and repeating them in all courts; nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum vel justitiam: and therefore every subject, “ for injury done to him, in bonis, in terris, vel persona, "by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal, without any exception, may take his remedy by the course of the law, “and have justice and right for the injury done to him, freely "without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without "delay."

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4. If there should happen any uncommon injury, or infringement of his rights, which the ordinary course of law cannot reach, there still remains a fourth subordinate right, namely, that of petitioning the sovereign, or either house of parliament, for the redress of grievances; which by the statute 1 W. & M., st. 2, c. 2, the subject has a right to do; all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning being illegal.

5. The fifth auxiliary right of the subject, is that of having arms for his defence, which is also declared by the same statute.

In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently termed, the liberties of Englishmen. So long as these remain inviolate, the subject is perfectly free; for every species of oppression must be in opposition to one or other of these rights. To preserve them from violation, it is necessary that the constitution of parliament be supported in its full vigour; and limits, certainly known, be set to the royal prerogative. And lastly, to vindicate these rights when attacked, every subject is entitled to the regular administration of justice; to petition the sovereign or parliament for redress, and to have arms for self-preservation and defence.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE PARLIAMENT.

THE rights and duties of persons, as members of society, are either public or private.

The most universal public relation, by which men are connected together, is that of government, or in other words, as magistrates and people. Of magistrates some also are supreme, in whom the sovereign power of the state resides; others are subordinate, deriving all their authority from the supreme magistrate, and accountable to him for their conduct.

In tyrannical governments the supreme magistracy, or the right both of making and of enforcing the laws, is vested in one and the same man, or one and the same body of men; and wherever these two powers are united, there can be no public liberty. In England this supreme power is divided into two branches; the one legislative, to wit, the parliament; the other executive, consisting of the sovereign alone.

The origin of parliament is one of those matters which lie so far hidden in the dark ages of antiquity, that the tracing of it out is a thing equally difficult and uncertain. The word parliament, which is of modern date, was first applied to general assemblies of the states in France, about the middle of the twelfth century. But with us long before the Norman Conquest, all matters of importance were settled in the great council of the realm; the witena-gemote or the meeting of the wise men. There are instances of this so early as the reign of Ina king of the West Saxons, Offa king of the Mercians, and Ethelbert king of Kent, in the several realms of the heptarchy. After their union, Alfred ordained that these councils should meet twice in the year; and there is no doubt but that similar great councils were occasionally held under the first princes of the Norman line. Parliaments, or general councils, are thus coeval with the kingdom itself. How they were composed is another question; and particularly, whether the commons were summoned at all; or if summoned, at what period they began to

form a distinct assembly. But it is not intended here to enter into controversies of this sort. It is sufficient to explain, firstly, the manner and time of its assembling; secondly, its constituent parts; thirdly, the laws and customs relating to parliament, considered as one aggregate body; fourthly and fifthly, the laws and customs relating to each house; sixthly, the method of proceeding in both houses; and lastly, the manner of the parliament's adjournment, prorogation and dissolution.

1. The parliament is summoned by the sovereign's writ, for no parliament can be convened by its own authority, or by the authority of any except the sovereign alone. Supposing it had a right to meet spontaneously, it is impossible to conceive that all the members and each of the houses, would agree unanimously upon the time and place of meeting, and if half met and half absented themselves, who could determine which was really the legislative body? It is therefore necessary that parliament be called together at a determinate time and place: and highly becoming its dignity, that it should be called together by none but one of its own constituent parts,—the sovereign,—a single person whose will may be uniform and steady,—and the only branch of the legislature that is capable of performing any act at a time when no parliament is in being. The sovereign only, then, can convoke a parliament; and this he is practically compelled to do every year, or oftener, if need be, as the supplies are voted only for one year at a time, and the Mutiny Acts are passed for one year only.

II. The constituent parts of parliament are, the sovereign in his political capacity, and the three estates of the realm; the lords spiritual, the lords temporal, and the commons; the sovereign and these three estates form the corporation or body politic of the kingdom.

It is highly necessary for preserving the balance of the constitution, that the executive power should be a branch, though not the whole, of the legislative. The union of them would be productive of tyranny; the entire disjunction of them would in the end produce the same effect, by causing that union; for the legislative would soon become tyrannical, by assuming to itself the rights of the executive. To hinder, therefore, any such encroachment, the sovereign is a necessary part of parlia

ment; and, as this is the reason of his being so, the share of the legislation, which the constitution has placed in the crown, consists in the power of rejecting. For the crown cannot originate any alteration in the law; it may only approve or disapprove of the alterations consented to by the two houses. The legislative, therefore, cannot abridge the executive power or any of its rights, without its own consent.

In the legislature, again, the people are, in theory, a check upon the nobility, and the nobility a check upon the people, by the mutual privilege of rejecting what the other has resolved: while the sovereign is a check upon both. And this very executive is kept within due bounds by the two houses, through the privilege they have of inquiring into, impeaching, and punishing the conduct, not, indeed, of the sovereign, which would destroy his independence; but of his evil councillors.

Thus every branch of our civil polity supports and is supported, regulates and is regulated, by the rest: for the two houses naturally drawing, it is supposed, in two directions of opposite interest, they mutually keep each other from exceeding their proper limits; while the whole is prevented from separation, and artificially connected together by the mixed nature of the crown which is a part of the legislative, and the sole executive magistrate.

The next in order are the spiritual lords. These consist of the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Bishops of London, Durham, and Winchester, and twenty-one other bishops of dioceses in England, according to their priority in consecration. These lords spiritual are in law a distinct estate from the lords temporal, yet in practice they are usually blended together under the one name of the lords; they intermix in their votes; and the majority binds both estates.

The lords temporal consist of all the peers of the realm, by whatever title distinguished. Some sit by descent, some by creation, and others by election; viz., the sixteen peers who represent the Scots nobility for the parliament for which they are elected; and the twenty-eight peers, elected for life, who represent the Irish nobility. The number of lords temporal is indefinite, for it may be increased by the crown, by the creation of peers of the United Kingdom.

The commons consist of all such men in the kingdom, as have not seats in the House of Lords; every one of whom has a voice in parliament, either personally or by his representatives. In a free state, every man who is a free agent, ought to be in some measure his own governor; and, therefore, a branch of the legislative power should reside in the body of the people. And this power, when the territories of the state are small, and its citizens easily known, should be exercised by the people collectively. But this is inconvenient when the public territory is extensive and the number of citizens large. In this country the people do that by their representatives, which is impracticable to perform in person. The counties are represented by persons elected by the proprietors and occupiers of land; the cities and boroughs by citizens and burgesses, chosen by the trading interest of the nation, and the universities by persons elected by the graduates. But every member serves for the whole realm; not to advantage his constituents, but the common wealth; and therefore is not bound to consult with his constituents unless he himself thinks it prudent so to do.

III. Next as to the laws and customs of parliament, as one aggregate body.

The power of parliament is so transcendent that it cannot be confined within any bounds. It has sovereign authority in the making, repealing, and expounding of laws, concerning all matters, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil or criminal: this being the place where that absolute power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution. All mischiefs and grievances, that transcend the ordinary course of law, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can new-model the succession to the crown; it can alter the established religion: it can change the constitution of the kingdoms and parliaments themselves; it can, in short, do everything that is not naturally impossible.

In order to prevent the mischiefs that might arise, by placing this authority in hands either incapable, or improper, to manage it, the custom of parliament provides that no one shall sit in either house, unless he be twenty-one years of age; and several statutes, that no member sit or vote in the House of Commons, except for the choosing of a speaker, till he has taken the prescribed oaths.