the general Notion of Self-fubfiftence, but leaves that equally clear and applicable, as before any fuch Alteration happened. Wood by the Application of Fire is turned into Charcoal; but Charcoal however different from Wood, is ftill a Substance. In like manner, Wax may be converted into Flame and Smoak, a human Body will moulder into Duft, yet thefe Alterations deftroy not their Being or Existence; they are still Substances as before, though under a different Form and Appearance. In the feveral Experiments made by Chymifts, Bodies undergo many Changes, and put on fucceffively a great Variety of different Shapes; and yet by the Skill and Address of the Operator, they are often brought back to their firft and primitive Form. What Alteration can we fuppofe the Fire, or the Application of any other Body to make, unless on the Configuration, Texture, or Cohesion of the minute Parts? When thefe are changed, the Body is proportionably changed; when they return to their original State, the Body likewife puts on its firft and natural Appearance. Foundation of the different Species of corporcal Subfances. IV. ALL that is effential to Matter therefore, is the Cohefion of folid extended Parts; but as thele Parts are capable of innumerable Configurations, as their Texture may be very various, and the internal Conftitution thence arifing be of Confequence extremely different in different Bodies, we may from these Confiderations conceive pretty clearly, the Source and Foundation of all the different Species of corporeal Subftances. Nor is this a Notion taken up at Random, or one of those chimerical Fancies in Philofophy, derived rather from a Warmth and Livelinefs of Imagination, than Obfervations drawn from Things themfelves. Do we not daily see our Food, by the Changes it undergoes in the different Avenues of the Body, converted firft into Blood, and thence employed in nourishing, building up, and enlarging, the feveral Parts of that wonderful Fabrick? Rain defcending from the Clouds, and mixing with the Mold or Earth of a Garden, becomes Aliment for Trees of various Kind, puts on a Diverfity of Forms, according to the different Channels and Conveyances thro' which it paffes, and at last after innumerable Changes and Tranfmutations, fprouts forth in Leaves, opens in Buds, or is converted into the Subftance of the Tree ittelf. Can we conceive any greater Difference between the component Parts of Gold, and thofe of a Stone, than between the moiftened Particles of Garden Mold, and thofe new Forms and Figures, under which they appear, after they have been been thus fashioned by Nature, for the Purposes of Growth and Nourishment? Effence of Substances the internal nothing but Structure and Conftitu tion. V. IF this be duly attended to, it will not appear wonderful to affert, that the Variety of material Subftances, arifes wholly from the different Configuration, Size, Texture, and Motion of the minute Parts. As thefe happen to be varioufly combined, and knit together under different Forms, Bodies put on a Diverfity of Appearances, and convey into the Mind by the Senfes, all those several Impreffons, by which they are diftinguifhed one from another. This internal Conftitution or Structure of Parts from which the feveral Properties that diftinguish any Substance flow, is called the Effence of that Subftance, and is in Fact unknown to us, any farther than by the perceivable Impreffions it makes upon the Organs of Senfe. Gold, as has been faid, is a Body yellow, very weighty, hard, fufible, malleable, &c. That inward Structure and Confirmation of its minute Particles, by which they are fo closely linked together, and from which the Properties above-mentioned are conceived to flow, is called its Effence; and the Properties themselves are the perceivable Marks that make it known to us, and diftinguish it from all other Subftances. For our Senfes are not acute enough to reach its inward Texture and Conftitution. The Parts themselves, as well as their Arrangement, lie far beyond the utmost Penetration of human Sight, even when affifted by Microscopes, and all the other Contrivances of Art. Is avholly un known to us, nor ferves to diftinguish the Species. VI. THUS as to the Effence, or internal Conftitution of Gold, we are wholly in the dark; but many of the Properties derived from this Effence, make obvious and diftinct Impreffions, as the Weight, Hardness, and yellow Colour, &c. Thefe Properties combined together, and conceived as co-exifting in the fame common Subject, make up our complex. Idea of Gold. The fame may be faid of all the other Species of corporeal Subftances, as Lead, Glafs, Water, &c. our Ideas of them being nothing elfe, but a Collection of the ordinary Qualities obfervable in them. is VII. THIS however ought to be obferved, that though the Effence or inward Structure of Bodies, altogether unknown to us, yet we rightly judge, that in all the feveral Species, the Effences are diftinct. For each Species being a Collection of C 2 Properties, which taken together, are different from those of every other Species, the Conformation of Parts, on which thofe Properties depend, muft in like manner be different; and this, as we have faid, conftitutes the Effence. Iron and Glafs are evidently diftinct Kinds of Body, their perceivable Qualities have little or nothing common; and therefore the inward Structure or Conftitution from which these Qualities flow, cannot be the fame in both. But after all, this is the only thing we can with Certainty affirm concerning these Effences, which lying fo wholly in the Dark, we fhall do well to lay them afide in our Reafonings about Things, and stick to those more intelligible and fettled Ideas, got by joining together their various Properties and Powers. For thus only is true Knowledge promoted, when we argue from known Qualities, and not from a fuppofed internal Constitution, which however real in itself, yet comes not within the Reach of our Faculties, and therefore can never be a Ground to us, for any Discoveries or Improvements. By what rive at the VIII. MATERIAL Subftance, as I have faid, includes the Idea of folid, cohering, extended Parts, and is divided into different Claffes, according to the different Impreffions made upon the Organs of Sense. But befides these fenfible Ideas received from without, we also experiment in ourselves Thinking and Volition. Thefe Actions have no Connection with the known Properties of Body; nay, they feem plainly inconfiftent with fome of its moft effential Qualities. For the Mind not only discovers no Relation between Thinking, and the Motion or Arrangement of Parts; but it alfo perceives that Confcioufnefs, a fimple individual Act, can never proceed from a compound Subftance, capable of being divided into many. Let us fuppofe for Inftance, a Syftem of Matter endowed with Thought; then either all the Parts of which this System is compofed must think, which would make it not one, but a Multitude of diftinct confcious Beings; or its Power of thinking muft arife, from the Connection of the Parts one with another, their Motion and Difpofition, &c. which all taken together, contribute to the Production of Thought. But it is evident that the Motion of Parts, and Manner of combining them, can produce nothing but an artful Structure, and various Modes of Motion. All Machines of human Compofition, as Watches, Clocks, &r. however artfully their Paets are fet together, however complicated their Structure, though we conceive innumerable different Motions, variously variously conjoined, and running one into another with an endles Diversity, yet never produce any thing but Figure and Motion. If a Clock tells the Hour and Minute of the Day, it is only by the Motion of the different Hands, pointing fucceffively at the Figures marked on the Hour-Plate for that Purpose. We never imagine this to be the Effect of Thought or Intelligence, nor conceive it poffible by any Re-' finement of Structure, fo to improve the Compofition, as that it fhould become capable of Knowledge and Confciousness. The Reafon is plain: Thought is fomething altogether different from Motion and Figure, there is not the leaft Connection between them; and therefore it can never be fuppofed. to refult from them. Which we otherwife call Spirits. IX. THIS then being evident, that Intelligence cannot arife from an Union or Combination of unintelligent Parts; if we fuppofe it to belong to any Syftem of Matter, we muft neceffarily attribute it to all the Parts of which that Syftem is compofed; whereby instead of one, we shall, as was before obferved, have a Multitude of diftinct conscious Beings. And because Matter, how far foever we pursue the Minutenefs of its Parts, is ftill capable of repeated Divifions, even to Infinity; it is plain, that this Abfurdity will follow us, through all the Suppofitions that make Thought inherent in a material Subftance. Finding therefore Consciousness incompatible with the Cohefion of folid feparable Parts, we are neceffarily led to place it in fome other Subftance, of a diftinct Nature and Properties, which we call Spirit. Body and Spirit, diftin&t Subftances. X. AND here it is carefully to be obferved, that the feveral Species of corporeal Subftances, tho' diftinguished one from another, and rank'd under different Names; yet agreeing in fome commou Properties, which taken together make up the Notion of Body, are thence all conceived to partake of this general Nature, and to differ only as different Modifications of the fame Subftance. Whatever confifts of folid extended Parts, is called Matter; and as all the various Species of Body, however diftinguished from one another by their feveral Properties, have yet this in common, that they are made up of fuch folid fe- . parable Parts, hence they fall naturally under the general Denomination of material Beings, and are not conceived to differ but in their Form. Thus Gold, Antimony, Wood, c. alike partake of the Notion of Body, they are all equaly material Substances, and have no other Difference, but what C 3 what arifes from the different Structure and Conformation, &c. of Parts, as we have fhewn above. But Spirit is fomething altogether diftinct from Body, nay and commonly placed in Oppofition to it; for which Reafon, the Beings of this Clafs are called immaterial, a Word that implies not any thing of their Nature, but merely denotes its Contrariety to that of Matter. There may be many various Species of Subfances, that come within the XI. BODY and Spirit therefore, differ not as Species of the fame Subftance, but are really distinct Kinds of Subftances, and ferve as general Heads, under which to rank all the particular Beings that fall within the Compafs of our Knowledge. For we having no Ways of Perception Reach of our but Senfe and Confcioufnefs, can have no Notices Faculties. of Things, but as derived from thefe two Inlets, By our Senfes we are informed of the Existence of folid extended Subftances, and Reflection tells us, that there are thinking conscious ones. Beyond these our Conceptions reach not, and therefore, though there may be many other Kinds, as different from them as they are from one another, yet having no Faculties fuited to them, they are as remote from our Knowledge, as Light and Colours from the Apprehenfion of a Man born blind. I believe it will hardly be doubted, but the Subftance of the Creator, differs more from that of his Creatures, than any two created Subftances can from one another; and therefore when we call God a Spirit, we ought not rafhly to prefume, that he is fo in the fame Sense, in which the human Soul is a Spirit. The Word is indeed used by us, to denote in general, all thinking intelligent Substances, in which Senfe God is very fitly called a Spirit. But it were the Height of Folly to imagine, because this Name is applied, as well to the Mind of Man, as the Creator, that therefore they partake of one common Nature, and differ only as different Modifications of the fame Subftance. This I mentian here, to check the Prefumption of the human Mind, always forward to conclude that every thing comes within its Reach, and to deny Existence to whatever exceeds the Comprehenfion of its feanty and limited Powers. Beings of a fuperior Clafs, may enjoy many Ways of Perception unknown. to us, from which they receive Notices as different from thofe in our Minds, as the Ideas we apply to Spirit, are from the Ideas we apply to Body. Solid and thinking Beings are, it is true, the only Ideas of Subftance, that we are able to frame; but this is no more an Argument against the Existence of |