o'clock on the morning of the 29th she put to sea. The order of the Foreign Office to detain her reached Liverpool in the afternoon.

The government of the United States, in 1793, had barely entered upon the performance of the duties of neutrality when it was swept into the vortex of the great struggle, which was to last almost unbroken for more than twenty years, for the maintenance of neutral rights. In this momentous contest there was involved the ever-recurrent question, which will continue in some form to arise as long as wars are waged, as to how far neutral powers are required to subordinate the interests of their commerce to the hostile interests of belligerents. That powers at peace were entitled to trade with powers at war was not denied, but the rule was subject to exceptions. It was admitted that a belligerent might cut off all trade with the enemy's ports by blockading them, and might also prohibit the carriage of contraband to the enemy. For entering or attempting to enter a blockaded port, the penalty was confiscation of vessel and cargo, while the carriage of contraband entailed the loss of the prohibited articles and the freight, if nothing more. There was, however, no precise and general agreement either as to what constituted a blockade, or as to what articles were to be considered as contraband. If blockades could be legally established merely by decrees on paper, without the application

of force, or if the list of contraband could be sufficiently extended, it is obvious that the right of neutrals to trade with belligerents could be reduced to the shadow of a tantalizing supposition. Grotius, often called the father of international law, had divided articles, with reference to the question of contraband, into three classes: First, articles that were directly useful in war, as arms; second, those that were useless in war; and third, those that could be "used both in war and in peace, as money, provisions, ships, and articles of naval equipment." Concerning the first and second classes there was no dispute, except as to the possible inclusion or exclusion of some particular article; but as to the third class there had been a long and heated controversy, especially respecting provisions.

There was also a question as to whether the goods of an enemy might be seized on board a neutral ship. It was conceded that a belligerent power might capture vessels belonging to subjects of the enemy, as well as other private property of the enemy at sea; but for many years an effort had been in progress to introduce the rule, denoted by the phrase "free ships free goods," that the merchandise of an enemy should, unless contraband of war, be exempt from seizure when transported by a neutral vessel. In 1780, the Empress Catherine of Russia issued a famous declaration concerning neutral rights. Since the days when Peter the

Great, barbarian, statesman, and seer, diversified his studies in shipbuilding by riding through Evelyn's hedges in a wheelbarrow and pulling the teeth of his own retinue, Russia had aspired to become a maritime power. The declaration of the Empress Catherine afforded a striking manifestation of that ambition. Affirming the right of neutrals to trade with the powers at war, it sought to limit the scope of contraband, declared that blockades must be maintained by a force sufficient to render access to the blockaded port dangerous, and adopted the rule of free ships free goods. On this manifesto there was based an alliance of neutral powers, called the Armed Neutrality, the formation of which was one of the most notable events of the wars growing out of the American Revolution; and although the alliance was not effectively maintained, the principles which it consecrated possessed vitality, and were destined to survive an ordeal yet more severe than any to which they had ever been subjected.

By a decree of the National Convention of France, of May 9, 1793, the commanders of French ships of war and privateers were authorized to seize merchant vessels laden with provisions bound to an enemy's port, or with merchandise belonging to an enemy. This decree was defended on the ground of a scarcity of provisions in France, but it ran counter to the views of the United States concerning the freedom of trade as well as to treaty stipula

tions. Morris remonstrated against it, and intimated that it would be followed with eagerness by France's maritime enemies. His prognostication proved to be correct. By an order in council of June 8, 1793, the commanders of British cruisers were authorized to seize all vessels laden with grain, flour, or meal, bound either to a port in France or to a port occupied by the French arms.

It is true

that, by the terms of both these measures, the provisions, if neutral-owned, were to be paid for; but the compensation promised was far less than the cargo would have brought at the port of destination. Moreover, the order in council was followed, as was also the decree, by other measures yet more vexatious.

Out of these perilous complications Washington sought to find a way by negotiation. John Jay, then Chief-Justice of the United States, was sent to London, where, on November 19, 1794, he concluded a treaty under which an aggregate amount of perhaps more than eleven million dollars was eventualby obtained from the British government on account of maritime captures. The treaty, however, gave great umbrage to France, not only because it granted privileges of asylum to British ships of war and recognized the right to capture enemies' goods in neutral vessels, but also because it definitely fixed the position of the United States as a neutral. The resentment of the French government was soon made

manifest by measures which prefigured the Berlin and Milan decrees of Napoleon. By a decree of the Executive Directory of July 2, 1796, which laid the foundation of a new series, it was announced that the cruisers of France would treat neutral vessels, as to searches, captures, and confiscation, in the same manner as their governments should suffer the English to treat them. The French government also recalled its minister from the United States and reduced the grade of the mission. Monroe, too, was recalled, and in his place was sent Charles Cotesworth Pinckney.

When, in December, 1796, Pinckney arrived in Paris, the Directory refused either to receive him or to permit him to stay at the capital as a private alien; and he retired to Amsterdam to await developments. Desirous, however, of trying all possible means of conciliation, President John Adams, while recommending to Congress the consideration of effectual measures of defence, joined Elbridge Gerry and John Marshall with Pinckney in a special mission. The three envoys arrived in Paris October 4, 1797. Four days later they were unofficially received by Talleyrand, who was then Minister of Foreign Affairs; but he subsequently intimated that they could not have a public audience of the Directory till their negotiations were concluded. Meanwhile, they were waited upon by three men who came sometimes singly and sometimes together, and