For these reference to what was the state of reasons, he must give his negative to the Kleber's army at the time; with a re- motion. ference to the condition of the war in Italy at the beginning of the campaign; and most of all with a reference to the effect which such a reinforcement as that of the army of Egypt might be likely, under all the circumstances, to have upon the war on the continent. In respect to the present state of the French army in Egypt, it appeared that the French government itself considered a reinforcements to peace, one was the demand of ment of 1,200 men and 10,000 muskets as necessary to its safety; and that being the case, it might fairly be presumed, that its condition at present was not very safe, even in the eyes of those who sent it. The earnestness with which this was pressed by M. Otto, proved the importance that was attached to it. In order to enable the House to appreciate the value of the representations which the French made of their own situation, and to judge of the propriety of allowing the invaders to evacuate Egypt upon easy terms, he would just observe, that they spoke with the same confidence of the garrison of Malta; and their certain and infallible means, by the possession of that island, of making themselves immediate masters of Naples and Sicily. The event however showed, that his majesty's ministers were right in not trusting too implicitly to the representations of M. Otto; for as we had since taken Malta from the enemy, we were in that proportionate degree masters of preventing them from sending any reinforcements to Egypt, the maritime places of which were besides blockaded by our fleets. So far, then, it was plain, that, in respect to Egypt, France was not on higher ground now that we are in possession of Malta, than she was at the time that general Kleber first entered into the capitulation; and he could not conceive what it was that gentlemen thought they could complain of. Were he not apprehensive of subjecting himself to the imputation of punning, he would say, that the only new ground brought forward on the present occasion was the demand of an old letter, which was already sufficiently known to all Europe; and he believed no one would at tempt to deny, that, as to the power of sending succours to Egypt; and it remained for the House to inquire, why that difficulty was not removed by accepting the terms of the convention agreed upon by general Kleber and the grand vizir, and guaranteed by a British officer? The minister thought proper to rest his defence on a reference to the state of the belligerent armies in Italy, the existing circumstances of the war, and the situation of Kleber's army at the time. But the present motion did not preclude the consideration of any of these topics, and only asked for such information as would enable the House to judge of admiral Keith's instructions. It was not to be supposed, that the present motion would stand alone; if carried, it would be followed by others of a more comprehensive nature. With respect to sir Sidney Smith's powers, it was not necessary for him to be specially instructed, either to sanction or to reject a convention. Sir Sidney was the British officer commanding on the spot; and nothing was more undeniable, than that every military commandant had power to accept any stipulations, which his prudence might direct him to agree to with the enemy, without having any special authority for the purpose. On such occasions, governments were bound, in good faith, to admit what their officers stipulated; and, if it were otherwise, the consequences would be subversive of those principles on which war was now conducted between civilized nations. Government might have instructed sir Sidney Smith not to consent to a treaty for the evacuation of the country, but after such treaty was once signed, it was their duty to have exe cuted it faithfully. The subject was of great importance, inasmuch as the refusat of the British government now formed an obstacle to a general negotiation. These were the reasons that would induce him to vote in favour of the motion, which he considered as a preliminary step to further inquiry. Mr. Windham said, that the objection to the motion was, first, that the paper was of no consequence in itself; and, in the next place, that it was already accessible to every one. The conduct of ministers respecting Egypt, certainly was a proper subject for parliamentary investigation. The question respecting the policy of allowing the French to withdraw their army from that part of the world, under all the circumstances existing at the time when the convention alluded to was signed, he allowed to be both important and difficult. But the argument founded upon that transaction, in relation to the printed papers, appeared to him most whimsical. It had been described as a stumbling-block to peace. Now, the fact was, that in war, and in negotiation, every thing which one nation possessed, and which another nation wanted, was in the same sense a stumbling-block to peace; and the argument, if carried far enough, would prove, that, in order to avoid throwing any difficulty in the way of pacification, we ought at once to abandon every conquest we had made. This, to be sure, was a short way of getting rid of difficulties; but it was not one which a nation, consulting its own interests, would be ready to adopt. The hon. mover had said justly, that the French attached a great importance to Egypt. Perhaps, indeed, they considered it of so much importance that, had it not been for the hope of keeping possession of it, they never would have offered to negotiate. But the same arguments which the hon. gentleman employed would, if applied to Malta (which he allowed to be of immense importance to any views, which the French could entertain in Egypt,) justify government in now giving it up to them, and would have justified them in withdrawing our ships from the blockade before it was taken; because it would have removed one of the stumbling blocks to peace. With what the hon. gentleman had said in praise of the gallant defender of Acre, he was happy perfectly to agree. He considered the conduct of sir Sidney Smith, on that occasion, as exhibiting an illustrious instance of the most consummate skill, wisdom, and valour, and the defence of the fort [VOL. XXXV.] as one of the most brilliant military achievements recorded in history. The importance of the service it was impossible to over-rate, as it proved the salvation of the Ottoman empire, the subversion of which was the main object of Bonaparte's expedition into Syria. Mr. Robson said, he should not think he did his duty unless he brought the author of the letter of instructions to lord Keith to a sense of his error. No possible situation of affairs in the Mediterranean could justify that letter. It was impossible to proceed in the proposed inquiry, without being put in possession of it. Mr. Nicholls was of opinion, that Egypt was of great value to the French, both with a view to India, and with a view to establishing a colony in that country. As a colony, it might be rendered much more valuable to them than ever St. Domingo was. He foresaw that, after we had given up Belgium and the reestablishment of the French monarchy as a hopeless cause, we should still have to contend about Egypt. Mr. Sheridan said, that the question laid within a small compass. The chancellor of the exchequer had said, that sir Sidney Smith had no power or authority whatever to treat with the French commandcr. Sir Sidney, then, had done what he had no right to do. But, would it be contended, that it was a matter of small importance, that the characters of such men as sir Sidney should be impeached upon a mere ipse dixit of the right hon. gentleman? It rested with ministers, if they disapproved of what he had done, to prove that he had no right to do it. The public had, as it were, a property in the character of all officers entrusted with great military powers; and therefore, the House ought not to entertain, without full proof, any aspersion that may be thrown upon their characters. If ministers disapproved of the treaty signed by sir Sidney, it was not enough to disavow it now; they should prove, either that he had exceeded his powers, or that the document alluded to was not authentic. He had no doubt the instrument said to be signed by sir Sidney was authentic, and that he had a right to do what he did. Lord Hawkesbury denied, that Mr. Pitt had thrown blame on sir Sidney Smith. All that his right hon. friend had said was, that sir Sidney had no power from [2 Q] Γ this country to conclude the treaty with Kleber. He did not say that there might not be many circumstances in which an officer might be allowed to use his discretion; but, in truth, when the French were supposed to be about to evacuate Egypt, there was no knowledge, in the possession of his majesty's ministers, that any British officer was there, and sir Sidney never did sign any such treaty by any authority whatever. But the mo ment it was known to government, orders were sent out to support what he had done. Mr. Tierney said, he wanted to know what the letter alluded to was? The right hon. gentleman said, that any body might have seen it in the public newspapers: that was very true; but the publication of any thing in a newspaper, however true, was no ground for a formal proceeding. Nothing, then, could be done against ministers, until the paper was authentically produced. It was a poor way of arguing, to say that sir Sidney Smith had no authority from government; for it was a part of the national compact to regard officers under government abroad upon service in time of war, as having a certain portion of power, to be exercised according to their discretion, for the purpose of alleviating, or perhaps, putting an end to, the horrors of war: this power had been exercised by sir Sidney Smith, and the engagement under it ought to be kept inviolate. Mr. Yorke was astonished that any one should say, that British faith was injured by what had taken place on our behalf in Egypt; more especially after we had been in possession of the intercepted correspondence. Sir Sidney Smith was acting under the command of lord Keith, from whom he had no authority whatever to enter into any treaty with general Kleber, any more than from government. Sir W. Young said, he should oppose the motion, because it would be improper to produce papers containing the instructions of government to their commanders. With respect to the powers which officers had of treating with an enemy, the order sent by government to sir Sidney Smith recognized them. Government did not know that the treaty was signed when this order was sent. With respect to the letter, he did not conceive it necessary to be produced. Mr. Sheridan said, that the charge against ministers was this, that sir Sidney Smith having the power, and having exerted it, ministers sent orders to lord Keith, by which the treaty with sir Sidney was broken. Mr. Pitt said, that before the order alluded to went out, there was no supposition that sir Sidney was then in Egypt, nor that he would be a party to the treaty between the Ottoman Porte and the French general. When he did take a part in that transaction, it was not a direct part. He did not exercise any direct power; if he had done so, he would have done it without authority: he had no such power from his situation; for he was not commander in chief. Large powers must be given to a commander in chief, for obvious reasons; and these powers must be subject to the discretion of the person with whom they were entrusted; but that neither was, nor ought to be, the case with every officer of inferior station: such person, however great his talents, should not go beyond a specified point; for otherwise he might treat for whole provinces, and counteract his superior in command. Sir Sidney was, at first, no party to this treaty: that he sincerely desired it to take place, that it was concluded on board his ship, and that he was a witness to the transaction, was very true; but he never affected to do it on the part of this country. The order was, to signify to our officer that we should not regard the treaty between the Turks and the French, wherever it tended to affect our state and condition in the Mediterranean; and what was there in this that could be considered as wrong? What legitimate power had the Ottoman Porte and a French general to dispose of our interest in the Mediterranean? Now, upon the subject of the breach of faith, he would say a word. The order was, not that we should break the treaty to which we were no party, but to give notice that, as we were no party to it, there was no power to dispose of our interest. But, the moment we found that a convention had been assented to by a British officer, although the policy of it we disapproved, we sent directions to conform to it. Mr. Hobhouse said, that if even a subordinate officer, who was entrusted with the direction of a particular enterprise, did what sir Sidney Smith had done, and entered into a convention which, strictly speaking, he had no power to conclude, many examples could be found, of cases YEAS in which the commander in chief thought himself bound to ratify what had been done, and in which government had rati fied the consent of the commanding officer. But the fact was, that sir Sidney was armed with full powers to negotiate and conclude such a treaty. Mr. Wallace said, that sir Sidney Smith had no powers to enter into any convention for the evacuation of Egypt. The French, however, chose to rely on the success of his interference, and they acted upon it. When this was known to government, it was thought better, in order to save the faith and the honour of the country from the slightest imputation, to consent to the execution of the con vention. Mr. Perceval said, that, supposing sir Sidney had had complete powers to enter into a convention for the evacuation of Egypt, he would still contend that there was no breach of faith on the part of this country. For, how did the business stand? The news arrived in this country, that there was some idea of a treaty being concluded between the Turks and the French, and at the same time that the state of affairs rendered it inexpedient for this country to accede to it. Upon this, government sent out orders to the commanders of its fleets and vessels not to take any part in it, nor to respect the French fleets and vessels in consequence of it. Lord Keith communicated these orders, not only to the Turks, but also to the French, on the same day; but the English did nothing to break the treaty; they committed no act of hostility. But the French, on receiving this communication, chose to break it themselves; and if there was any breach of faith, it =was on the side of the French. But when government heard that the French had = acted on the belief that this country would consent to the convention, it sent out orders not to ratify, but to respect it. With regard to the motion, he had never heard any one supported by less argument. Mr. Jones consented to withdraw his motion, and to move, "That an humble Address be presented to his majesty, that he will be graciously pleased to give directions, that there be laid before this House, copies of all letters from the commander in chief in the Mediterranean to general Kleber." Upon this, the House divided: NOES Tellers. Mr. Jones........ ......... Mr. Robson .. So it passed in the negative. }12 80 Debate in the Commons on the Population Bill.] Nov. 19. Mr. Abbot said:Sir, In rising to propose the measure, of which I have given notice, I am fully aware of its magnitude and extent; but it appears to me to be a measure of unquestionable utility, and its execution, as I conceive, will not be attended with any great difficulty, or any unnecessary delay. To me, Sir, it has long been a matter of surprise and astonishment, that a great, powerful, and enlightened nation like this should have remained hitherto unacquainted with the state of its popula tion; the knowledge of which must be serviceable for so many important purposes of wise legislation and good government, and without which no country can avail itself of the full extent of its resources, or effectually and permanently provide for its wants.-But, Sir, in times like these when the subsistence of the people is in question, this knowledge becomes of the highest importance. It is surely important to know the extent of the demand for which we are to provide a supply; and we should set about obtaining it immediately, not only for the uses of the current year (for which it must necessarily come late), but also for the year that is to follow; a consideration inseparably connected with the former, and to which we are bound to look forward with all its possible circumstances. It is important also to obtain this information for the purpose of knowing whether one of the chief causes which, for the last thirty years, has made this country cease to export, and obliged it to depend for succour on its neighbours, is not an increased and increasing population; because this may fix our opinions not only upon the necessity of extending our scale of agriculture, but may serve also to show us the degree and point to which that extension must necessarily be carried; and if it be true that we have three millions of acres in this island fit for the plough, and hitherto uncultivated, we may see in what proportion we are called upon to render them most profitable for the publie subsistence. And whatever |