of natural or market values, no board could possibly judge intelligently of the great variety of occupations, conditions, and questions that would come before it. It might be able and honest; but in addition, it would be necessary for its members to be universal experts. No two cases would be alike. It would not be simply a question of law and principle, or right or wrong; but, rather, of materials, qualities, markets, credits, competition, expenses, and many other elements which would all have a bearing. Aside, then, from its strained and unnatural jurisdiction, it would be a physical and mental impossibility for any board to grapple with such a variety of problems as would come before it.

Voluntary arbitration is of value in its proper sphere, but the fixing of prices and forcing them upon an unwilling purchaser is coercive. In the interpretation and enforcement of existing contracts arbitration is often quicker, less expensive, and more satisfactory than the regular process of law; but its adoption must be voluntary on both sides. The time-honored method of settling disputes by each party choosing one who is familiar with the conditions, and they choosing the third, the three then acting together to make a just settlement, is a commendable way of adjusting differences without requiring the intervention of a State board.

Conciliation, however, is more useful than arbitration. There is an important difference between them. The former may be employed regardless of State law, and is always mutually voluntary. Often all that is necessary to settle serious disputes is the assistance of conciliators who possess the confidence and esteem of both parties. They also should have a thorough knowledge of all the details and peculiarities of the special business, such as would be impossible with any State board. By such means angry feelings and prejudices may often be subdued, and reason and good sense brought to the front. When, in a conciliatory spirit, those who differ can be brought to sit around the same table and

reason together in a friendly way, differences rapidly disappear. This would not often be the result of formal arbitration, which has the character of a court of law, in the fact that each side is arrayed against the other. Arbitration, in the proper sense of the word, must proceed under statutory or judicial authority. Even when both parties enter into it voluntarily, they must relinquish their freedom to a great extent by consenting in advance to accept the award of the arbitrators, so as to enable it to be judicially enforced. This gives it essentially the character of a court of law, with all its incidental antagonism and bitterness. If it have not these features, it is in reality conciliation, and not arbitration.

As long as the present strained and opposing relations exist between capital and labor, disputes and controversies will be numerous and bitter. Any ostensible settlement of them by boards of arbitration will only be a brief truce, rather than a treaty of peace. Under the head of conciliation is included all that is voluntary, friendly, reasonable, and fair in its character; and its possibilities for usefulness are great. Arbitration which must take account of the legal, opposing, and two-sided phases of a question, is wellnigh valueless for permanent results. There is much of the combative element in human nature; and instead of stimulating it to greater activity, it should be counteracted and subdued by other qualities which are just as inherent in man's constitution. Only by such means can the different elements of society be united and harmonized.

ECONOMIC LEGISLATION AND ITS

PROPER LIMITS.

"There shall be, in England, seven half-penny loaves sold for a penny the three-hooped pot shall have ten hoops; and I will make it felony to drink small beer."

KING HENRY VI.

"O! it is excellent

To have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous
To use it like a giant."

MEASURE FOR MEASure.

"Let us a little permit Nature to take her own way; she better understands her own affairs than we."

"For where's the state beneath the firmament

That doth excel the bees for government?"

MONTAIGNE.

DU BARTAS.

XI.

ECONOMIC LEGISLATION AND ITS PROPER

LIMITS.

To what extent the State may properly interfere with the industrial freedom of its citizens is a difficult and many-sided question. We shall not attempt to answer it in detail, but rather indicate certain general principles deducible from Natural Law, as a guide to its solution. The goal to be reached is the greatest good for the greatest number; and natural principles are the finger-boards that point out the way.

It is obvious that as modern civilization becomes more complex, population denser, and inventions and improvements more numerous, the scope of legislation, especially municipal, widens. The modern city, in many respects, is a great copartnership. Some sentimentalists hail municipal drainage, water-works, lighting, and possible rapid transit as successive steps in socialism. They are, however, only the wise business methods of a great corporation. Circumstances make them expedient, but their purpose is not to absorb private interests but to render them aid. The municipality can economically supply the citizen with water and light without the least impairment of his personal rights or privileges. With the growth of cities and profusion of inventions, an increasing number of functions can be performed by public administration. This is especially true, where, in services like those before mentioned, unlimited private competition is not practicable. The supply of water and light in a municipality involves the use