The prominence which Pestalozzi gave to form and number caused him to undertake a new treatment of the subjects of geometry and arithmetic. Subsequently he divided geometry into instruction in form and instruction in spaces, for the reason that we perceive shape and size, (mathematical quality and quantity,) independently of each other; drawing he made a part of the instruction in form-writing a part of drawing.

But what became of Pestalozzi's principle, that observation is the foundation of all intelligence, when he thus gave an undue prominence to form and number, and neglected all other properties? Suppose that we put a glass cube into the hands of a child and he observes in respect to it nothing else, but that it has the cubic form, and, over and above this, that it is one cube,-so far this glass cube is in no way distinguished from a wooden one. But if I require to take notice of other properties, such as color, transparency, weight, &c., in order that I may form a correct idea of the glass cube, as a separate object, and so describe it that it shall be distinguished with certainty from every other cube,—then I must fix my attention, not only on form and number, but on all apparent properties, as elements in a complete observation.

Lastly, language itself has nothing to do with observation. Why should I not be able to form a perfectly correct notion of an object that has no name-for instance a newly-discovered plant? Language only gives us the expression for the impressions of the senses; in it is reflected the whole world of our perceptions. "It is," as Pestalozzi rightly observes, "the reflex of all the impressions which nature's entire domain has made on the human race." But what does he go on to say? "Therefore I make use of it, and endeavor, by the guidance of its uttered sounds, to reproduce in the child the self-same impressions which, in the human race, have occasioned and formed these sounds. Great is the gift of language. It gives to the child in one moment what nature required thousands of years to give man."

In that case, every child would be a rich heir of antiquity, without the trouble of acquisition; words would be current notes for the things which they designate. But both nature and history protest against payment in such currency, and give only to him that hath. Does not Pestalozzi himself repeatedly protest against this very thing? "The christian people of our quarter of the world, (he says,) have sunk into these depths, because in their lower school establishments the mind has been loaded with a burden of empty words, which has not only effaced the impressions of nature, but has even destroyed the inward susceptibility for such impressions."

Pestalozzi's further treatment of the instruction in language clearly proves that, contrary to his own principles, he really ascribed a magical power to words-that he put them more or less in the place of observation-and, (to speak with a figure,) that he made the reflected image of a thing equal to the thing itself.

As this error of Pestalozzi's is of the greatest consequence, I will examine it more closely. In the instruction in language, he begins with lessons on sounds; these are followed by lessons on words; and these again by lessons on language.

I. LESSONS ON SOUNDS.-"The spelling book, (says Pestalozzi,) must contain the entire range of sounds of which the language consists, and portions of it should be repeated daily in every family, not only by the child that is going through the exercises to learn how to spell, but also by mothers, within hearing of the child in the cradle, in order that these sounds may, by frequent repetition, be so deeply impressed upon the memory of the child, even while it is yet unable to pronounce a single one of them, that they shall never be forgotten. No one imagines to what a degree the attention of infants is aroused by the repetition of such simple sounds as ba, ba, ba, da, da, da, ma, ına, ma, la, la, la, &c., or what a charm such repetition has for them."

And so the child in the cradle is to have no rest from elementary teaching; the cradle songs sung to it are to consist of such delightful bawling and bleating as ba, ba, ba, &c., which might well scare away the child's guardian angels.

As soon as the child begins to talk, it is to "repeat some sequences of these sounds every day;" then follow exercises in spelling.

II. "LESSONS IN WORDS, or rather, LESSONS IN NAMES."-According to Pestalozzi, "all the most important objects in the world are brought under the notice of the child in the Book for Mothers."

"Lessons in names consist in giving the children lists of the names of the most important objects in all three kingdoms of nature, in history, in geography, and in the pursuits and relations of mankind. These lists of words are placed in the hands of the child, merely as exercises in learning to read, immediately after he has gone through his spelling book; and experience has shown me that it is possible to make the children so thoroughly acquainted with these lists of words, that they shall be able to repeat them from memory, merely in the time that is required to perfect them in reading: the gain of what at this age is so complete a knowledge of lists of names so various and comprehensive, is immeasurable, in facilitating the subsequent instruction of the children."

Here again it is not even remotely hinted that the children ought to know the things named; words, mere words, are put in the place of observation.

3. LESSONS IN LANGUAGE.-The highest aim of language, according to Pestalozzi's idea, is to lead us from dim perceptions to clear notions, and that by the following process:

1. "We acquire a general knowledge of an object, and name it as unity, as an object.

2. We gradually become conscious of its distinguishing qualities, and learn how to name them.

3. We receive through language the power of designating these qualities of the objects more precisely by means of verbs and adverbs."

The first step in this process is, as we have seen, the object of the Pestalozzian lessons in names; but, when viewed more closely, the lessons are found to consist, not in the naming of objects arising out of knowing them, but in the names for their own sake.

In reference to the second operation, when Pestalozzi writes on the black-board the word "eel," and adds the qualities, "slippery, wormshaped, thick-skinned," the children by no means become conscious of the distinguishing qualities of an eel, and learn to name them, through observing an eel; they rather get adjectives to the noun "eel." Of the process by which these adjectives arise from the observation of the qualities which they express, there is again nothing said.

This neglect of observation is still more striking, when Pestalozzi, further on, classifies what is to be learned under the following heads: 1. Geography. 3. Physics. 5. Physiology. 2. History.

4. Natural History.

Each of these five heads he divides again into forty subdivisions, so that he makes two hundred subdivisions. He now proceeds to give lists of words in all these subjects in alphabetical order, which lists are to be impressed upon the childrens' memories, "till it is impossible they should be forgotten." Afterward, this alphabetical nomenclature is to be transformed into a "scientific" one. "I do not know, (says Pestalozzi,) whether it is necessary to illustrate the matter further by an example; it appears to me almost superfluous: nevertheless, I will do so, on account of the novelty of form. E. G. One of the subdivisions of Europe is Germany: the child is first of all made well acquainted with the division of Germany into ten circles, so that he shall not be able to forget it; then the names of the towns of Germany are placed before him, at first in mere alphabetical order for him to read, but each of these towns is previously marked with

the number of the circle in which it lies. As soon as the child can read the names of the towns fluently, he is taught the connection of the numbers with the subdivisions of the main heads, and in a few hours he is able to determine the place of the entire number of German towns in these subdivisions. For example, suppose the names of the following places in Germany are set before him, marked by numbers :

He reads them all in the following manner :

Aachen lies in the Westphalian circle;

Abenberg in the Franconian circle;

Acken in the Lower Saxony circle; and so on.

Amöneburg, 6.
Andernach, 6.

In this manner the child is evidently enabled, at first sight of the number or mark referring to the subdivisions of the main head, to determine the place of each word of the list in the scientific classification of the subject, and thus, as I before said, to change the alphabetical into a scientific nomenclature."

It is quite unnecessary to give a refutation of these views.*

Further on in the book, there follow some directions "how to explain more fully to the pupil the nature, qualities, and functions of all the objects with which the lessons in names have made him acquainted, and which have already been explained to him, to a certain extent, by placing their qualities side by side with their names." this purpose, the mother is to read to the child certain sentences, and the child is to repeat them after her. Many of these sentences would be quite unintelligible to a child; for instance, "The creditor desires payment," ," "The right must be maintained." They are mere exercises in reading, not based in the slightest degree on observation.

We have seen that Pestalozzi fixed his attention chiefly on the principle that instruction must be based on observation, out of which the clear idea is at last developed. He says that we are dazzled by the charm of a language, "which we speak without having any real

* Observe, too, how Pestalozzi has taken the names of any obscure places that occurred to him at the moment, such as Aberthan, Ala, &c. Out of the 31 places whose names are given, five at most would deserve to be included in a school geography. Not a word is said about maps.

knowledge of the ideas conveyed by the words which we allow to run through our mouths." He combats "all scientific teaching which is analyzed, explained, and dictated by men who have not learnt to think and speak in harmony with the laws of nature," whose "definitions must be conjured into the soul like a deus ex machinâ, or must be blown into the ears as by stage-prompters;" the effect of which is that men "sink into a miserable mode of education, fit only for forming play-actors." He speaks with great warmth against "definitions not founded on observation." "A definition, (he says,) is the simplest expression of clear ideas, but for the child it contains truth only in so far as he has a clear and comprehensive view of the ground work of observation on which these ideas are based; whenever he is left without the greatest clearness in the observation of a natural object which has been defined to him, he only learns to play with words like so many counters, deceives himself, and places a blind belief in sounds which will convey to him no idea, nor give rise to any other thought, except just this, that he has uttered certain sounds.* Hinc illa lacrymæ.

These excellent principles can not receive too much attention; but if Pestalozzi's own method of instruction be squared by them, it will be found to run quite counter to them. He begins, not with observations, but with words; with him, substantives stand in the place of the observation of objects, adjectives in the place of the observation of the properties of objects. His polemic against empty wordwisdom hits therefore his own method of instruction. Fichte says very truly in regard to Pestalozzi's idea: "In the field of objective knowledge, which relates to external objects, the acquaintance with the literal sign that represents the clearness and definiteness of the knowledge, adds nothing whatever for the student himself; it only heightens the value of the knowledge with reference, to its communication to others, which is a totally different matter. The clearness of such knowledge can result only from observation, and that which we can at pleasure reproduce in all its parts, just as it really is, in the imagination, is perfectly known, whether we have a word for it or not.

We are even of the opinion that this perfection of observation

Pestalozzi also shows briefly and truly that none but those who have a thorough knowl edge of a subject can possibly give a real explanation of it in words. "If I have not a clear perception of a thing," he says, "I can not say with certainty what its attributes are, much less what it is; I can not even describe it, much less define it. If then a third person puts into my mouth the words by means of which some other person, who had a clear conception of the thing, makes it intelligible to people of his own stamp, it is not on this account any clearer to me; but it is clear to the other person and not to me so long as the words of this person are not for me what they are for him: the definite expression of the full clearness of an idea."

No. 10--[VOL. IV., No. 1.]—6.