BOOK I. We have therefore now chalked out all the principal outlines of this vaft title of the law, the fupreme executive magistrate, or the king's majesty, confidered in his feveral capacities and points of view. But, before we entirely difmifs this fubject, it may not be improper to take a short comparative review of the power of the executive magistrate, or prerogative of the crown, as it stood in former days, and as it ftands at present. And we cannot but obferve, that most of the laws for ascertaining, limiting, and restraining this prerogative have been made within the compass of little more than a century paft; from the petition of right in 3 Car. I. to the prefent time. So that the powers of the crown are now to all appearance greatly curtailed and diminished fince the reign of king James the first: particularly, by the abolition of the star chamber and high commiffion courts in the reign of Charles the firft, and by the disclaiming of martial law, and the power of levying taxes on the fubject, by the fame prince: by the difufe of foreft laws for a century past: and by the many excellent provifions enacted under Charles the fecond; efpecially the abolition of military tenures, purveyance, and pre-emption; the habeas corpus act; and the act to prevent the difcontinuance of parliaments for above three years: and, fince the revolution, by the ftrong and emphatical words in which our liberties are afferted in the bill of rights, and act of fettlement; by the act for triennial, fince turned into feptennial, elections; by the exclufion of certain officers from the house. of commons; by rendering the feats of the judges permanent, and their falaries liberal and independent; and by restraining the king's pardon from obftructing parliamentary impeachments. Befides all this, if we confider how the crown is impoverifhed and ftripped of all it's antient revenues, fo that it must greatly rely on the liberality of parliament for it's neceffary fupport and maintenance, we may perhaps be led to think, that the ballance is inclined pretty strongly to the popular scale, and that the executive magiftrate has neither independence nor power enough left to form that check upon the lords and commons, which the founders of our constitution intended.

BUT, on the other hand, it is to be confidered, that every prince, in the first parliament after his acceffion, has by long

ufage a truly royal addition to his hereditary revenue fettled upon him for his life; and has never any occafion to apply to parliament for fupplies, but upon fome public neceffity of the whole realm. This reftores to him that constitutional independence, which at his firft acceffion feems, it must be owned, to be wanting. And then, with regard to power, we may find perhaps that the hands of government are at least fufficiently strengthened; and that an English monarch is now in no danger of being overborne by either the nobility or the people. The inftruments of power are not perhaps fo open and avowed as they formerly were, and therefore are the less liable to jealous and invidious reflections; but they are not the weaker upon that account. In fhort, our national debt and taxes (befides the inconveniencies before mentioned) have also in their natural confequences thrown fuch a weight of power into the executive scale of government, as we cannot think was intended by our patriot ancestors; who gloriously struggled for the abolition of the then formidable parts of the prerogative, and by an unaccountable want of forefight established this system in their stead. The entire collection and management of so vast a revenue, being placed in the hands of the crown, have given rise to such a multitude of new officers created by and removable at the royal pleasure, that they have extended the influence of government to every corner of the nation. Witnefs the commiffioners and the multitude of dependents on the customs, in every port of the kingdom; the commiffioners of excife, and their numerous fubalterns, in every inland district; the post-masters, and their fervants, planted in every town, and upon every public road; the commiffioners of the ftamps, and their diftributors, which are full as scattered and full as numerous; the officers of the falt duty, which though a species of excife and conducted in the same manner, are yet made a distinct corps from the ordinary managers of that revenue; the furveyors of houses and windows; the receivers of the land tax; the managers of lotteries; and the commiffioners of hackney coaches; all which are either mediately or immediately appointed by the crown, and removable at pleasure without any reafon affigned: thefe,

it requires but little penetration to fee, must give that power, on which they depend for fubfiftence, an influence most amazingly extensive. To this may be added the frequent opportunities of conferring particular obligations, by preference in loans, fubfcriptions, tickets, remittances, and other money-tranfactions, which will greatly increase this influence; and that over those persons whose attachment, on account of their wealth, is frequently the most defirable. All this is the natural, though perhaps the unforeseen confequence of erecting our funds of credit, and to support them establishing our prefent perpetual taxes: the whole of which is entirely new fince the restoration in 1660; and by far the greatest part fince the revolution in 1688. And the fame may be faid with regard to the officers in our numerous army, and the places which the army has created. All which put together give the executive power so persuasive an energy with respect to the perfons themselves, and fo prevailing an interest with their friends and families, as will amply make amends for the lofs of external prerogative.

BUT, though this profufion of offices fhould have no effect on individuals, there is ftill another newly acquired branch of power; and that is, not the influence only, but the force of a disciplined army: paid indeed ultimately by the people, but immediately by the crown: raised by the crown, officered by the crown, commanded by the crown. They are kept on foot it is true only from year to year, and that by the power of parliament: but during that year they muft by the nature of our conftitution, if raised at all, be at the abfolute difpofal of the crown. And there need but few words to demonstrate how great a truft is thereby repofed in the prince by his people. A truft, that is more than equivalent to a thousand little troublesome prerogatives.

ADD to all this, that befides the civil lift, the immenfe revenue of almost seven millions fterling, which is annually paid to the creditors of the public, or carried to the finking fund, is first depofited in the royal exchequer, and thence

iffued out to the refpective offices of payment. This revenue the people can never refuse to raise, because it is made perpetual by act of parliament: which also, when well confidered, will appear to be a trust of great delicacy and high importance.

UPON the whole therefore I think it is clear, that, whatever may have become of the nominal, the real power of the crown has not been too far weakened by any transactions in the last century. Much is indeed given up; but much is alfo acquired. The ftern commands of prerogative have yielded to the milder voice of influence: the flavish and exploded doctrine of non-refiftance has given way to a military establishment by law; and to the difufe of parliaments has fucceeded a parliamentary truft of an immenfe perpetual revenue. When, indeed, by the free operation of the finking fund, our national debts shall be leffened; when the posture of foreign affairs, and the universal introduction of a well planned and national militia, will fuffer our formidable army to be thinned and regulated; and when (in consequence of all) our taxes fhall be gradually reduced; this adventitious power of the crown will flowly and imperceptibly diminish, as it flowly and imperceptibly rofe. But, till that shall happen, it will be our especial duty, as good subjects and good Englishmen, to reverence the crown, and yet guard against corrupt and fervile influence from those who are intrusted with it's authority; to be loyal, yet free; obedient, and yet independent; and, above every thing, to hope that we may long, very long, continue to be governed by a fovereign, who, in all those public acts that have perfonally proceeded from himself, hath manifested the highest veneration for the free conftitution of Britain; hath already in more than one inftance remarkably ftrengthened it's outworks; and will therefore never harbour a thought, or adopt a persuasion, in any the remotest degree detrimental to public liberty.

CHAPTER THE NINTH.

OF SUBORDINATE MAGISTRATES.

IN

Na former chapter of these commentaries a we diftinguished magiftrates into two kinds; fupreme, or those in whom the fovereign power of the ftate refides; and fubordinate, or those who act in an inferior fecondary sphere. We have hitherto confidered the former kind only; namely, the fupreme legislative power or parliament, and the supreme executive power, which is the king: and are now to proceed to inquire into the rights and duties of the principal fubordinate magiftrates.

AND herein we are not to inveftigate the powers and duties of his majefty's great officers of ftate, the lord treasurer, lord chamberlain, the principal fecretaries, or the like; becaufe I do not know that they are in that capacity in any confiderable degree the objects of our laws, or have any very important fhare of magiftracy conferred upon them: except that the fecretaries of ftate are allowed the power of commitment, in order to bring offenders to trial. Neither fhall I here treat of the office and authority of the lord chancellor, or the other judges of the fuperior courts of justice; because they will find a more proper place in the third part of these commentaries. Nor fhall I enter into any minute difquifitions, with regard to the rights and dignities of mayors and alder

a ch. 2. page 146.

143.

Leon. 70. 2 Leon. 175. Comb. 291.

5 Mod. 84. Salk. 347. Carth,

men,