giving certainty to opinion and assurance to belief, in relations purely mental, it forges the successive links of that golden chain of intellectual necessity which binds together the elements of the moral world.

Reason, in its processes of Generalization and Induction. In the wider action of this sovereign power, it takes that highest course of which human intellect is capable; and, in tracing the relations of causation, aspires, by its power of generalization and its processes of induction, to announce and interpret the laws of the universe, and to read the evidences of a First ordaining Cause.

In these excursions, reason gathers in, from the vast field of analogy, corresponding facts and relations; and, in virtue of that pervading unity which comparison has enabled it to discover as existing among them, recognizes that spacious principle of generality coëxtensive with its own capacities of thought, by which it rises above the limits of the concrete and the particular to the contemplation of those abstract ideas and comprehensive principles which constitute the prime elements of intellectual and moral truth, and which bear the stamp of supremacy and the inscription of Law, human or Divine.

Not less impressive or sublime is the action of this august faculty of the human soul, when it puts forth its constructive power, and, aided by the scrutiny of patient experiment, it verifies the analogies of phenomena and of fact, "inducts" them, (leads them,) into their appropriate groups of affinity and correlation, plies them with its tentative, magnetic, aggregating power of "hypothesis," (theoretic, interrogative assumption,) and, by careful induction, at last consummates the vast fabric of "theory," (intellectual vision,) whose foundations are laid in the certainty of knowledge, and whose walls rise, in the symmetry of truth, to heights which inspire the mind with awe.

Ratiocination. In the dimness of abstract conceptions, in the obscurity of abstruse relations of thought, or in the apparent conflict of contrasted truths, when the eviction of hidden causes, or when the detection of intermediate and reconciling principles, becomes essential to the conscious recognition of ideas, to the distinct conception of relations, or to the firm conviction of truth, reason comes to the mind laboring under uncertainty, and brings the aid of its discursive processes of ratiocination, in the form of dissertation, argument, discussion, and debate. Assuming the seat of judgment, it thus institutes inquiry, conducts examination, prosecutes investigation, discriminates terms, scrutinizes allegations, compares conflicting arguments, weighs opposing evidence, judges of facts, rejects assumptions, exposes error, detects truth or falsehood, and pronounces its authoritive and final decision, as the inevitable law of intellection.

Reason, as cognizant of Truth.-Reason, in its judicial capacity, traces, or recognizes and announces, the correspondence or the discrepance of idea with object, thought with fact, conception with conception, principle with principle, proposition with proposition, sentiment with sentiment, opinion and statement with fact, language with thought, argument with argument, effect with cause. It thus, by the eviction of truth, produces in the mind the result of conviction; and truth, as the consummated and perfect result of the action of reason, in its cogniziance of the ascertained relations of knowledge, demands, in virtue of the supremacy and authority of the faculty by whose agency it is discovered, the assent of the mind, in the form which we term belief,-not a bare comprehension or merely passive reception by the understanding, not the mere negative acquiescence or silent admission of the judgment, but the consentaneous recognition and adoption which come from the voluntary action of reason, uniting itself with the subject of its contemplation, and identifying with it all its own consequent action. Reason, therefore, has to do with all the preliminary processes by which truth is established; and in the moral not less than in the intellectual relations of thought, has, for its office, the sifting of evidence, the scrutiny of testimony, the weighing of proof; on the validity of all which, belief, as the normal and healthy tendency of the mind, is conditioned. In the yet higher sphere of Sacred truth, belief becomes subsidiary to the Faith which trusts.

Reason, as susceptible of Cultivation.—As the subject of disciplinary culture, this faculty presents itself to the educator as that to which his chief attention is due, in the relations of intellect, not only from its supremacy in the class of faculties to which it belongs, and the fact of its being the very constituent of intelligence, but from its peculiar susceptibility of development and training, and the extent to which it may be rendered clear, decisive, vigorous, and comprehensive, by appropriate exercise. No faculty reveals more distinctly than this the progressive character of man, as an intelligent agent, if we advert to its dim, uncertain, and feeble action in childhood, and its ceaseless growth in soundness, clearness, and vigor, as life advances to its maturity. But when we contrast the reasoning powers of such individuals as Newton, Locke, Butler, or Edwards, in manhood, with the mere germ of latent capability which they possessed in infancy, we perceive yet more distinctly what education may accomplish for the eduction and strengthening of this powerful element in the mental constitution of man.

The cultivation of this faculty becomes yet more important in its

results, when we advert to its value in the relation of morals. Reason is naturally the firm ally of conscience, in discriminating between right and wrong, and in instituting those reflective trains of thought by which man is arrested in the pursuit of sensual gratification, and called home to himself, in the conscious exercise of higher faculties, in the enjoyment of truer satisfactions, and in obedience to the rectitude which he feels to be the great law of his being. Reason, in coöperation with conscience, then becomes the regulating principle of his actions; raising them from mere obedience to prudence and judgment, and conservative propriety, to the higher influences of selfintelligence, consentaneous action, and rational conformity with the laws and conditions of his own nature, and of the Power by which those laws were ordained. Reason is the eye by which he learns to read the volume of revelation,-whether that written in the language of the "elder Scripture," which speaks of the "eternal power and godhead of the Creator," or that of the recorded Word which makes man "wise unto salvation."

(5. and 6.) JUDGment and UndersTANDING: their Identity with Reason. It has been justly remarked by an eminent writer on intellectual philosophy, that, in arbitrarily multiplying the number of faculties attributed to the mind, we confuse our own views of mental action, and lose rather than gain by such uses of analysis. In the prosecution of our present inquiries, it will be recollected, that it has been uniformly our endeavor to keep in mind the absolute unity of intellection, under whatever apparent diversity of processes it conducts its action; and the preceding observations on reason, as a reflective faculty, have, it may have been perceived, presented the operations of judgment and understanding as virtually but different functions of reason. To venture on a figure drawn from the sciences of observation: Reason may be regarded as bearing the relation of "genus" to judgment and understanding as "species." Reason surveys the whole ground of intellection, whether directed outward or inward; it works in the great field of analogy, and on the common ground of correlation, cotendency and consistency, in the universal sphere of thought. In its comprehensive action, it proclaims the harmonies of the universe. It has the power, therefore, of investigating and proving analogies, and, consequently, of rejecting discordant elements. Descending to this task, reason becomes, in the vocabulary of intellection, "judgment." Stooping yet lower, to trace and verify relations of humbler value, or of exterior character, or processes of passive reception of knowledge or of truth, it assumes the lower office and familiar name of "understanding."

Maintaining the justness of this definition of the faculty of reason, we would not, however, overlook the fact, so important to the right management of education, that the more closely we watch the operations of intellect, the more searching the investigation, and the more minute our analysis, we shall be the better prepared to minister to the manifold wants of the mind, and to its healthful development. The subdivision of reason into "judgment" and "understanding," if taken as merely a temporary assumption of theory, with a view to fuller provision for mental action and discipline, can not be objected to; and, indeed, the common branches of useful knowledge and of seientific acquirement which constitute the material and media of intellectual education, address themselves distinctively to that classification of the mental faculties which is commonly adopted or recognized. Of these we shall have occasion to speak, when discussing the modes and processes of culture. Nor can any detriment to a just view of mind as subjected to invigorating discipline, arise from adopting, for the time, that more comprehensive classification of the forms of mental action, which is now proposed. We shall pass, therefore, in our subsequent remarks, without further discussion concerning the actual or assumed number of the reflective faculties, to the consideration of the main spring by which, in the provisions of Creative wisdom, furnished in the human constitution, they are kept in action, so as to insure definite and salutary results.

(To be continued.)

XIII LETTERS TO A YOUNG TEACHER.

BY GIDEON F. THAYER,

Late Principal of Chauncy-Hall School, Boston.

PRINTING has been styled, "the preservative art of all arts; " and reading what is printed is the means of communicating to the universal mind of civilized man whatever the press records.

What a leveller-perhaps I should say, what an equalizer - the capacity of reading is! No matter how lowly born, how humbly bred, how obscure the position in life of an individual, — if he can read, he may, at will, put himself in the best society the world has ever seen. He may sit down with the good and great men of antiquity. He may converse with Moses and the Hebrew prophets; with Jesus and his disciples; with Homer and Plato; with Shakspeare and Milton; with Fenelon and Newton; with Franklin and Washington; with all the writers in prose and poetry whose works have come down to us, and, through them, with the heroes whose deeds have become the admiration of men; with benefactors, whose acts of love and kindness to their race have proved them to be the sons of God. He may learn the lessons of wisdom that History teaches, the discoveries that Genius has achieved, the light that Science has shed on the world, and the inventions of Art by which the physical conveniences and comforts of man anticipate even his imaginary wants. He may learn how to live,how to avoid the errors of his predecessors, and to secure blessings, present and future, to himself.

He may reside in a desert, far away from the habitations of men; in solitude, where no human eye looks upon him with affection or interest, where no human voice cheers him with its animating tones; if he has books, and can read, he needs never be alone. He may choose his company and the subject of conversation, and thus become contented and happy, intelligent, and wise, and good. He thus elevates his rank in the world, and becomes independent in the best sense of the term.

Reading, then, stands among the first, if not the very first, in