LESSON CXXXIX. The same continued. 1. Let it be remembered, that the Constitution of the United States is not unalterable. It is to continue in its present form no longer than the people who established it shall choose to continue it. If they shall become convinced that they have made an injudicious or inexpedient partition and distribution of power, between the State Governments and the General Government, they can alter that distribution at will and pleasure. 2. If any thing be found in the national constitution, either by original provision, or subsequent interpretation, which ought not to be in it, the people know how to get rid of it. If any construction be established, unacceptable to them, so as to become, practically, a part of the Constitution, they will amend it, at their own sovereign pleasure. But while the people choose to maintain it, as it is; while they are satisfied with it, and refuse to change it, who has given, or who can give, to the State Legislatures a right to alter it, either by interference, construction or otherwise? 3. Gentlemen do not seem to recollect that the people have any power to do any thing for themselves; they imagine there is no safety for them, any longer than they are under the close guardianship of the State Legislatures. Sir, the people have not trusted their safety, in regard to the general constitution, to these hands. 4. They have required other security, and taken other bonds. They have chosen to trust themselves, first, to the plain words of the instrument, and to such construction as the government itself, in doubtful. cases, should put on its own powers, under their oaths of office, and subject to their responsibility to them; just as the people of a State trust their own State Governments with a similar power.. 5. Secondly, they have reposed their trust in the efficacy of frequent elections, and in their own power to remove their own servants and agents, whenever they see cause. Thirdly, they have reposed their trust in the judicial power, which, in order that it might be trust-worthy, they have made as respectable, as disinterested, and as independent as was practicable. 6. Fourthly, they have seen fit to rely, in case of necessity, or high expediency, on their known and admitted power, to alter or amend the Constitution, peaceably and quietly, whenever experience shall point out defects or imperfections. And, finally, the people of the United States have, at no time, in no way, directly or indirectly, authorised any State Legislature to construe or interpret their high instrument of Government; much less to interfere, by their own power, to arrest its course and operation. 7. If, sir, the people, in these respects, had done otherwise than they have done, their Constitution could neither have been preserved, nor would it have been worth preserving. And, if its plain provisions shall now be disregarded, and these new doctrines interpolated in it, it will become as feeble and helpless a being as its enemies, whether early or more recent, could possibly desire. It will exist in every State, but as a poor dependent on State permission. It must borrow leave to be; and will be, no longer than State pleasure, or State discretion, sees fit to grant the indulgence, and to prolong its poor existence. 8. But, sir, although there are fears, there are hopes also. The people have preserved this, their own chosen Constitution, for forty years, and have seen their happiness, prosperity, and renown, grow with its growth, and strengthen with its strength. They are now, generally, strongly attached to it. Overthrown by direct assault, it cannot be; evaded, undermined, NULLIFIED, it will not be; if we, and those who shall succeed us here, as agents and representatives of the people, shall conscientiously and vigilantly discharge the two great branches of our public trust-faithfully to preserve, and wisely to administer it. 9. Mr. President, I have thus stated the reasons of my dissent to the doctrines which have been advanced and maintained. I am conscious of having detained you and the Senate much too long. I was drawn into the debate, with no previous deliberation, such as is suited to the discussion of so grave and important a subject. But it is a subject of which my heart is full, and I have not been willing to suppress the utterance of its spontaneous sentiments. 10. I cannot, even now, persuade myself to relinquish it, without expressing, once more, my deep conviction, that, since it respects nothing less than the union of the States, it is of most vital and essential importance to the public Ꮓ happiness. I profess, sir, in my career, hitherto, to have kept steadily in view the prosperity and honour of the whole country, and the preservation of our federal union. 11. It is to that union we owe our safety at home, and our consideration and dignity abroad. It is to that union that we are chiefly indebted for whatever makes us most proud of our country. That union we reached only by the discipline of our virtues in the severe school of adversity. It had its origin in the necessities of disordered finance, prostrate commerce, and ruined credit. 12. Under its benign influences, these great interests immediately awoke, as from the dead, and sprang forth with newness of life. Every year of its duration has teemed with fresh proofs of its utility and its blessings; and, although our territory has stretched out wider and wider, and our population spread farther and farther, they have not outrun its protection or its benefits. 13. It has been to us all a copious fountain of national, social and personal happiness. I have not allowed myself, sir, to look beyond the union, to see what might lie hidden in the dark recess behind. I have not coolly weighed the chances of preserving liberty, when the bonds that unite us together shall be broken asunder. 14.. I have not accustomed myself to hang over the precipice of disunion, to see whether, with my short sight, I can fathom the depth of the abyss below; nor could I regard him as a safe counsellor in the affairs of this government, whose thoughts should be mainly bent on considering not how the union should be best preserved, but how tolerable might be the condition of the people when it shall be broken up and destroyed. 15. While the union lasts, we have high, exciting, gratifying prospects spread out before us, for us and our children.. Beyond that I seek not to penetrate the veil. God grant that, in my day, at least, that curtain may not rise. God grant that on my vision, never may be opened what lies behind. 16. When my eyes shall be turned to behold, for the last time, the sun in Heaven, may I not see him shining on the broken and dishonoured fragments of a once glorious union; on States dissevered, discordant, belligerent; on a land rent with civil feuds, or drenched, it may be, in fraternal blood! Let their last feeble and lingering glance, rather behold the gorgeous ensign of the republic, now known and honoured throughout the earth, still full high advanced, its arms and trophies streaming in their original lustre, not a stripe erased or polluted, nor a single star obscured-bearing for its motto, no such miserable interrogatory as What is all this worth? 17. Nor those other words of delusion and folly, Liberty first and Union afterwards-but every where, spread all over in characters of living light, blazing on its ample folds, as they float over the sea and over the land, and in every wind under the whole heavens, that other sentiment, dear to every true American heart-liberty and union, now and for ever, one and inseparable! LESSON CXL. Constitutional Doctrine. FROM THE LETTER OF JAMES MADISON. 1. In order to understand the true character of the Constitution of the United States, the error, not uncommon, must be avoided, of viewing it through the medium either of a consolidated Government, or of a confederated Government, whilst it is neither the one nor the other; but a mixture of both. And having, in no model, the similitudes and analogies applicable to other systems of Government, it must, more than any other, be its own interpreter, according to its text and the facts of the case. 2. From these it will be seen, that the characteristic peculiarities of the Constitution are, I, the mode of its formation, II, the division of the supreme powers of Government between the States in their united capacity, and the States in their individual capacities. 3. It was formed, not by the Governments of the component States, as the Federal Government for which it was substituted was formed. Nor was it formed by a majority of the people of the United States, as a single community, in the manner of a consolidated Government. 4. It was formed by the States, that is, by the people in each of the States, acting in their highest sovereign capacity; and formed consequently by the same authority which form ed the State Constitutions. 5. Being thus derived from the same source as the Constitutions of the States, it has, within each State, the same authority as the Constitution of the State; and is as much a Constitution, in the strict sense of the term, within its prescribed sphere, as the Constitutions of the States are, within their respective spheres: but with this obvious and essential difference, that, being a compact among the States in their highest sovereign capacity, and constituting the people thereof one people for certain purposes, it cannot be altered or annulled at the will of the States individually, as the Constitution of a State may be at its individual will. 6. And that it divides the supreme power of Government, between the Government of the United States, and the Governments of individual States, is stamped on the face of the instrument; the powers of war and of taxation, of commerce, and of treaties, and other enumerated powers vested in the Government of the United States, being of as high and sovereign a character, as any of the powers reserved to the State Governments. 7. Nor is the Government of the United States, created by the Constitution, less a Government in the strict sense of the term, within the sphere of its powers, than the Governments created by the Constitution of the States are, within their several spheres. It is like them organized into Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary Departments. It operates, like them, directly on persons and things. And, like them, it has at command a physical force for executing the powers committed to it. The concurrent operation in certain cases, is one of the features marking the peculiarity of the system. LESSON CXLI. The same continued. 1. Between these different Constitutional Governments, the one operating in all the states, the others operating sepa rately in each; with the aggregate powers of government divided between them, it could not escape attention, that controversies would arise concerning the boundaries of jurisdiction; and that some provision ought to be made for such occurrences. |