ed with vigour, and brought to an honourable and advantageous conclusion. He readily admitted, that the company would be an improper instrument for the direction of an empire, if they were not under the controul of the executive power, and the superintendance of parliament. But they were now an organ both of government and trade, and capable of answering all the political and commercial purposes for which they can be employed. Mr. Dundas then took a view of the hypothesis, that the system of governing India should be altered, and enumerated the difficulties which must be overcome before the separation of the government from the trade could be effected. Recurring to the actual state of the revenue and the trade; and to the advantages which the public were deriving, and were about to receive from the company, he asked, if the system of separation would not create an interruption in the discharge, or liquidation of the company's debts? Would it not derange the regular progress of their increasing commerce; and would there not be a serious danger, that while these innovations were proceeding, rival European powers might seize the occasion, renew their commercial efforts, and divert into a new channel those streams of commerce which rendered London the emporium of the Eastern trade?

He asked, in fine, considering the distance of the two parts of our empire from each other, whether an injudicious procrastination might not shake that confidence, which so remote a dependency at present had in the sovereignty of Britain? And whether this

danger was to be incurred, merely because it was true in theory, and popular in opinion, that a mercantile body was unequal to the government of distant provinces.

Mr. Dundas stated as a third difficulty in receding from the present system of government in India, the effect which the innovation might have on the minds of the natives, who had been long habituated to look up to, and to rest upon the protection of the company. We have now, said he, after many a struggle in the field, and after the many experiments which necessarily preceded the establishment of a regulated commerce, the prospect of consolidating our power and increasing our revenue. Would it be wise to recede from the treaties by which we acquired our territories? Or would the deviation from them accommodate itself to the feelings of the natives? It would be vain to suppose that their minds, or their habits of thinking, could be easily familiarized to the change; no foresight could even conjecture the consequences. The natives of India look back to the ancient sovereignty of the Moguls, and their confidence in the company has its source in the country governments, exercising power as a branch of that subordination to which their forefathers were subjected. Would the attempt to unhinge their opinions be liberal, or would it be just? Lord Clive, to whom we owe our empire in India, with a discernment and a wisdom equal to his valour, laid the foundations for consolidating the British power in Asia by entwining his laurels round the opinions and prejudices of the subjugated natives. To this poli

tical foresight, his country is as much indebted to him, as for his victory at Plassey. This great warrior and statesman thought that it would be wise to hold our territories by grants from the Mogul. He saw that all the native princes and states, which had sprung up out of the ruins of that empire, were sheltering themselves under the forms of the fallen government he knew that the power of granting or refusing privileges no longer remained with the emperors of Delhi; but he appealed to the rights of these sovereigns, and engrafted on them the British power in Asia. In proof of the inexpediency of deviating from experience, Mr. Dundas mentioned, that soon after the acquision of the territorial revenues, government, desirous of forming plans for the future administration of Indian affairs, stated to Mr. Hastings, Mr. Barwell, sir John Clavering, Mr. Francis, colonel Monson, sir William Chambers, and sir Elijah Impey, who held distinguished situations at that time in India, several questions, on the political government, the executive power, the subordinate legislation, the territorial revenues, the collection of duties, and the judicial power of the British East Indian possessions.

If I had found (said Mr. Dundas) that so many able men had agreed in opinion in the answers which they transmitted home upon all or upon any of these subjects, it would have been an inducement to build a system upon them but from their differences of opinion, I can only draw this conclusion, that it is safer to rest on the present system, which experience has rendered practicable, than to entrust

myself to theories, about which ingenious and informed men have not agreed.

Having thus shewn the expediency of continuing the foreign government, as at present administered, Mr. Dundas proceeded to consider the propriety of continuing the domestic plan of administration. He was aware it might be asserted, that though the patronage was directly in the company, it was indirectly in the crown. With respect to this subject, he wished only to fix the attention of the committee on the fact, that the civil and military servants were appointed by the directors. He by no means meant to be understood as asserting, that the recommendation of a person by the executive power, would not meet with attention; on the contrary, he was free to confess, that it had often done so, and that the directors had been disposed to listen to such recommendations. At the same time he stated his full conviction, after mature consideration, that if the Indian patronage should be vested and concentrated immediately in the crown, the weight of it would be too great in the balance of our government, and might prove dangerous to the spirit of the constitution.

Had even the government of India remained as much unrestrained by the executive power and by parliament, as before the establishment of the present system, by the act of 1784, still, with all its imperfections on its head, and with all the faults which marked it, he would have preferred a lesser to the greater evil, of placing the administration of the government and revenues in the hands of the state.

The

The case, however, was otherwise; the company could no longer oppress the natives, by an unjustifiable augmentation of revenue, because the affairs of India were under the immediate control of the executive power. The company could no longer augment their investments by despoiling the natives of the fruits of their industry, because the tenures on which the lands were held were rendered permanent, and the taxes on the produce of arts and manufactures were known and fixed. The company could no longer make war, to gratify the avarice and ambition of their servants, because their servants were now made responsible to their superiors, and these to the decisions of a British parliament. The present system of governing India both abroad and at home, has been found adequate to the objects both of war and of peace. In so far as that system shall appear to be experimentally erroneous, it can be varied and improved by regulations, calculated to remedy those errors; but it would be unjustifiable rashness totally to over

turn it.

Mr. Dundas then proposed, that the board of commissioners should continue in its present constitution; but with one change, viz. that his majesty should have the power of promoting, to a seat at the board, men, who were not of his privy council. It was in the remembrance of many of the members of the House, and it was known to them all, that at the period when the board of controul was instituted, the object was, that the members composing it should be selected from those high departments of the state, where, as of

ficers of the crown, they enjoyed emoluments which would compensate for the discharge of this new trust. It had been found, however, from experience, (whether this was to be referred to the other important charges committed to the members of the board, or whether to the aspiring at the great offices of state) that the changes at the board had been too frequent, to enable those who had the immediate responsibility, to derive the aid they might otherwise expect from their counsels and support. Though no member who had held a seat at the board had left it, without having done himself honour by his labour and attention, yet he could not help wishing for the aid of some members to this board, whose situations might be considered as more per

manent.

Having thus given his opinion of the foreign and domestic government required for Indian affairs, he could not but offer a public apology for differing in opinion, on the subject of the appointment to the governments and supreme councils in India, from Lord Cornwallis, who recommended, that this power should be vested in the crown, two reasons had induced him to prefer the continuance of the present system. One was, that the crown had the power of recalling these officers, if their administration appeared to be directed by any but public measures. Another was, that a minister might be prevailed upon from private motives, or by solicitations from those whom it might be difficult to resist, to appoint persons whom he might not altogether approve. however

This case was widely different,

while a minister could only recommend a character to the judgment of twenty-four persons. This was a proper check on the executive power, and obviously tended to make the directors careful in chusing a man whom they could acknowledge in the face of the nation. Here Mr. Dundas took an interesting retrospect of the history of the East India trade. The staples of Asia, he said, viz. spiceries and aromatics, precious stones, and wrought silks and cottons, had been in estimation among all the polished nations of every age. When Europe was relieved from the darkness of the middle ages, a similar taste for the productions of the East was created by the commercial efforts of the Italian republics. By means of caravans, and the navigation of rivers, the produce of India was brought to the shores of the Mediterranean, and carried from the ports of this sea by the traders of Venice and Genoa to the different countries in the north of Europe. The riches acquired by these republicans, in consequence of the exclusive privileges which they possessed in the countries through which the Eastern commodities had to pass before they reached the Mediterranean, at the same time tended to rouse the spirit of enterprise and discovery among the other European nations. In consequence of this prevailing spirit the Portuguese, under Vasco de Gama, discovered the passage to India, by the Cape of Good Hope, which gave to that people an exclusive possession of all the wealth which the East could then send to Europe. About the latter end of the 16th century, the Dutch became independent of the crown of Spain, and in a few years were the

rivals and supplanters of the Portuguese trade in the East Indies. The spirit of commercial enterprize also induced France to engage in the Asiatic trade, and to establish an East India company in imitation of their neighbours the Dutch, though not with their

success.

During these important commercial transactions, England also became a competitor in the trade and navigation to the Eastern world. After the example of the other European nations, Queen Elizabeth gave a charter to the London company in 1600. At first, one or more of the adventurers were entitled to carry on the trade upon their own shares, but in a short time it was found necessary to rest the whole of the concern upon a joint stock. In the succeeding reigns, the crown frequently granted licences to individuals, and the London company had to struggle, not only against the foreign companies of Europe, but against the English interlopers. At last a new association was formed, under the name of the English East India company; the charter of the London association still remaining. It was soon, however, found, that two companies belonging to the same nation, neither could carry on the trade with profit to themselves, or for the interest of their country. The London company had, besides, purchased the greatest part of the shares of the English company, and the ruin of both was prevented by the award of lord Godolphin, which occasioned the establishment of the present united company of merchants of England trading to the East Indies. From this period to the middle of the present century,

our

our trade to the East Indies had nothing to distinguish it from that of the other countries of Europe. Towards the middle of the present century, however, France formed the bold design of acquiring territorial possessions in India, and the struggle between the French and the English companies terminated in our acquiring a revenue of many millions sterling, and comprehend ing about twenty millions of inhabitants. This triumph of England was ratified by the memorable peace of 1763. Mr. Dundas then gave the following statement of our Asiatic commerce at that juncture.

From 1731 to 1741, on an aver age of ten years, there was paid for bullion exported, 464,5741.; for goods and stores exported, 152,6091; the bills drawn on the court of directors amounted to 167,4101.; and the amount of the sales in Europe was 1,700,6751.

From 1741 to 1747, on the average of six years, there was paid, for bullion exported, 567,2381.; for goods and stores exported 189,4111.; the bills drawn on the court of directors amounted to 230,9141.; and the sales of goods amounted to 1,907,1051.

From 1747 to 1757, on an average of ten years, there was paid, for bullion exported, 767,0571.; for goods and stores exported, 267,7301.; the bills drawn on the court of directors amounted to 164,4821.; and the sales of goods amounted to 2,143,4591.

From 1757 to 1767, on an average of ten years, there was paid, for bullion exported, 121,2871.; for goods and stores exported428,7071.; the bills drawn on the court of directors amounted to 432,891.; and

the sales of goods amounted to 2,315,5731,

Mr. Dundas, having thus given a view of the company's affairs, when their situation was merely commercial, or changing to the novel character of delegated sovereigns drawing revenues from rich provinces, to be realised in Britain through the medium of trade, (after again adverting to the magnitude of our possessions, and to the acquisition of the Duannee) observed, that the company was the instrument of government, remitting a revenue which was to furnish a capital for trade, exclusively of the exports upon which they had formerly depended. Adverting again to the laudable interferences of parliament to obtain, upon evidence, a knowledge of the actual value of the British possessions in India, and to the successive regulations in different acts, down to the period when the present system of controul was established, in 1784; he concluded "That the company had now become the organ by which the Indian Empire of Britain ought to be administered."

Upon this system, Mr. Dundas remarked, there were a variety of opinions by one set of men it was maintained, that it was a political absurdity to entrust to a commercial association the government of an empire, since the very nature of this power rendered it impracticable for the company's servants, either to conduct commerce upon proper principles, or to govern our subjects in India wisely or well. But is it not true, said he, that the revenues of India must pass to Britain, through the medium of trade? Is it not true, that the manufacturers of Britain, whether we view

them