there could be no doubt we ought to have interposed to prevent it in the very first instance; for it was the natural consequence which every man foresaw, of a war between France and Austria. The French now said, they would evacuate the country at the conclusion of the war, and when its liberties were established. Was this sufficient? by no means: but we ought to tell them what we would deem sufficient, instead of saying to them, as we were now saying, "this is an aggravation, this is nothing, and this is insufficient." That war is unjust which tells not an enemy the ground of provocation, and the measure of atonement it was also as impolitic as unjust; for without the object of contest, clearly and definitively stated, what opening could there be for treating of peace? Besides, before we engage in a war with France, it is but right, surely, that the people, who must pay and must suffer, ought to be informed on what object they were to fix their hopes for its honourable termination. After five or six years passed in war, the French might agree to evacuate the Netherlands as the price of peace; and was it clear they would not de so now, if we would condescend to propose it in intelligible terms? The experiment appeared, at least, to be worth a trial: but then we have no security against the French principles: surely we have the same security now, which they would be able to give us at the conclusion of a war.

With respect to the general danger of Europe, the same arguments applied, and to the same extent. To the general situation and security of Europe, we had been shame

fully inattentive: we had seen the entire conquest of Poland, and the invasion of France, with such marked indifference, that it would be difficult now to take it up with the grace of sincerity: but even this would be better provided for, by proposing terms before we absolutely engaged in war.

Having thus contended, that none of the professed causes were grounds for going to war, Mr. Fox asked, what then remained but the internal government of France, always disavowed, but ever kept in mind, and constantly mentioned! The destruction of that government was the avowed object of the combined powers, whom it was hoped we were to join. To this then we came at last, that we were ashamed to own engaging to aid the restoration of despotism, and collusively sought pretexts in the Scheldt and the Netherlands. Such would be the real cause of a war, if war we were to have, which he hoped soon to see as generally execrated, as it now appeared to be popular. He knew, that for this wish, he should be represented as holding up the internal government of France, as an object for imitation. He thought the present state of government in France nothing less; but he maintained, as a principle inviolable, that the government of every independent state was to be settled by those who were to live under it, and not by foreign force. The conduct of the French in the Netherlands, was the same with such a war, as he was now deprecating. It was a war of pikes and bayonets, against opinions; it was the tyranny of giving liberty by compulsion; it was an attempt to introduce a system among a people [E 2]

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by force, which the more it was forced upon them, the more they abhorred. The French appeared less moderate, from pretending to be more so, than other nations; by overturning the ancient government, and inposing theories of their own, on a people who disliked them, while they pretended to liberate, instead of using their right of conquest. But was this such a crime in the eyes of Europe? As was said of the woman caught in adultery, which of the courts, would that of London or Berlin cast the first stone? The states of Brabrant, they were told, had, pacta conventa, a legal and free government of their own. But were the states free under the house of Austria, under Joseph, Leopold, or Francis? O yes! for when Dumourier was triumphantly entering Brussels, and the Austrian governors making their escape at a postern, they sent back a declaration to the states, restoring their magna charta, the joyeuse entrée, which had been the perpetual subject of dispute with their sovereign, and which all their remonstrances could never obtain before. This was the government that acted with such honour to its subjects, and put the French to shame. He feared, that if they were to examine the conduct of foreign powers, in point of honour and good faith, they must be compelled to speak less civilly of them than policy would dictate. Why, then, had he touched upon it? Because the conduct of France was perpetually introduced to. inflame and delude, and it was his duty to dispel the delusion, by shewing that it was not more exceptionable than that of its neighbours.

Mr. Fox then argued from the consequences that might result to Holland, and the actual state of Ireland, that we ought not to enHe gage in a war with France. afterwards proceeded to consider the principles which had been reprobated on the proposed address; it was not the principles, he said, which were bad, but the abuse of them. From the abuse, not the principles, had flowed all the evils that afflicted France. The use of the word equality by the French was deemed highly objectionable. When taken as they meant it, nothing was more innocent; for what did they say, "all men are equal in respect of their rights." To this he assented; all men had equal rights, equal rights to unequal things; one man to a shilling, another to a thousand pounds; one man to a cottage, another to a palace; but the right in both was the same; an equal right of enjoying, an equal right of inheriting or acquiring, and of possessing inheritance or acquisition.

The effect of the proposed address was to condemn, not the abuse of those principles, (and the French had much abused them,)' but the principles themselves. To this he could not assent, for they were the principles on which all just and equitable government was founded.

He considered the atheism of France, if the French were atheists, as a ridiculous ground for war; and that, if we engaged in it to propagate the Christian religion, it should not be by a conduct contrary to the religion of Christ. He concluded, by exculpating himself, with great spirit, from the calumniating accusation of his being a partizan

partizan of France, and in correspondence with persons in that country.

Mr. Windham replied to Mr. Fox.-It had been said, he observed, that no specific object had been held out for which this country should go to war; nor in his opinion could it always happen, that, previous to entering upon a war, the precise object which was to lead to its termination should be distinctly known. At present we go to war for the security of this country, to attain which would be the object of the war, though it might be impossible to say how or when that was to be obtained: in the same way, when a person is attacked by a ruffian, the object is to escape, though it may be uncertain by what means that may be accomplished. In his opinion, from the present declared dispositions of the French, war was inevitable, and the only choice left us was the time, and he thought it by no means prudent to wait till they were ready to attack us. He conceived the French to be actuated by as great a spirit of conquest at present as they had ever been. War might, no doubt, occasion some discontents in this country; but impressed, as he was, that war was absolutely inevitable, neither that consideration, nor the calamities necessarily attending it, and which were always much to be regretted, bore at all upon his mind. His opinion of the views of the French, founded upon the whole tenour of their conduct for the last three or four years, could hardly be changed by any argument; and from thence conceiving it impossible that war could be avoided, he thought it should be undertaken

when it might probably be most effectually carried on; negotiation might, no doubt, be tried, but he had no hope that it would do any good.

Mr. Windham then proceeded to state strongly his ideas of the great danger of the propagation of French principles; and that opinions and principles, supported and propagated by arms, behoved to be opposed by arms. In his idea, the conquest of Britain by Louis XVI. would by no means have been a calamity equal to the propagation of French principles. In the one case, our persons might perhaps have been safe; all morality, order, and religion, would be totally overthrown in the other. This would be a war pro aris & focis to the greatest extent.

With respect to the Duke of Brunswick's expedition, which had been called the cause of despots, he confessed that he had wished them success, from the belief that the evil which that expedition was undertaken to remove was greater than any which could be apprehended from its success. He could, by no means, he said, join with Mr. Fox in his approbation of French principles, considered abstractedly; for they appeared to him as false in theory as in practice.-Who, he asked, ever expected advantages from war? But great as is the evil of war, he observed, that there must be a still greater evil; namely, the occasion of it. As to the idea that nothing but extirpation could effect the most desirable object of the war, that was viewing the matter in too dreadful a light: it might rather be hoped, that a people, who had of late so often changed their opinion, would

sidered, whether we should prepare to meet it with a firm determination, and support his majesty's government with zeal and courage against every attack. War now was not only declared, but carried on at our very doors; a war which aimed at an object no less destructive than the total ruin of the freedom and independence of this country.

After having taken a view of the situation of the country at the time of his majesty's last message, and of the circumstances which had preceded and accompanied it, Mr. Pitt entered into a very extensive examination of the situation in which we stood at that important moment. When, said he, his majesty had dismissed M. Chauvelin, as by the melancholy catastrophe of the monarch, his character had ceased at the British court, eight days had been allowed him for his departure, and if during that period he had sent any more satisfactory explanation, it would still have been received. M. Chauvelin, however, instantly quitted the country, without making any proposition. The next event that succeeded, was an embargo laid on all the vessels and persons of his majesty's subjects who were then in France, contrary to treaty, and against all the laws of nations.

Notwithstanding this violent and outrageous act, such was the disposition to peace in his majesty's ministers, that the channels of communication, even after this period, were not shut: a most singular circumstance happened, which was the arrival of intelligence from his majesty's minister at the Hague, on the very day when the embargo became known here, that he had received an in

timation from General Dumourier, that the general wished an interview, in order to see if it were yet possible to adjust the differences between the two countries, and to promote a general pacification. Instead of treating the embargo as an act of hostility, and forbearing from any communication, even after this aggression, his majesty's ministers, on the same day on which the embargo was made known to them, gave instructions to the ambassador at the Hague to enter into a communication with General Dumourier; and they did this with great satisfaction, on several accounts; first, because it might be done without committing the king's dignity; for the general of an army might, even in the very midst of war, without any recognition of his authority, open any negotiation of peace. But this sort of communication was desirable also, because, if successful, it would be attended with the most immediate effects, as its tendency was immediately to stop the progress of war, in the most practical, and perhaps, in the only practical way. No time was therefore lost in authorising the king's minister at the Hague to proceed in the pursuit of so desirable an object, if it could be done in a safe and honourable mode, but not otherwise. But be fore the answer of government could reach the ambassador, or any means be adopted for carrying the object proposed into execution, war was declared, on the part of the French, against this country.

He now proceeded to the declaration itself, which asserts, "that the king of England has not ceased, especially since the revolution of the 10th of Aug. 1792,

to