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virtue disdained and lamented them but he was too indolent, too good-natured, that is, too fearful of giving pain, to exert himself in the controul and correction of them. The gentleness of his nature, and the amiable pliancy of his temper, which, when accompanied with piety, enabled him to support the evils that befell him, disqualified him, in a great measure, for that power and promptitude of exertion which would have prevented their approach. To use the emphatic words of M. de Malesherbes, "he was as pious as Louis IX. just as Louis XII. and humane as Henry IV.; and his only fault was that of conducting himself too much as the father of his people, and not enough as their king." His fate was deplored by the surrounding nations, who considered it as an act of assassination; and their respective courts put on mourning as is usual on the death of kings. Indeed, we most readily adopt the opinion of Mr. Fox, in his address to the electors of Westminster, that there is not a person

in Europe out of France, who does not consider this sad catastrophe, as a most revolting act of cruelty and injustice.

Louis XVI. king of France, was born the 23d of August, 1754, ascended the throne on the 10th of May, 1774, and reigned eighteen years and three months.

Some of the members of the convention, who had been most zealous in their endeavours to preserve the king's life, immediately after his death resigned their seats in that assembly; particularly Kersaint and Manuel. The minister Roland was also impelled by the same motives to declare his resignation. Paché, the minister for the war department, was soon after dismissed; and Bournonville was appointed to succeed him. a very short time after the condemnation of the king, M. Pelletier de Saint Fargeau, a deputy of the convention, who had voted for his death, was assassinated; and public honours were decreed to his memory.

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received orders from government to quit the kingdom. This person, who was very generally suspected, and not without sufficient reason, of intriguing with the discontented party in this country; who had long renounced the king, who sent him hither, and had sworn fidelity to his new masters, when they had dethroned his kind and early benefactor; was not only permitted to remain here unmolested, but was at length suffered to hold a correspondence with the king's ministers, who hoped that, without recognizing the new French government, a friendly intercourse might be maintained, which, if France was influenced by pacific intentions, would ultimately tend to the accomplishment of pacific objects. In this unofficial correspondence, M. Chauvelin contended, that the decree of the French convention, dated the 19th November, 1792, which had encouraged all nations to rebel against their sovereigns, related only to a decided majority of the people struggling for free dom; as if a decided majority stood in need of foreign assistance. He declared, that the French would not attack Holland, as long as it remained neutral, as if it had not observed the most rigid neutrality, and nevertheless had been already attacked; and represented the question of opening the Scheldt as too unimportant to England, or Holland, to be the cause of a war. It was also suggested, that, in the course of this correspondence, the French were more friendly to the English nation than its own government; and something of a menace was also held forth, that an appeal would be

made, on that principle, from France to the English people.

In answer to these assertions, it was observed, that the obnoxious decree still remained in force, and could not be explained away: that if the question of the Scheldt was of so little importance, it proved, in how small a degree of estimation the convention held the friendship or neutrality of Great Britain, by violating a treaty which she had guaranteed, and by encroaching on the territories and rights of her allies: that, instead of retracting, they continued their usurpation, though they knew that the utmost importance had been attached, by Great Britain, to the independence of the Netherlands; and that she would never, with indifference, see France aiming, directly or indirectly, at the sovereignty of those countries, or assuming to arbitrate on the rights and liberties of Europe. though England had carefully ab stained from all interference in the internal affairs of France, the latter, by encouraging republican addresses from republican clubs and associations in England, had made a very unsuitable return: that France had revoked the decree by which she renounced all ideas of conquest, and had acted on a principle of universal aggrandizement; a principle, that set at defiance the power, as it menaced the tranquillity of every country in Europe: in short, it was declared by lord Grenville, that if France desired to maintain peace with the British empire, she must atone for her acts of aggression, abandon the places she had conquered, and retire within her ancient limits. Here then the

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the business rested between lord Grenville and M. Chauvelin, and M. Chauvelin was ordered to leave this country.

So much has been said respecting M. Maret, and his mission, and the refusal of ministers to enter into any negotiation with him, has been a topic so repeatedly urged by those who impute the war to the rashness and folly of ministers, that we think it necessary to state what we conceive to be the truth, respecting that gentleman's residence in England. It is well known, that, the party in opposition, both in and out of parliament, have been in the habit of asserting, that M. Maret came to this country expressly to treat with ministers, and that they refused to treat with him. But these assertions are ill-founded, and must have been the effect of misrepresentation on the part of those to whom the leaders of opposition were in the habits of applying for information respecting the conduct and designs of France. The first visit of M. Maret to England related solely to the domestic concerns of the duke of Orleans; and he never pretended to have any other business. His interview with Mr. Pitt was wholly unofficial, and was admitted by the minister, because he was anxious to do any thing, and every thing consistent with the honour of the nation, that might prevent a war with France. Of this interview, M. Maret always spoke in terms of great satisfaction; and never failed to consider Mr. Pitt's conduct in the course of it with great respect, both as to his general demeanour and his pacific dispositions. In fact, from the favourable account he transmitted to Pa

ris, of his reception by Mr. Pitt, he fully expected that, on the return of the courier, he should be authorised to treat, as a confidential minister, with the British government. But M. Chauvelin, to whom he had unfortunately communicated his interview with Mr. Pitt, and who was jealous of every Frenchman that arrived in London, contrived to counteract the projects of a man whom he considered as a rival; so that the answer transmitted from the executive counsel contained a very severe reprimand; and while it forbid Maret, in rather angry terms, to enter into any explanation whatever, or even to speak to Mr. Pitt on the subject of public affairs, ordered him to refer the English minister to M. Chauvelin, who was furnished with the proper explanations, and to return immediately to Paris. In January, 1793, however, M. Maret, was ordered to revisit England, preparatory to the projected embassy of Dumourier, who was to have been invested with full powers, to arrange every subsisting difference, between his own and this country. This will not be denied ; but that all intercourse was refused him by the king's ministers, is a most egregious mistake; for the fact is, that he never solicited a moment's audience of them. As M. Chauvelin left London at the time that Maret quitted Paris, the latter apprehended, that the sudden appearance of M. Chauvelin, in the convention, already aggravated by inflammatory misrepresentations, would render it necessary for the executive counsel to make some alteration in his instructions. Impressed with this idea, M. Maret, on his arrival at Dover, wrote to M. Le

Brun,

Brun, the secretary for foreign affairs, at Paris, that he should not desire an interview with the English minister until fresh instructions arrived. He remained, however, in London, for the space of eight days, and never received a line from the French ministry, during that time. He wrote an official notice to lord Grenville, on his arrival, merely to inform his lordship, that he had come over to take charge of the diplomatic papers in the house of the French envoy. This note, and a letter to the same minister, on his departure, formed the whole intercourse between him and the English government. What the particular grounds of his mission were, is not known, but there is good reason to believe, that they were not sufficient to have acted upon, without the concurrence of other circumstances, which intermediate events might have checked or controuled. M. Maret, therefore. returned to France, and learned on his arrival there, that war had been declared against England. Indeed, from every circumstance connected with M. Chauvelin, and M. Maret, as well as from the sentiments of M. Le Brun, it appears, that the French, while they were claiming the diplomatic recognition of M. Chauvelin, sending over M. Maret to England, and suggesting an ambassador of far greater importance in the person of general Dumourier, had already determined to declare war against England. M. Chauvelin is known to have communicated his official instructions, and they positively stated that the freedom of the Scheldt, and the acknowledgment of himself as ambassador from the French repub

lic, must precede all communication between the two countries: and he made no secret of declaring, that if he was not received at St. James's, according to the tenor of his credentials, it would be the height of his ambition to leave this country, with a declaration of war.

The leaders, as well as the emissaries of opposition, were in the habit of seeing and communicating freely with M. Chauvelin, who, in addition to his other indiscretions, stated it as a proof of merit to his employers that he was in confidential intercourse with those who were in direct hostility to the measures of the sovereign to whom he was accredited; and with whose ministers alone he ought to have communed on the public affairs and interests of the two nations. But the folly and impropriety of this conduct, in the French envoy, would not have had any importance annexed to it, if it had not been countenanced by the French executive counsel. If M. Le Brun, and his associates, had really wished to have prevented hostilities with this country, they would carefully have avoided whatever might have given umbrage, or excited the jealousy of government; nor would they have hesitated a moment to reprimand their envoy, if their dispositions towards Great Britain had been sincere and pacific, when he made a proud boast, and urged it as an argument for his being continued after he had been recalled; that though he was ill with ministers, he was well with opposition: but they did no such thing;-on the contrary, they admitted the plea, and allowed him to remain. There is every reason

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