Difference of

Ideas confidered as com

pound and as univerfal

Nature; nor can the Collections of fimple Ideas, marked by thefe Names, while others are fuppofed excluded, exift any where out of the Understanding. Nevertheless, as all the fimple Ideas included in the general Notion of Man, are to be found in every particular Man; and all those implied in the Notion of a Tree, in every particular Tree; hence the general Nature of Man, exifts in every individual Man, as does the general Nature of a Tree, in every individual Tree. IX. ONE Thing ftill remains to be obferved, with regard to these our general Ideas; that though many of them are evidently Combinations of different fimple Ideas, and according to that Way of confidering them, are included in the first Divifion of our complex Conceptions, those namely framed by the Compofition of the Mind; yet we are carefully to diftinguish between an Idea as it is compound, and as it is univerfal. In the firft Cafe, the Mind chiefly confiders the several Ideas that are combined together; or in other Words, all the Attributes, Qualities, or Parts, that are contained in any Idea. Thus the Idea of a Bird, includes Life, Senfe, fpontaneous Motion, a Covering of Feathers, Wings, &c. none of which can be left out, without deftroying the very Nature of the Idea, and making it something quite different from what it was before. This Way of confidering Things, according to the Number of their Parts and Properties, is called by Logicians the Comprehenfion of an Idea. But the Univerfality of our Notions implies quite another Turn of Thinking, inafmuch as it fixes the Regard of the Mind, upon the Subjects to which our Ideas extend, or the Individuals and Species comprehended under them. In this Sense the Idea anfwering to the Word Bird, takes in the feveral Species of the feathered Creation, the Hawk, the Eagle, Sparrow, Lark, and innumerable others, to all which it may with equal Propriety be applied. And here it is remarkable, that the Idea lofes nothing of its Force or Comprehenfion, by being reftricted to a particular Kind. When I fay the Bird of Jove, though in this Cafe the Idea is restrained to the Eagle alone, it ftill remains as diftinct, and includes as many fimple Ideas in its Compofition, as when before it was extended to all the different Tribes of feathered Animals. X. WE fee therefore that our compound Ideas, may continue the fame in refpect of their Attributes, or the Number of Parts, and yet vary confiderably in the Degree of Univerfality. The general Idea of Man is the fame, whether applied

The Compre Extension af benfion and

our Ideas.

to

Book I. to the whole human Race, or thofe of any particular Nation. When I affirm for inftance of Mankind in general, that their Knowledge falls fhort of Perfection, and afterwards make the like Obfervation of the Men of the prefent Age; in both Cafes, the Word Man ftands for one and the fame Collection of fimple Ideas; but in respect of the Individuals to which it is applied, there is a great and manifeft Difference. That is, the Term Man, denotes one invariable compound Idea; which notwithstanding, confidered as a general Notion, may be contracted or enlarged at pleafure. And as in the former Cafe, the feveral Parts of the compound Idea, is called its Comprehenfion; fo in the latter, the Individuals to which the univerfal Idea is applied, is called its Extenfion. I might add many more Obfervations on this Subject, but chufe rather to ftop here, having faid enough to explain the Difference between compound and abstract Ideas, and fhew the Reafon of my ranging them under diftinct Heads.

Ideas of Relations exceed

ing numerous.

I.

SECT. III.

Of our Ideas of Relations.

I

COME now to the third and laft Divifion

of those Ideas, which I confider as the Creatures and Workmanship of the Understanding; fuch namely as arife, from the comparing of Things one with another. For the Mind in its Views, is not tied to fingle Objects; but can examine their References and Refpects, in regard to others, brought under Confideration at the fame time. And when it does fo, and thence derives new Notices of Things, the Ideas thus got are called Relations, and make I am apt to think the largest Clafs of all our Perceptions. For every fingle Object will admit of almoft innumerable Comparifons with others, and in this Senfe may become a very plentiful Source of Ideas to the Underftanding. Thus if we compare one thing with another in refpect of Bulk, we get the Ideas of greater, lefs, or Equality; if in refpect of Time, of older and younger; and fo for other Relations, which we can purfue at pleasure, almoft without End; whence it is eafy to conceive, how very extenfive this Tribe of our Perceptions must be.

Men chiefly determined to

particular Comparisons by the Wants and Exigencies of Life.

IL I SHALL not pretend to trace out these Ideas particularly, nor indeed fo much as to enumerate their feveral Divifions; it being enough to obferve, that here, as well as in the other kinds of our complex Ideas, we bound ourselves for the moft part to fuch Comparisons, as the Exigencies of Society, the Wants of Life, and the different Profeffions of Men, render neceffary; and are more or less accurate in tracing out the Relations of Things, according to the Degree of Importance they appear to have in these Refpects. The Relations of Men one to another, arifing either from the Ties of Blood, their feveral Ranks and Places in the Community, or a mutual Intercourfe of good Offices, being of great Weight and Concern in the Commerce of Life, have in a particular Manner engaged our Attention, and are therefore very minutely defcribed. For the fame Reason, Men have found it neceffary, to determine as exactly as poffible, the various Dependence of Things, as their Happiness is nearly connected with this Knowledge. When we confider Objects merely in respect of Existence, as either giving or receiving it, we come by the Ideas of Cause and Effect: Nor need I mention, how much the Welfare of Mankind depends, upon an extenfive View of Things, as they ftand connected in this Relation; it being evident, that the feveral Schemes. and Purposes of Life, are all conducted upon a previous Suppofition, that certain known Caufes, will have their ufual regular Effects, and such and such Actions, be attended with fuch and fuch Confequences.

Relations of
Creator and

Creature, &c,

III. BUT there are other Relations of this kind, befides thofe that merely regard Existence ; as when we also take into the Account, the additional Gifts, of a Capacity for Happiness, and the Means of attaining it; which conftitutes the Relation of Creator and Creature, in the more folemn Acceptation of thefe Words. Again, when we confider the great Author of our Being, not only as the Creator of the Univerfe, but alfo as preferving and holding it together, and prefiding over the prefent Frame of Things with uncontrouled Dominion; he then appears under the Notion of a moral Governor, to whom we are accountable for our Actions, and the Ufe we make of thofe Powers and Faculties we derive from him. as it is of the highest Confequence for Men, not to be unacquainted with these, and fuch like Relations; hence we find, that the wifeft Nations, and fuch as beft understood the true Application

Now

Book I. Application of the Powers of the Mind, have always made it their chief Study, to regulate and afcertain these Ideas, and trace them in all their Confequences. And thus we may in some measure perceive, how the Mind proceeds in comparing its Ideas together, and by what Views it is chiefly governed, in framing the complex Notions of this Clafs, by which it reprefents the various Habitudes of Things. I fhall only add upon this Subject, these two Obfervations.

Our Ideas of

clear and di.

Ainet.

IV. FIRST that our Ideas of Relations are for the most part very clear and diftinct. For Relations very the comparing of things together, being a voluntary Act of the Mind, we cannot but fuppofe, that it must be acquainted with its own Views in the Comparifon; and of course, have a clear Conception of the Foundation of that Relation, it fets itself to enquire into. Thus the Relation of Caufe and Effect, implying only that one thing produces, or is produced by another, which Notions are always diftinctly fettled in the Understanding, before it goes about to make the Comparison; it is evident, that the Idea reprefenting this mutual Refpect of Objects, will be no lefs clear, than are the Notions themfelves, upon which the Relation is founded. And what is ftill more remarkable of the Ideas of this Clafs; they cease not to be diftinct, even where the Subjects compared are but very imperfectly known. For I can well enough conceive that one thing has produced another, and that therefore they ftand related as Caufe and Effect, though my Ideas of the things themselves may perhaps be very obfcure, and come far fhort of reprefenting their real Nature and Properties. I doubt not but it will be readily owned, that our Idea of the Univerfe, confidered as comprehending the whole Frame of created Things, is very inadequate; and I think it is ftill more apparent, that our Notion of the Supreme Being, comes not up to the Excellence and Perfection of his Nature. Yet we very well understand what is meant, by calling God the Author of the World; and though we comprehend not the Manner of his producing it, find no Difficulty in framing the Ideas, the relative Words Creator and Creature ftand for

Ideas of Relations among the most important Con

V. I HAVE yet another Obfervation to make upon this Subject; and it is, that our Ideas of Relations, are among the most important Conceptions of the Underftanding, and afford the ceptions of the largeft Field, for the Exercife and Improvement of human Knowledge. Moft of our Enquiries

Mind.

regard

regard relative Ideas, and are fet on foot with a View to inveftigate the mutual Habitudes of Things. The Mathematician has taken Quantity for his Province, and teaches how to compare Magnitudes of different Figures and Dimenfions, in order to judge with Certainty of their relative Properties. The Philofopher attaches himself to the Chain of Caufes and Effects, and endeavours to trace out the various Dependence of Things confidered in this Light. In fine, whither do all our Researches tend, but by means of certain known Properties and Relations, to find out others that stand fome how connected with them? As for the Importance of thefe Conceptions, no one can call that in Queftion, who reflects; that from our Relations to our Creator and one another, arife all the Duties of Morality and Religion; and that the Correspondence of the feveral Objects of Nature, to the Organs of the Body, and Faculties of the Mind, is that by which alone we can judge, of what will procure us Happiness or Mifery. Whence it is evident, that without an exact Knowledge of thefe Relations, we must wander on in Life with great Uncertainty, and may often plunge into Calamities and Misfortunes, by thofe very Pursuits, from which we expected nothing but Joy and Pleasure.

Recapitula

tion.

VI. THUS have I gone through the several Divifions of our Ideas, which I have endeavoured to reprefent in fuch a Manner, as their vaft Extent may moft eafily appear, and the Conduct of the Mind in framing them be diftinctly apprehended. I might eafily run into other Diftinctions, by confidering them as clear or obfcure, adequate or inadequate, true or falfe. But the Limits of this Tract will not allow my entering more fully into the Subject, and I think it the lefs needful, because the very Names are almoft fufficient, to convey a Notion of thefe feveral Kinds of Ideas into the Mind. But as the Divifion explained above feems to be of great Importance, towards fettling in the Understanding a juft View of the Progress of human Knowledge, and the Steps by which it advances from one Degree of Improvement to another, I fhall here run over it again in as few. Words as poffible, that the whole Process may be seen at once. Our Ideas are all derived into the Underftanding, either by Senfation, or Reflection. This however is obfervable, that one and the fame Object often excites a Variety of Perceptions at once, which are nevertheless readily diftinguifhed by the Mind, and appear cach under a Form peculiar to itself. Thefe conftitute our primary and original Notices, and are easily known from

all