was a question of pleading, its sufficiency
might be doubtful, but affidavits in bankruptcy
were not sworn to such nicety. On none of
those grounds had the validity of the fiat
been disturbed. He (the Chief Judge) had
the misfortune not to see the case in such a
strong light as his colleagues, and should have
hesitated to supersede. Still there was enough
to induce him to think that the judgment of
the Court would indicate the proper course.
There had been harsh proceedings, and the re-
spondents were not entitled to benefit thereby.
He would, however, have preferred waiting to
see whether the fiat could be worked by other
hands. He scarcely relied on the bankrupt's
solvency, and saw no reason to think the fiat
had been sued out by the respondents to rid
themselves of the petitioner. It was a strong
circumstance that no other creditor had proved;
and as his colleagues thought it a case for a
supersedeas, though, for his own part, he would
have preferred waiting, the Court would order
the fiat to be annulled.
Fiat superseded with costs.

Court, the other was of public importance. || out by the requisite officer for a debt due to Was this a fiat which under the circumstances the company. This was allowable under the ought to be sustained? If all the Courts had 1 & 2 Vic. c. 96. The decision in "Guthrie agreed on the insufficiency of the act of bank- and Fisk" against a fiat was, in reference to a ruptcy, a reference to these matters would private act of Parliament, to be construed have been unnecessary. Mr. Hall was a mem- strictly. The Legislature had since extended ber of the company. He had no other trad- the powers of banking companies. The affiing, and had no debts but those alleged under davit adverted to had been duly filed and the affidavits. A bill in equity was filed, with served; and the question was, if it was proproceedings for an account. It then occurred perly sworn. The statute was silent, as in to the plaintiff that it would be better to make 6 Geo. IV., leaving the conclusion that it was the defendant a bankrupt, the new act of Par- intended to be sworn by persons permitted to liament having provided an opportunity, if an take, and before persons empowered to receive, affidavit of debt could be made large enough affidavits in bankruptcy proceedings. As reto drive the party into an act of bankruptcy.garded the person to take the affidavit, if it The representative of the company swore to a debt of 15,000l. without any reference to the securities, and to an amount far beyond the balance due. By this contrivance the debtor was driven by the creditor's affidavit into the snares and trammels of an act of bankruptcy. He did not find bail, and was made a bankrupt simply on the affidavit of a partner. They carried down the fiat, and applied for a provisional assignment to the petitioning creditor, a proceeding contrary to all usage. He (Sir John Cross) had had long experience as a commissioner, and certainly would never have given such a power. The cause for this provisional assignment was not shown on the proceedings. Now, mark its effects. It empowered the seizure instanter of all real and personal estate; it enabled the parties to turn the debtor out of his house, and leave him at the mercy of his adversary in the suit in equity. The bankrupt swears there was no other creditor, and that the claim itself was sub judice. The Court had left the matter for the choice of assignees; but the commissioners could not stir a step. They sat their hour, and received their fees, but no creditor proved a debt, not even the petitioning creditor himself; the prosecution of the fiat broke down. This was not a case to which bankruptcy was intended to apply; it was not for equal division of property amongst creditors, there being none other than the plaintiff in equity. It would be monstrous to say that all this gentleman's property should be left at the mercy of his legal adversary. It had been doubted if there was a precedent for such a case. In the 4th Vesey, in re Bowles," a similar case, where there was a suit in equity, Lord Loughborough superseded with costs. He (Sir J. Cross) was of opinion, upon the merits, that this fiat ought to be superseded.

The CHIEF JUDGE said, that with regard to the trading a doubt had arisen from what had fallen from the Court on a former occasion, when an individual had endeavoured to support a fiat upon the purchase of shares to enable a friend to sue out a commission. This the Court would not allow; but it had never said that a shareholder did not make himself a trader as a banker, and would not allow such a person to set up a denial of trading. Here the person was not only a shareholder, but a manager, and there could be no doubt as to the trading. He thought the fiat was well sued

Reviews of New Books.

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Sandon, in the abolition of Imprisonment for || sonal liberty can at all times be placed in

debt Bill on the 24th July last, which were negatived. The debates upon this bill should be read by every professional man, and they are in this periodical detailed with great care. It also contains the debate upon the Bishop of Exeter's question to Ministers as to the Earl of Durham's instructions on the 23d July last, and much other interesting matter, which is highly valuable.

The LAW STUDENT'S Common Place Book, being a Collection of Titles, Divisions, and Subdivisions of THE LAW, arranged Alphabetically with references to the Authorities to be consulted on each Title, or Division, and with appropriate blanks to enable the Student to insert such Notes or Memorandums as the progress of his reading or experience may suggest, or alterations or amendments in the Law render necessary. Compiled and arranged from the MSS. of Charles Petersdorff, Esq. of the Inner Temple. London, L. Houghton, 30, Poultry; Henry Butterworth, 7, Fleet Street.

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jeopardy by the written order of a friend,
surgeons, or apothecaries."
when backed by the warrant of two physicians,

Upon this startling anomaly in the juristhe Chancellor in a lucid and intelligible prudence of England," the writer addresses manner. The pamphlet merits the attention of our readers.

Business in the Courts.

Beadles v. Russell-Saxby v. Saxby-Cochtane v. Robinson-Powell v. Longsden-In re Harrison-Simmonds v. Barber - Peach v. Pigon - Dawson v. Dawson - Stonnell v. Estate In re Mill-hill Grammar School-In Browning-In re Webb-In re Antholin Trust re Bowman-Ex parte Overton-Shipley v. Shipley-Wray v. Field-In re York Estates rities-Taunton v. Mouzen-Shirley v. Lord -In re Wisbech Charities-In re Oadly ChaManners-Slaughter v. Ferrier-Cannings v. Flower-Ex parte Evans-Boulger v. Blandy. After the Petitions.

De Tastet v. Thorpe, to be spoke to-Bradly v. Birch, ditto-Davis v. Pitt, ditto-In re Dorchester Charities, petition by order-Julian Powell, ditto Holmes v. Crispe, dittoPlowes v. Bossy, ditto.

A Letter to the Right Hon. the Lord Chancellor on the present state of the Law of Lunacy, with suggestions for its amend, ment, by a Barrister of the Inner Temple, London, William Crofts, 19, Chancery Lane, 1838.

The simple object of the writer appears to be to draw his Lordship's attention to the fact, that by the law as it now stands an idiot "-a monomaniac-the mere lovely and quiet sufferer from morbid feeling and imagination, is placed in a worse condition, and a more perilous situation with regard to his personal liberty, than the criminal, who by his delinquencies has rendered himself liable to punishment. The property of an actual or supposed lunatic is infinitely better guarded than his person, indeed property receives all the protection which can be bestowed; but let the individual himself be never so inoffensive, and sane upon every subject but one, his per

COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH.
Middlesex Common Juries.
Farrar and others v. Hutchison-Lewis v.
Ponsford-Wilson v. Knapp and another-
Basta v. Ryan-Devonald v. Hope-Melton v.
Harvey-Pierson v. Pain and another-Phil-
lips v. Croucher-Doe, dem. Ive, v. Scott-
Farrington v. Tilley and another-Blewit v.
Morgan-Walton v. Gomme-Daniel v. Smith
-Jones v. London and Birmingham Railway.

ROLLS COURT.

The following notice has been posted in the Registrar's Office:

"The Master of the Rolls, taking notice that there are now remaining in his Lordship's cause-book, to be heard, several pleas

demurrers, exceptions, further directions, and || wish to be useful to all the profession, but, causes, which have stood over for a consider- in being so, we must not destroy our ways able time, and it is probable that the matters and means. in difference in some of them are accommo

Goodricke v. Wood-Smith v. Bull-Rose v. Smith-Priddey v. Leman. The last Common Jury cause is No. 21 on pelled to read nor buy. Our business is

with ourselves and our "Guide," and not with any contemporary. We shall never The Court having disposed of all the Mid-be found wanting in our pledges for its condlesex cases will sit in London this day.

LONDON PRINTED BY STEWART AND MURRAY, OLD BAILEY.

The Legal Guide.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1838.

ON THE TITLE A PURCHASER MAY
REQUIRE.

The new Statute of Limitations, relating to
Real Property, 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 27.
continuation of our observations upon
the state of the Law previous to the
passing of this Statute, we proceed to Sect.
27, which saves the Jurisdiction of Equity,
on the ground of acquiescence or otherwise;
it is therefore the more necessary that this
jurisdiction should be well understood at the
present day.

breach of trust by the trustee, is barred of relief. See Walker v. Symonds, 3 Swanst. 64; Brice v. Stokes, 11 Ves. 319; Ryder v. Bickerton, id. 83. n. Underwood v. Stevens, 1 Mer. 712.; Trafford v. Boehm, 3 Atk. 444. In the former case it was observed by Lord Eldon that, "it is established by all the cases, if the cestui que trust joins with the trustees in that which is a breach of trust knowing the circumstances, such a cestui que trust can never complain of such a breach of trust, and either concurrence in the act or acquiescence without original concurrence, will release the trustees; but that is only a general rule, and the Court must enquire into the circumstances which induced concurrence or acquiescence, recollecting in the conduct of that inquiry how important it is on the one hand to secure the property of the cestui que trust, and on the other not to deter men from undertaking trusts."

Long acquiescence by a party acquainted with the facts is a bar to equitable relief. (See Selsey r. Rhodes, 2 Sim & Stu. 41.) So also length of time or long acquiescence in a transaction may bar relief in cases where But this doctrine of acquiescence must be the transaction, if impeached within a rea- construed differently, in the relation of hussonable time, would be set aside. (See Hickes hand and wife. In Honner v. Morton, 3 . Cooke, 4 Dowl. 16.) But to fix acqui- Russ. 65. S. P. Watson v. Dennis, id. 90. escence upon a party, it should unequivo- the wife had a vested interest in remainder cally appear that he knew the fact upon expectant on the death of a tenant for life, which the supposed acquiescence is founded, in an ascertained fund, the wife and tenant and to which it refers. The doctrine of for life survived the husband. Previous acquiescence does not apply where all the to the death of the husband he and his parties are under the influence of a common wife executed four assignments, by which mistake (see 2 Mer. 352); and where a they assigned portions of the fund for party is ignorant that he has a right to dis- valuable consideration; after the death of pute there can be no acquiescence. See Chol- the husband the wife assigned to one of mondeley v. Clinton, 2 Mer. 362. A cesthe former purchasers by indorsement on tui que trust concurring or acquiescing in a the first purchase-deed, a further portion VOL. I.

K

able to reduce the property into possession, and then his previous assignment will operate on his actual situation, and the property

of the fund, and the deed recited that the purchaser was entitled to that portion of the fund he had first purchased, and referred to the three other assignments. She after-will be transferred. His Lordship conwards filed a bill, insisting that the assign- cluded that the judgment of the Master of ments made while her husband and the the Rolls, in Purdew v. Jackson, (a) was tenant for life were living, did not bind her, right, and that the husband dying while the and the question rose was, whether when a wife's interest continued reversionary, had husband and wife have assigned to a pur- no power to make an assignment of prochaser for valuable consideration, an ascer-perty of this description, which should be tained fund in which the wife has a vested valid against the wife surviving, and dereversionary interest expectant on the deathclared that the four assignments made durof a tenant for life, and the wife and the ing the husband's life-time could not be tenant for life both outlive the husband, the sustained. wife is entitled by right of survivorship to claim the whole of the fund against such particular assignee for valuable considera-escence on the part of the wife, because the tion.

The Lord Chancellor said, that this fund was a chose in action of the wife; it was her reversionary chose in action. Whether the husband has the power of assigning his wife's reversionary interest in a chose in action, is a question which has been repeatedly agitated, and has excited considerable interest both at law and in equity. At law the choses in action of the wife belong to the husband if he reduces them into possession. If he does not reduce them into possession and dies before his wife, they survive to her. When the husband assigns the chose in action of his wife, one would suppose on the first impression, that the assignee would not be in a better situation than the assignor, and that he too must take some steps to reduce the subject into possession, in order to make his title good against the wife surviving. But equity considers the assignment by the husband as amounting to an agreement that he will reduce the property into possession; it likewise considers what a party agrees to do as actually done, and therefore where the husband has the power of reducing the property into possession, his assignment of the chose in action of the wife will be regarded as a reduction of it into possession. On the other hand, his Lordship said, he should also infer that where the husband has not the power of reducing the chose in action into possession, his assignment does not transfer the property till by subsequent events he comes into the situation of being

His Lordship observed. upon the allegation, that there had been waiver and acqui

suit was not instituted, and the assignments were not called in question till more than seven years after the husband's death; but the bill was filed the month following the death of the tenant for life, and the wife was not called upon to take any step till the death of the tenant for life.

And with reference to the assignment executed by the wife after the husband's death, which is made subject to the former assignments also there recited, and was relied upon as amounting to a recognition and confirmation of those assignments. His Lordship continued, it would be too much to attribute such an effect to such recitals and such phrases, which were intended merely to state the order in which the assignments were to have priority. See on this subject Mitford . Mitford, 9 Ves. J. 99; White . St. Barbe, 1 Ves. & B. 405 ; Hornsby v. Lee, 2 Mad. 16; Dawbury v. Atkins, Gilb. Eq. Rep. 88; Grey v. Kentish, 1 Atk. 280; Bates v. Dandy, 2 id. 208; 1 Russ. 33, 3 id. 73, and cases cited in the latter; Bush v. Dalway, 1 Ves. S. 19, 3 Atk. 530; Hawkins v. Obyn, 2 Atk. 549; Duke of Chandos v. Talbot, 1 P. Wms. 602; Theobald v. Duffoy, 9 Mod. 102; Woollands v. Crowcher, 12 Ves. J. 177; Howard e. Damiani, 2 Jac. & W. 458; Gayer v. Wilkinson, 1 Bro. C. C. 50; Gage v. Acton, 1 Salk. 327; 1 Ld. Raym. 115, upon which case see 4 Term Rep. 385, where Lord Ken

(a) 1 Russ. 1.