this country, if it should enter into a negotiation with France. Mr. Adam said, he considered such an opinion as a libel upon the good sense and virtue of Englishmen. That he believed them to be too much attached to their constitution, and to that system of sound, just morality which had been long the established characteristic of this country, to run the risk of any such corruption: that they heard with horror, and shuddered at the events which crowded the present history of France that the enjoyment of a free constitution gave them rights which were dear to them: that besides it gave them the means of being taught and instructed, by men of talents, education, and virtue, în all the different public situations of life. He said, that there was a new and most dangerous doctrine taught by Mr. Burke, that sentiment and passion, not safety and security, were to operate in national intercourse; and contended, that the latter alone should be chief object of every government. He said, that it was the bounden duty of the governors to use every means to avert the evil of war: but, above all, never to allow passion to interfere with the important principle of national safety: that upon this principle, all wise nations had acted at all times that, during the contest of the red and white roses, the kings de facto, in this country, had been treated with, as well as those de Jure: that the Netherlands, when they threw off the yoke of Spain, as well as the seven united Provinces and Cromwell, had all been treated with. And why? Because that assemblage of men called a nation, whoever or whatever administered their affairs, became

dangerous to neighbouring nations; and therefore the de facto governors were acknowledged, negotiations entered into, and wars averted, by the wise policy of considering the safety of the state as the supreme law; not the passion, or violence, or indignation, or disgust which might actuate. That besides this, if all was done that could be done by negotiation, and nothing resulted, the whole nation would be satisfied, and with one heart and one voice would encounter their difficulties; and by that bravery and spirit, the result of rational freedom, we should maintain the fame for which we had always stood conspicuous among the nations of the earth.

After Lord Carysfort had made some pointed observations on the conduct of the French, and the claims as well as loyalty of the Catholics of Ireland, Mr. Dundas entered on a defence of himself and his colleagues. He stated, that a coincidence of circumstances which no human foresight could either foresee or prevent, had conspired to render our immediate interference absolutely necessary in supporting the honour and independence of Britain. There was every reason to apprehend, that the French meditated an attack on Holland; and if England were to abandon the treaty with Holland, she would lose at once the respect hitherto offered to her high character, and be no longer considered by any other nation as worthy of confidence. He then enlarged on the comparative prosperity of this country with that of France, and from the general unanimity and the variety of resources which England possessed, he derived the most flattering hope, that

if we should be forced into a war, its termination would be honourable and advantageous to the British name and people.

Mr. Powys considered the political intentions declared by Mr. Fox, to be peculiarly baneful to this country; and that his amendment tended to alienate the people from the executive power. Negotiation appeared to him to be impracticable. To whom was an ambassador to be sent? Who could be sure that they who had proscribed our king, would accept an ambassador from him. He approved the speech and the address: they breathed nothing but the faithful preservation of our treaties abroad, and the security of our internal peace. If he had his wish, he would draw a line round France, to prevent the spreading of her infection: he would avoid meddling with her; but if she meddled with us, no choice remained for Great Britain.

Mr. Wilberforce said, that he should vote against the amendment, not as being determined for war, but because he believed the amendment would by no means tend to peace. He frankly declared, that as, at all times, war ought to be deprecated as the greatest of human evils; so there never was a period when it appeared more likely to be injurious to this country than the present. He could not feel the force of the arguments for war that might seem to have been suggested by what had been said concerning the distressed situation of the French, and the flourishing state of Great Britain. He preferred to the amendment, the language of the address, which, concurring with the speech from the throne, plainly declared, that the House of Com

mons approved of the neutrality his majesty's ministers had hitherto observed, and of their determination to avoid a war, if it were possible, consistently with justice. This, he fully trusted, would be the conduct of administration. If we should find ourselves compelled by the obligations of solemn treaties to engage in war, as men of conscience and integrity we must submit to the necessity; but nothing less than this necessity could justify the measure, and he begged it to be understood, that it was on this ground only that he felt it his duty to support government in their present

measures.

The amendment was negatived without a division.

On the following day, December 15th, after the house had returned, from presenting the address to his majesty, Mr. Fox rose to make his promised motion; by which, he said, he did not mean to imply any appro bation of the conduct of the exist ing French government, or of the proceedings which had led to the present state of things in France, His object was simply to declare and record his opinion, that it was the true policy of every nation to treat with the existing government of every other nation with which it had relative interests, without enquiring or regarding how that government was constituted, or by what means those who exercised it came into power. This was not only the policy, but frequently the practice. If we objected to the existing form of government in France, we had as strong objections to the form of government at Algiers; yet at Algiers we had a consul. If we abhorred the crimes committed in France, we equally

abhorred

It

abhorred the crimes committed in Morocco; yet to Morocco we had sent a consul. By these acts we were neither supposed to approve of the form of government at Algiers, nor of the crimes committed in Morocco. From this motion no opinion was to be implied, but the opinion he had stated. would have been better, if what he proposed had been done sooner, and there were circumstances that made it less proper now than at an earlier period. But this was not imputable to him. The earliest period was now the best: and this was the earliest opportunity that the meeting of parliament afforded him. It would have been still better, if the British ininister had not been recalled from Paris; but had continued there as the ministers of some other courts had done. He concluded with moving, "that an humble address may be presented to his majesty, that his majesty will be graciously pleased to give directions, that a minister may be sent to Paris, to treat with those persons who exercise provisionally the functions of executive government of France, touching such points as may be in discussion between his majesty and his allies, and the French nation." The motion was seconded by Mr. Grey.

Lord Sheffield rose, in great agitation, and not only reprobated in the most pointed terms the object of the motion; but declared himself to be almost ashamed of his former enthusiasm for the right honourable mover of it.

In re

spect to war, he believed every man wished to avert it: that the surest means of avoiding it would be by vigorous preparations for it; and, if it could not be avoided,

that it would be better policy to meet it than wait for it. That the disturbers of the world, when they had over-run other nations, envying and dreading our prosperity, would not fail with double force to visit us.

His lordship concluded with approving the promptness and vigour of the measures that ministers had adopted, at the same time he disapproved of what appeared to him to be an unjustifiable interpretation of the word insurrection. In his opinion they would have done much better, if they had acknowledged that in consequence of some uncommon danger which impended, they had for the public good laid themselves under the necessity of applying to the legislature for indemnity; but that he had not objected to the address, or supported the amendment, because he would not seem to countenance the many mischievous principles and suggestions which had been heard in that house the two last days from the mover of the amendment.

Mr. T. Stanley expressed his astonishment at what had fallen from Mr. Fox during the last three days, and hoped that he might be prevailed on to withdraw his motion.

Mr. M. A. Taylor defended the character of Mr. Fox. Mr. Grey rose for the same purpose. Their arguments went to the same objects; to the purity of their own motives, and their confidence in those of their right honourable friend. Mr. Grey delivered himself with great energy. It was asked, said he, if Great Britain was to sneak and crouch to France. No; neither sneak nor crouch, but negotiate like a great and high-spirited nation, and if redress was re

fused

fused of any injury offered, then denounce war. We are asked again, would we treat now under all the circumstances we know to be existing. I say, yes, certainly; for though I admit that the time is not the most favourable, the fault is not with us, but with ministers, who let the favourable opportunity pass away, and by their supine neglect lost an occasion of preventing many of the crimes committed in France, and perhaps of averting that act of injustice and impolicy (the execution of the king) which we now at this moment fear is committing. We are told by a right honourable gentleman (Mr. Burke) that to treat with men stained with so many crimes as the present rulers of France, would be disgraceful. Let, says he, the present guilty men pass away, and in the mean time let us fight a little. What disgrace is to be avoided, or honour to be acquired by fighting first, and then treating afterwards, which we know we must at last, I do not comprehend, nor how the object can be worth such a price. If a war the most dangerous ever undertaken, is to be avoided, we must treat now, and I support the motion as the only means left of averting so great a calamity. We are not here to be hurried away by our feelings, and our indignation against the perpetrators of the crimes committed in France. We are to decide on national- policy, not personal feeling. I am for maintaining the national faith

tion as an encroachment on the royal prerogative.

Mr. Jenkinson was of the same opinion, and opposed the motion in a speech of considerable length. He dwelt on the flourishing state of our finances,decried those of France, and represented the present period as far more favourable for engaging in a war with France than the year 1787, when there was a prospect of hostilities between the two countries. He believed that there were disaffected persons in thecountry, whose activity made them dangerous; but he was of opinion, that war, instead of increasing their power of mischief, would lessen it. The French knew that we were engaged to protect Holland in the navigation of the Scheldt, and their insolent threats of opening it, in defiance of guarantees and subsisting treaties, must be considered as an intentional insult to this country, which could not be overlooked without the imputation of a cowardly and base submission. The ambition of the French he stated in strong terms, with their conduct respecting the king of Sardinia and Geneva, and justified ministers in not having endeavoured at an earlier period to conciliate the good-will of France: for where persons and things were every day changing, where all rule belonged to robbers and assassins, in what quarter were they to apply? what government should they acknowledge where there was no government? How could England recognize a constitution, which the French themselves were every day violating? But, thank God, England, so long distinguished for her faithful and sacred adherence to her treaties, would not forego her respect

able