ty. In fuch a Competition of Interefts, it is evident, that the greatest is to be chofen; and that is the greatest Interest, which contains the greateft Sum or Aggregate of public Good, greatest in Quantity as well as Duration. This then is the common Standard, by which the refpective Forces and Subordinations of the focial Affections must be adjusted. Therefore we conclude, that "this Clafs of Affections are "found and regular, when they prompt us to purfue the In"tereft of Individuals in an entire Confiftency with the public "Good," or, in other Words, "when they are duly propor"tioned to the Dangers and Wants of others, and to the "various Relations in which we ftand to Individuals, or to "Society."

Thus we have found by an Induction of Particulars, the natural Pitch or Tenour of the different Orders of Affection, confidered apart by themfelves. Now as the Virtue or Perfection of every Creature lies in following its Nature, or acting fuitably to the juft Proportion and Harmony of its feveral Powers; therefore, the VIRTUE of a Creature endow'd "with fuch Affections as Man, must confift in obferving, or "acting agreeably to their natural Pitch and Tenour." Let this fuffice at leaft for its first rude Sketch.

But, as there are no independent Affections in

the Fabric of the Mind, no Paffion that ftands by Balance of itfelf, without fome Relation to the reft, we canAffection. not pronounce of any one confidered APART, that it is either too ftrong, or too weak. Its Strength and just Proportion must be measured, not only by its Subferviency to its own immediate End, but by the Refpect it bears to the whole Syftem of Affection. Therefore, we fay a Paffion is too ftrong, not only when it defeats its own End, but when it impairs the Force of other Paffions, which are equally neceffary to form a Temper of Mind, fuited to a certain Oeconomy, or State; and too weak, not merely on account of its Infufficiency to anfwer its End, but because it cannot fuftain its Part or Office, in the Balance of the whole Syftem. Thus the Love of Life may be too ftrong, when it takes from the Regard due to one's Country, and will not allow one bravely to encounter Dangers, or even Death on its Account. Again, the Love of Fame may be too weak, when it throws down the Fences which render Virtue more fecure, or weakens the Incentives which make it more active and public-fpirited.

If it be afked, "How far may the Affections "towards private Good or Happiness be in

Limits of

"-dulged ?"

private Ajfections.

dulged? One Limit was before fixed for the particular Indulgences of each, viz. their Subordination to the common Aggregate of Good to the private Syftem. In thefe therefore, a due Regard is always fuppofed to be had to Health, Reputation, Fortune, the Freedom of Action, the unimpair'd Exercife of Reason, the calm Enjoyment of one's felf, which are all private Goods. Another Limit now refults from the Balance of Affection just named, viz." The Security and Happiness of others," or to exprefs it more generally," a private Affection may be fafely indulged, when, by that Indulgence, we do not violate the Obligations which refult from our higher Relations, or public Connections " A juft Refpect therefore being had to thefe Boundaries, which Nature has fixed in the Breaft of every Man, what fhould limit our Purfuits of private Happinefs? Is Nature fullen and penurious? Or does the God of Nature envy the Happiness of his Offspring?

Collifion of
Interefis.

Whether there is ever a real Collifion of Interefts between the public and private Syftem of Affections, or the Ends which each Clafs has in View, will be afterwards confidered; but where there is no Collifion, there is little or no Danger of carrying either, but efpecially the public, Affections to Excefs, provided both Kinds are kept fubordinate to a difcreet and cool Self-Love, and to a calm and univerfal Benevolence, which Principles ftand as Guards at the Head of each System. This then is the Conduct of the Paffions, confidered as particular and feparate Forces, carrying us out to their refpective Ends; and this is their Balance or Oeconomy, confidered as compound Powers, or Powers mutually related, acting in Conjunction towards a common End, and confequently as forming a Syftem or Whole.

Refult.

Subordi

nation of

Now, whatever adjufts or maintains this Balance, whatever in the human Conftitution is form'd for directing the Paffions, fo as to keep Ponvers. them from defeating their own End, or interfering with each other, must be a Principle of a fuperior Nature to them, and ought to direct their Meafures, and govern their Proportions. But it was found that REASON or Ref Etion is fuch a Principle, which points out the Tendency of our Paffions, weighs their Influence upon private and public Happiness, and fhews the beft Means of at

taining

taining either. It having been likewife found, that there is another directing or controuling Principle, which we call CONSCIENCE, or the MORAL SENSE, which, by a native kind of Authority, judges of Affections and Actions, pronouncing fome juft and good, and others unjust and ill; it follows that the Paffions, which are mere Impulfes, or blind Forces, are Principles inferior and fubordinate to this judging Faculty. THEREFORE, if we would follow the Order of Nature, i. e. obferve the mutual Refpects and the Subordination which the different Parts of the human Conftitution bear one to another, the Paffions ought to be fubjected to the Direction and Authority of the leading, or controuling Principles.

We conclude therefore from this Induction,

66

confifis.

that The Constitution or just Oeconomy of In what i "buman Nature, confifts in a regular Subor"dination of the Paffions and Affections to the "AUTHORITY of CONSCIENCE, and the DIRECTION of "REASON."

Oeconomy of

Nature, or right Tem

per.

That Subordination is regular, when the Proportion formerly mentioned is maintained; that is to fay, "When the DEFENSIVE Paffions are "kept proportioned to our DANGERS; when "the PRIVATE Paffions are proportioned to our "WANTS; and, when the PUBLIC Affections "are adapted to our PUBLIC CONNECTIONS, and proportion"ed to the Wants and Dangers of others." This laft Branch is expreffed fomewhat differently from the two former, in order to include that most important Relation in which we stand, and those indifpenfable Laws of Duty which we owe to the great Author of our Nature, who being fupremely perfect and happy, has no Wants to fupply, and is obnoxious to no Poffibility of Change.

Human Vir

tue and Perfection.

But the natural State, or the found and vigorous Conflitution of any Creature, or the just Oeconomy of its Powers, we call its Health and Perfection; and the acting agreeably to thefe, its VIRTUE OF GOODNESS. THEREFORE, "the "HEALTH and PERFECTION of Man muft lie in the afore"faid SUPREMACY of CONSCIENCE and REASON, and in "the SUBORDINATION of the Paffions to their AUTHO"RITY and DIRECTION. And his VIRTUE or GOOD"NESS muft confift in acting agreeably to that ORDER OF "OECONOMY."

That

How conJormable to Reajon.

That fuch an Ornament of the Mind, and fuch a Conduct of its Powers and Paffions will ftand the Teft of Reafon, cannot admit of any Difpute. For, upon a fair Examination into the Confequences of Things, or the Relations and Aptitudes of Means to Ends, Reafon evidently demonftrates, and Experience confirms it, that, "To have our defenfive "Paffion duly proportioned to our Dangers, is the fureft way "to avoid or get clear of them, and obtain the Security we "feek after." To proportion our private Paffions to our "Wants, is the beft Means to fupply them;-and, to adapt our public Affections to our focial Relations, and the Good of "others, is the most effectual Method of fulfilling one, and ર procuring the ather." In this Senfe therefore, Virtue may be faid to be a "Conduct conformable to Reafon," as Reafou difcovers an apparent Aptitude in fuch an Order and Oeconomy of Powers and Paffions, to answer the End for which they are naturally formed.

If the Idea of Moral Obligation is to be deConnection duced merely from this Aptitude or Connection between Af between certain Paffions, or a certain Order fections and Ends, not and Balance of Paffions, and certain Ends obthe Idea of tained, or to be obtained by them, then is ReaMoral Obli fon or Reflection, which perceives that Aptitude gation. or Connection, the proper Judge of Meral Obligation; and on this Suppofition it may be defined, as hath been done by fome, the Connection between the Affection and the End, or which is the fame thing, between the Action and the Motive; for the End is the Motive, or the final Caufe, and the Affection is the Action, or its immediate, natural Cause. A Man, from mere Self-Love, may be induced to fulfil that Obligation, which is founded on the Connection between the defenfive Paffions and their Ends, or the private Paffions and their Ends; because in that Cafe his own Intereft will prompt him to indulge them in the due Proportion required. But if he has no Affections which point beyond himfelf, no Principle but Self-love, or fome fubtle Modification of it, what fhall intereft him in the Happinefs of others, where there is no Connection between it and his own; or what Senfe can he have of Moral Obligation to promote it? Upon this Scheme therefore, without public or focial Affection there could be no Motive, and confequently no Moral Obligation to a beneficent, difinterefted Conduct.

But

But if the mere Connection between certain Paffions, or a certain Order of Paffions, and certain Ends, are what conftitutes, or gives us the Idea of Moral Obligation, then why may not the Appofitenefs of any Temper or Conduct, ray, of any Piece of Machinery to obtain its End, form an equally strict Moral Obligation? For the Connection and Aptitude are as ftrong and invariable in the latter Inftances as in the former. But as this is confounding the most obvious Differences of things, we must trace the Idea of Moral Obligation to another and a more natural Source.

Idea of it

from Expe

rience.

Let us appeal therefore to our inmost Senfe and Experience, "How we ftand affected to thofe "different Sets of Paffions, in the juft Meafure "and Balance of which we found a right Tem"per to confift." For this is entirely a Matter of Experience, in which we muft examine as in any other natural Enquiry, "What are the genuine Feelings and Ope❝rations of Nature, and what Affections or Symptoms of "them appear in the given Inftance."

Why the defenfive Paffiens approvid

The DEFENSIVE Paffions, as Anger and Fear, give us rather Pain than Pleasure, yet we cannot help feeling them when provoked by Injury, or exposed to Harm. We account the Creature imperfect that wants them, because they are neceffary to his Defence. Nay we fhould in fome measure condemn ourselves, did we want the neceffary Degree of Refentment and Caution. But if our Refentment exceeds the Wrong received, or our Caution the Evil dreaded, we then blame ourfelves for having over-acted our Part. Therefore, while we are in Danger, to be totally deftitute of them we reckon a blameable Defect, and to feel them in a just, i. e. neceffary Measure, we approve, as fuited to the Nature and Condition of fuch a Creature as Man. But our Security obtain-. ed, to continue to indulge them, we not only disapprove as hurtful, but condemn as urmanly, unbecoming, and mean-fpirited: Nor will fuch a Conduct afford any felf-approving Joy, when we coolly reflect upon it.

With regard to the PRIVATE Paffions, fuch as Love of Life, Pleafure, Eafe, and the like, Why the as these aim at private Good, and are necef- private. fary to the Perfection and Happiness of the Individual, we should reckon any Creature defective, and even blameable, that was deftitute of them. Thus, we condemn the Man who imprudently ruins his Fortune, impairs his Health, or expofes his Life; we not only pity him as an unVOL. II.

S

fortunate