relieve the colony from the heavy loss of inhabitants, and from the expence of money yearly sustained; and prevent the total depopulation of the fertile plains beyond the Blue Ridge. If the necessary co-operation of Great Britain to enable the colony to drive, the enemy from the Ohio were unattainable, which would prove a radical cure of the evil, he strongly recommended that a regular force of two thousand men should be raised. By this measure he thought the militia, whose services were attended with incalculable expense, and were seldom productive of good, might be relieved from temporary draughts. The feelings and views of Colonel Washington on these subjects will fully appear by the following extracts from letters which he wrote at the time. In a dispatch to the lieutenant-governor, he thus paints the situation of the inhabitants and the troops. "I see their situation, I know their danger, and participate their sufferings, without having it in my power to give them further relief than uncertain promises. In short, I see inevitable destruction in so clear a light, that, unless vigorous measures are taken by the assembly, and speedy assistance sent from below, the poor inhabitants, now in forts, must unavoidably fall, while the remainder are flying before the barbarous foe. In fine, the melancholy situation of the people, the little prospect of assistance, the gross and scandalous abuses cast upon the officers in general, which is reflecting on me in particular, for suffering misconduct of such extraordinary kind, and the distant prospect, if any, of gaining reputation in

gave

the service, cause me to lament the hour that me a commission, and would induce me at any other time than this of imminent danger, to resign, without one hesitating moment, a command from which I never expect to reap either honour or benefit; but, on the contrary, have almost an absolute certainty of incurring displeasure below, while the murder of helpless families may be laid to my account here.

"The supplicating tears of the women, and moving petitions of the men, melt me with such deadly sorrow, that I solemnly declare, if I know my own mind, I could offer myself a willing sacrifice to the butchering enemy, provided that would conduce to the people's ease.

The inefficiency of the militia he thus pourtrays. "The inhabitants are so sensible of their danger, if left to the protection of these people (militia), that not a man will stay at his place. This I have from their own mouths, and the principal inhabitants of Augusta county. The militia are under such bad order and discipline, that they will come and go when and where they please, without regarding time, their officers, or the safety of the inhabitants. There should be, according to your honour's orders, one third of the militia of these parts on duty at a time; instead of that, scarce one thirtieth is out. They are to be relieved every month, and they are a great part of that time marching to and from their stations; and they will not wait one day longer than the limited time, whether relieved or not, however urgent the necessity for their continuance may be.".

"I met with Colonel Buchanan, with about thirty men, chiefly officers, to conduct me up Jackson's river, along the range of forts. With this small company of irregulars, with whom order, regularity, circumspection, and vigilance, were matters of derision and contempt, we set out, and by the protection of providence, reached Augusta court-house in seven days, without meeting the enemy; otherwise we must have been sacrificed by the indiscretion of these hooping, hallooing, gentlemen soldiers. This jaunt afforded me great opportunity of seeing the bad regulation of the militia, the disorderly proceedings of the garrisons, and the unhappy circumstances of the inhabitants.

"We are either insensible of danger until it breaks upon our heads, or else through mistaken potions of economy, evade the expence until the blow is struck, and then run into an extreme of raising the militia. These, after an age, as it were, is spent in assembling them, come up, make a noise for a time, oppress the inhabitants, and then return, leaving the frontiers unguarded as before. This is still our reliance, notwithstanding former experience convinces us, if reason did not, that the French and Indians are watching the opportunity when we shall be lulled into fatal security, and unprepared to resist an attack, to invade the country, and by ravaging one part, terrify another; that they retreat when our militia assemble, and repeat the stroke as soon as they are dispersed; that they send down parties in the intermediate time to discover our motions, procure intelligence, and sometimes to divert the troops."

The expediency of an offensive war, he supports by the following observations.

"The certainty of advantage by an offensive scheme of action, renders it, beyond any doubt, much preferable to our defensive measures. To prove this to you, Sir, requires, I presume, no arguments. Our scattered force, so separated and dispersed in weak parties, avails little to stop the secret incursions of the savages. We can only put them to flight, or frighten them to some other part of the country, which answers not the end proposed. Whereas, had we strength enough to invade their lands, and assault their towns, we should restrain them from coming al road and leaving their families exposed. We then should remove the principal cause, and have stronger probability of success; we should be free from the many alarms, mischiefs, and murders that now attend us; we should inspirit the hearts of our few Indian friends, and gain more esteem with them. In short, could Pennsylvania and Maryland be induced to join us in an expedition of this nature, and to petition his Excellency Lord Loudoun for a small train of artillery, with some engineers, we should then be able, in all human probability, to subdue the terror of Fort du Quesne, retrieve our character with the Indians, and restore peace to our unhappy frontiers."

On condition that the assembly should persist in the scheme of defensive warfare, he presented to the Governor a plan for his opinion. This was to establish twenty-two forts, reaching from the river Mayo to the Potomack, in a line of three

hundred and sixty miles; and which were to be garrisoned by a regular force, consisting of two thousand men.

The pride of Governor Dinwiddie was offended by these frank communications of a gallant and independent officer. In uncourtly language he censured advice, which he could not comprehend, and reproached this officer with officiousness and neglect of duty. Colonel Washington felt the reprimand as a patriot, the welfare of whose country ever dwelt on his heart; and, like a soldier, who had an invaluable prize in his own reputation. In the consciousness of having made the highest efforts faithfully to execute the trust reposed in him, he thus spiritedly replied to the charge, in a letter to an influential friend.

Whence it arises, or why, I am ignorant; but my strongest representations of matters relative to the peace of the frontiers are disregarded as idle and frivolous; my propositions and measures, as partial and selfish; and all my sincerest endeavours for the service of my country, perverted to the worst purposes. My orders are dark, doubtful and uncertain. To-day approved, to-morrow condemned; left to act and proceed at hazard; accountable for the consequences, and blamed without the benefit of defence. If you can think my situation capable of exciting the smallest degree of envy, or of affording the least satisfaction, the truth is yet hid from you, and you entertain notions very different from the reality of the case. However, I am determined