Thus the Ideas of Colour, Extenfion, and Motion, may be taken in at one and the fame Time, from the fame Body; yet thefe three Perceptions are as diftinct in themfelves, as if they all proceeded from different Objects, or were exhibited to our Notice at different Times. We are therefore carefully to diftinguish between our fimple and primitive Conceptions, and thofe different Combinations of them, which are often fuggefted to the Mind, by fingle Objects acting upon it. The first conftitute our original Notices of Things, and are not diftinguishable into different Ideas, but enter by the Senfes fimple and unmixed. They are also the Materials out of which all the others, how complex and complicated foever, are formed; and therefore ought deservedly to be looked on as the Foundation and Ground-work of our Knowledge. Simple Ideas of Senfa tion. II. Now if we take a Survey of these Ideas, and their feveral Divifions and Claffes, we fhall find them all fuggefted to us, either by our Senfes, or the Attention of the Mind to what paffes within itself. Thus our Notices of the different Qua lities of Bodies, are all of the Kind we call fimple Ideas, and may be reduced to five general Heads, according to the feveral Organs which are affected by them. Colours, & and Sounds are conveyed in by the Eyes and Ears; Taftes, and Smells by the Nose and Palate; and Heat, Cold, and Solidity, &c. by the Touch. Befides thefe, there are others which make Impreffions on feveral of our Senfes, as Extenfion, Figure, Reft and Motion, &c. the Ideas of which we receive into our Minds both by seeing and feeling. III. IF we next turn our View upon what pafles within ourselves, we shall find another Set Simple Ideas of fimple Ideas, arifing from our Consciousness of of Reflections રું. the Acts and Operations of our own Minds. Perception or Thinking, and Volition or Willing, are what every Man experiments in himself, and cannot avoid being fenfible of. I fhall only obferve farther, that befides all the above-mentioned Perceptions, there are others that come into our Minds by all the Ways of Senfation and Reflection; fuch are the Ideas of Pleafure and Pain, Power, Existence, Unity, Succeffion, &c. which are derived into our Undertandings, both by the Action of Objects without us, and the Consciousness of what we feel within. It is true fote of thefe Ideas, as of Extenfion and Duration, cannot be conceived altogether without Parts; nevertheless they are juftly rank'd among our fimple Ideas, because their Parts being alf Book I. all of the fame Kind, and without the Mixture of any other Idea, neither of them can be refolved into two diftinct and feparate Conceptions: Thus they still anfwer the Definition. given above, of being one uniform Appearance in the Mind, without Variety or Plurality. But to prevent confounding our fimple Ideas of Space and Duration, with thofe complex Modes of them, marked out by the feveral Measures commonly in Ufe, as Yards, Miles, Days, Years, &c. it may perhaps be more proper, to confider the leaft Portions of either, whereof we can form a clear and diftinct Perception, as the fimple Ideas of that kind, out of which all their other Modes and Combinations are formed. Such an Inftant, or Point, may be conceived to be the fame in respect of Duration or Space, as Unity is in refpect of Number; and will ferve beft to fhew, how by a continued Addition or Repetition, our more enlarged and complex Ideas are made up. Simple Ideas bave no Admillion but by the proper Inlets of Nature. IV. HAVING thus given a general View of our fimple Ideas, I have ftill two Obfervations to make concerning them. The firft is, that they are fuch as can only be conveyed into the Mind by the proper Channels and Avenues pro vided by Nature; infomuch that if we are defitute of any of thofe Inlets, by which the Impreffions that produce them are wont to be admitted, all the Ideas thence arifing are abfolutely loft to us; nor can we, by any Quickhefs of Understanding, find a Remedy for this Want. A Man born blind, is incapable of the Ideas of Light and Colours; in like manner as one who is deaf, can form no Notion or Conception of Sound. Hence it appears, that thefe our fimple Ideas are juft fuch as Nature has furnished them, and have no Dependence on our Will; we can neither deftroy them when in the Understanding, nor fashion or invent any new one, not taken in by the ordinary means of Perception. So that we here fee the utinoft Bounds of human Knowledge, which however mighty and enlarged, cannot exceed the Limits of thefe our fimple original Ideas, and their various Combinations. They furnif ample Materials of Knowledge. V. AND this leads me to the fecond Obfervation I propofed to make, which is, that though the Mind cannot, in multiplying its Conceptions of Things, advance one Pace beyond the Materials furnished it by Senfe and Confcioufnefs; yet as it has a Power of combining, modifying and enlarging them, in all the different Ways in which they can be put together, it thereby finds itfelf in Poffeffion of an inexhaustible Treasure of Ideas, fufficient to em ploy ploy it to the full Extent of all its Powers, and furnish Matter for thofe various Opinions, Fancies, and Views of Things, that make up the Subject of its Thoughts and Contemplations. Let us but reflect upon the fingle Idea of Unity or One, and obferve what a Variety of Combinations are formed, by continually adding it to itself; infomuch that the Understanding finds no Stop or Boundary, in its Progrefs from Number to Number. In what an Infinity of different Lights may Extenfion alone be confidered What Limits can be fet to that endless Diversity of Figures, which it is in the Power of the Imagination to fashion and reprefent to itself? If to these we add thofe numberless other Combinations, that refult from varioufly compounding and comparing the reft of our fimple Ideas, we fhall have little Reafon to complain of being limited to a fcanty Meafure of Knowledge, or that the Exercife of the human Faculties is confined within narrow Bounds. But having traced the Progrefs of the Mind through its original and fimple Ideas, until it begins to enlarge its Conceptions by uniting and tying them together; it is now time to take a Survey of it as thus employed in multiplying its Views, that we may Ice by what Steps it advances from one Degree of Improvement to another, and how it contrives to manage that infinite Stock of Materials it finds itself poffeffed of. The Divifion of complex Ideasinto thof of real Exifences, and thefe framed by the Mind. VL WHOEVER attentively confiders his own Thoughts, and takes a View of the several complicated Ideas that from time to time offer themfelves to his Understanding, will readily obferve, that many of them are fuch as have been derived from without, and fuggefted by different Objects affecting his Perception; others again are formed by the Mind itself, varioufly combining its fimple Ideas, as feems beft to answer thofe Ends and Purposes it has for the present in View. Of the first Kind are all our Ideas of Subftances, as of a Man, a Horfe, a Stone, Gold: Of the fecond are thofe arbitrary Collections of things, which we on many Occafions put together, either for their Usefulness in the Commerce of Life, or to further the Purfuit of Knowledge: fuch are our Ideas of ftated Lengths whether of Duration or Space, as Hours, Months, Miles, Leagues, &c. which Divifions are apparently the Creatures of the Mind, inafmuch as we often find them different in different Countries, a fure fign that they are taken from no certain and invariable Standard in Nature. Many of our Ideas of human Actions may be alfo referred to this Head, as Treafon, Inceft, Manflaughter; which complex Notions we do not alwayas derive from an actual View of what thefe Words defcribe, but often from combining the Circumftances of them in our own Minds, or, which is the moft ufual Way, by hearing their Names explained, and the Ideas they ftand for enumerated. These two Claffes comprehend all our complex Conceptions, it being impoffible to conceive any that are not either fuggefted to the Understanding by fome real Existences, or formed by the Mind itself, arbitrarily uniting and compounding its Ideas. We fhall treat of each in Order. Ideas of Subfances, Collections of Simple Ideas, held together by unknown Support. CHA P. III. Of our Ideas of Subftances. 1. Ttioned in the foregoing Chapter is that HE firft Head of complex Ideas men of Subftances, which I chufe to handle bcfore the other, becaufe, as will afterwards appear, the Notices derived from this Source, very much help us, in forming thofe arbitrary Col lections, which make up the fecond Divifion. For in many of them, we take our Hints from the Reality of things, and combine Ideas that actually exift together, though often with an Exclufion of others, as will be explained when we come to treat of abstract and univerfal Notions. It has been already obferved, that the Impreffions conveyed into the Understanding from external Objects, confift for the moft part of many different Ideas joined together, which all unite to make up one Whole. Thefe Collections of various Ideas, thus co-exifting in the fame common Subject, and held together by fome unknown Bond of Union, have been diftinguished by the Name of Subftances, a Word which implies their fubfifting of themfelves, without Dependence (at leaft as far as our Knowledge reaches) on any other created Beings. Such are the Ideas we have of Gold, Iron, Water, a Man, &c. For if we fix upon any one of thefe, for inftance Gold, the Notion under which we represent it to ourfelves, is that of a Body, yellow, very weighty, hard, fufible, malleable, &c. Where we may oblerve, that the fe veral Properties that go to the Compofition of Gold, are represented reprefented to us by clear and evident Perceptions; the Union too of these Properties, and their thereby conftituting a diftinct Species of Body, is clearly apprehended by the Mind; but when we would push our Enquiries farther, and know wherein this Union confifts, what holds the Properties together, and gives them their Self-fubfiftence, here we find ourfelves at a Lofs. However, as we cannot conceive Qualities, without at the fame time fuppofing fome Subject in which they inhere; hence we are naturally led to form the Notion of a Support, which ferving as a Foundation for the Coexistence and Union of the different Properties of things, gives them that feparate and independent Exiftence, under which they are reprefented to our Conception. This Support we denote by the Name Subftance; and as it is an Idea applicable to all the different Combinations of Qualities that exift any where by themselves, they are accordingly all called Subftances. Thus a House, a Bowl, a Stone, &c. having each their diftinguishing Properties, and being conceived to exift independent one of another, the Idea of Subftance belongs alike to them all. The Divifion II. IN Substances therefore there are two things to be confidered: Firft the general Notion of Self-fubfiftence, which, as I have faid, belongs equally to them all; and then the feveral Qualities or Properties, by which the different Kinds and Individuals are diftinguifhed one from another. Thefe Qualities are othewife called Modes, and have been diftinguished into Effential and Accidental, according as they are conceived to be feparable or infeparable from the Subject to which they belong. Extenfion and Solidity are effential Modes of a Stone, because it cannot be conceived without them; but Roundnefs is only an accidental Mode, as a Stone may exist under any Shape or Figure, and yet ftill retain its Nature and other Properties. The Notion of II. I MIGHT run farther into thefe Divifions and Subdivifions, in which Logicians have been very fertile; but as they tend little to the Advancement of real Knowledge, and ferve rather to fill the Memory with Words and their Significations, than furnith clear and distinct Apprehenfions of Things, I fhall not trouble the Reader with them. It is more material to obferve, that the Change of Properties in any Subftance, though it oft-times changes the Nature of that Subftance, that is, its Species or Kind; yet it never destroys VOL. II. C |