those principles pushed to the utmost extent, which set out with dissolving all the bonds of legislation by which society was held together, which were established in opposition to every law, divine and human, and presumptuously relying on the authority of wild and delusive theories, rejected all the advantages of the wisdom and experience of former ages, and even the sacred instructions of revelation.

Mr. Pitt then proceeded to enlarge on the advantages enjoyed by the inhabitants of this country, where equal protection is extended to all, and where there exists so high a sum of human felicity. He then briefly contrasted it with the situation of France, and entered, without any preliminary observations, on the consideration of the papers which had been laid upon the table.

It would appear, he said, from the first paper, that the system on which his majesty had uniformly acted, was founded on the very principles, which had afterwards dictated the necessity of making preparations. His majesty had declined taking any part in the inter nal government of France, and had made a positive declaration to that effect. When he took that wise, generous, and disinterested resolution he had reason to expect, that the French would, in return, have respected the rights of himself, and his allies, and most of all, that they would not have attempted any internal interference in this country. A paper on the table contained on their part a positive contract to abstain from any of those acts by which they had provoked the indignation of this country. In this

paper they disclaimed all views of aggrandizement; they gave assurances of their good conduct to neutral nations; they protested against their entertaining an idea of interfering in the government of the country, or making any attempts to excite insurrection, upon the express ground (stated in the paper) that such interference, and such attempts, would be a violation of the law of nations. They had themselves, by anticipation, passed sentence upon their own conduct; and the event of this evening's discussion would decide, whether that sentence would be confirmed by those who had actually been injured. During the whole summer, while France had been engaged in the war with Austria and Prussia, his majesty had in no shape departed from the neutrality which he had engaged to observe, nor did he, by the smallest act, give any reason to suspect his adherence to that system.

But what, he would ask, was the conduct of the French ?-Had they also faithfully observed their part of the agreement, and adhered to the assurances which, on the ground of his majesty's neutrality they had given, to reject all views of aggrandizement, not to interfere with neutral nations, and to respect the rights of his majesty and his allies? What had been their conduct would very soon appear from the statement of facts. They had immediately shewed how little sincere they were in their first assurances, by discovering intentions to pursue a system of the most unlimited aggrandizement, if they were not opposed and checked in their career. The first instance of their

success

success in Savoy had been sufficient to unfold the plan of their ambition. They had immediately adopted the course to annex it for ever to their own dominions, and had displayed a resolution to do the same, wherever they should carry their arms. That they might not leave any doubt of their intentions, by a formal decree, they had stated their plan of overturning every government; and substituting their own; they threatened destruction to all who should not be inclined to adopt their system of freedom; and, by an horrid mockery, offered fraternization, where, if it was refused, they were determined to employ force, and to propagate their principles where that mode should fail, by the mouths of their cannon. They established, in their instructions to the commissioners whom they appointed to enforce the decree, with respect to the countries entered by their armies, a standing revolutionary order: they instituted a system of organizing disorganization. And what was the reason which they assigned for all this? "The period of freedom," said they," must soon come; we must then endeavour, by all means in our power, to accomplish it now; for should this freedom be accomplished by other nations, what then will become of us? Shall we then be safe?"-A question they might well put, for well might they entertain doubts of their safety. They had rendered the Netherlands a province in substance as well as name, entirely dependent on France. That system, pursued by the jacobine societies, in concert with their correspondents, had given a more fatal blow to liberty, than any which had ever

been suffered from the boldest attempts of the most aspiring monarchs.

To shew in what manner the French had conducted themselves towards neutral nations, he need only refer to the decree of the 19th of November, which had already been so often mentioned, and so amply discussed. He should, from a compilation, which contained a collection of addresses transmitted by certain English clubs and societies to the National Convention of France, which concentrated in one point of view, all the grounds of offence which the French had given to this country, read an extract from this decree. He then read that passage in which the French grant fraternity to all those people who should be desirous to gain their freedom, and offer them assistance for that purpose.-Some pretended explanations of this decree had indeed been given, but they contained an avowal and a repetition of the offence.

Mr. Pitt acknowledged that the Dutch had made no formal requisition for the support of this country, in order to enable them to maintain their right to the exclusive navigation of that river. But might there not be prudential reasons for not making this requisition on their part, very different from those which should induce this country to withhold its support? When the French opened the Scheldt, the Dutch entered their solemn protest against that invasion of their rights, which left them at liberty, at any time, to take it up as an act of hostility. If, from the sudden progress of the French arms, and the circumstance of their forces being at their very door,

they,

-

they, either from prudence or fear, did not think proper to take it up as an immediate commencement of hostilities because they had been timid, would England think itself entitled to leave its allies, already involved in a situation of imminent danger, to that certain ruin to which they were exposed, in consequence of a system, the principles of which threatened also detruction to England, to Europe, and to the whole of mankind?Thus, in all those three assurances which they had given of their intention to reject any system of aggrandizement, to abstain from interfering in the government of any neutral country, and to respect the rights of his majesty and of his allies, they had entirely failed, and in every respect completely reversed that line of conduct, which they had so solemnly pledged themselves to adopt. As to their explanations, they contained nothing that either afforded any compensation for the past, or was at all satisfactory with respect to the future. On the 27th of December M. Chauvelin, on the part of the executive council, had presented the note complaining of the injurious construction of the decree of the 19th of November. On the 31st of December a member of that executive council (minister of the marine) addressed a letter to all the friends of liberty in the seaports; from which he would now read some passages:

"The government of England is arming, and the king of Spain, encouraged by this is preparing to attack us. These two tyrannical powers, after persecuting the patriots on their own territories, think,no doubt, that they shall be able to influence the judgment to be pronounced on

the tyrant Louis. They hope to frighten us but no-a people who has made itself free-a people who has driven out of the bosom of France, and as far as the distant borders of the Rhine, the terrible army of the Prussians and the Austrians-the people will not suffer laws to be dictated to them by a tyrant.

"The king and his parliament mean to make war against us. Will the English republicans suffer it? Already these free men shew their discontent, and the repugnance which they have to bear arms against their brothers the French. Well! we will fly to their succour, -we will make a descent in the island-we will lodge there fifty thousand caps of liberty-we will plant there the sacred tree, and we will stretch out our arms to our republican brethren-the tyranny of their government shall soon be destroyed."

Mr. Pitt called the attention of the House to this declaration, which distinguished the English people from the king and the parliament, and to the nature of that present which was intended to be made them. While such declarations were made, what could be thought of any explanations which were pretended to be given, or what credit was due to the assertions, that they entertained no intentions hostile to the government of this country. It was not probable, he added, that a war could be avoided; and that war was preferable to a peace, which could neither be consistent with the internal tranquillity nor external safety of the country. He concluded by moving that an humble address be presented to his Majesty to the above effect.

Lord

Lord Beauchamp entered at length, and with great accuracy, into an account of the conduct of the French in the progress of their late conquests, and stated the probable consequences of them to our own country and to Europe. His Lordship seconded the motion.

Earl Wycombe conceived it to be his most indispensible duty to use every argument in his power to prevent a war. The country, he insisted, was in no danger whatever, being equally secured by its insular situation, its internal resources, and the strong attachment of the people to the constitution. As to the navigation of the Scheldt, he considered the opening of it as likely to produce great advantage to our commerce and manufactures, by affording them a new and more ready channel of communication with the continent of Europe. As for French principles, he had no idea to war against them: and with respect to the cruelties perpetrated in France, he attributed them to the infamous expedition of the duke of Brunswick, which might be called a fraternity of kings for the purpose of imposing despotism on all Europe. He considered the balance of power in Europe as a political fiction, a cover for any interference that caprice might dictate; and, consequently, by no means a fit inducement to engage His Lordship then proceeded to consider the great accumulation of public burthens which must inevitably attend upon war, and gave a decided negative to the

motion.

the manifestos of the duke of Brunswick, and considered that an equal degree of criminality might be justly attributed to the distinct powers who confined Mr. La Fayette in a prison, and consigned Louis XVI. to the scaffold. He did not think that war was justifiable upon any grounds stated in the papers on the table; nor would he allow that ministers had done their utmost to avert the calamity. After acknowledging that the decree of the 19th of November was not defensible, he entered at large upon the subject of a balance which he did not think could justify our entering into a war. He thought it an hard necessity that Great Britain should be forced to go to war to maintain to the Dutch the exclusive navigation of the Scheldt; at the same time he was decidedly for supporting the faith of treaties, where the casus fœderis was clearly defined. Mr. Whitbread concluded with refusing his assent to the address.

Mr. Anstruther entered on the various objects of the message in succession, and endeavoured to save the duke of Brunswick from the charge which had been so frequently made against him, of being the origin of the murders and massacres in France, by the observation, that it was not their enemies whom the French had murdered, but their brethren. He most heartily concurred in the motion for the address.

Mr. Fox, after execrating in very pointed terms the murder of Louis XVI. said, that the various topics which the minister had introduced into the debate, were brought forward to blind the judgment, by rousing the passions, and were none [E]

of

of them the just grounds of war.They were three-the danger of Holland, the decree of the Convention of the 19th of November, and the general danger of Europe from the progress of the French arms.

With respect to Holland, the conduct of ministers afforded a fresh proof of their disingenuousness. They could not state that the Dutch had called upon us to fulfil the terms of our alliance. They were obliged to confess, that no such requisition had been made; but added, that they knew the Dutch were very much disposed to make it. Whatever might be the words of the treaty, we were bound in honour, by virtue of that treaty, to protect the Dutch, if they called upon us to do so; but neither by honour nor the treaty, till then.

This he by no means construed into giving up the opening of the Scheldt on their part; but it pretty clearly shewed, that they were not disposed to make it the cause of a war, unless forced to do so by us. But France had broke faith with the Dutch; was this a cause for us to go to war? How long was it since we considered a circumstance tending to diminish the good understanding between France and Holland, as a misfortune to this country! The plain state of the matter was, that we were bound to save Holland from war, or by war, if called upon; and that to force the Dutch into a war at so much peril to them, which they saw and dreaded, was not to fulfil, but to abuse the treaty.

The decree of the 19th of November, he considered as an insult; and the explanation of the executive council as no adequate satisfaction; but the explanation shewed

that the French were not disposed to insist upon that decree, and that they were inclined to peace; and then our ministers, with haughtiness unexampled, told them, they had insulted us, but refused to tell them the nature of the satisfaction that we required. It was said, we must have security; and he was ready to admit, that neither a disavowal by the executive council of France, nor a tacit repeal by the convention, on the intimation of an unacknowledged agent, of a decree, which they might renew the day after they repealed it, would be a sufficient security. But at least we ought to tell them what we meant by security, for it was the extreme of arrogance to complain of insult, without deigning to explain what reparation we required: and he feared an indefinite term was here employed, not for the purpose of obtaining, but of precluding satisfaction. Next it was said, they must withdraw their troops from the Austrian Netherlands, before we could be satisfied. Were we then to come to that pitch of insolence, as to say to France, “You have conquered part of an enemy's territory, who made war upon you, we will not interfere to make peace, but we require you to abandon the advantages you have gained, while he is preparing to attack you anew." Was this the neutrality we intended to hold out to France ? -"If you are invaded and beaten, we will be quiet spectators; but if you hurt your enemy, if you enter his territory, we declare against you." If the invasion of the Netherlands was what alarmed us so much, and that it ought to alarm us, if the result was to make the country an appendage to France,

there