Reafonings uniform and unbroken, to purfue the Relations of Things through all their Labyrinths and Windings, and at length exhibit them to the View of the Soul, with all the Advantages of Light and Conviction. the Mind. IV. BUT as the Understanding in advancing from one Part of Knowledge to another, proceeds Operations of by a juft Gradation, and exerts various Acts, according to the different Progrefs it has made, Logicians have been careful to note thefe feveral Steps, and have datinguifhed them in their Writings by the Name of the Operations of the Mind. These they make four in Number, and agreeably to that, have divided the whole Syftem of Logick into four Parts, in which thefe Acts are feverally explained, and the Conduct and Procedure of the Mind, in its different Stages of Improvement, regulated by proper Rules and Obfervations. Now, in order to judge how far Logicians have followed Nature, in this Diftinction of the Power of the Understanding, let us take a short View of the Mind, and the manner of its Progrefs, according to the Experience we have of it in ourfelves, and fee whither the Chain of our own Thoughts will without Conftraint lead us. Perception. V. FIRST then, we find ourselves furrounded with a Variety of Objects, which acting differently upon our Senfes, convey diftinct Impreffions into the Mind, and thereby roufe the Attention and Notice of the Understanding. By reflecting too on what paffes within us, we become fenfible of the Operations of our own Minds, and attend to them as a new Set of Impreffions. But in all this there is only bare Confciousness. The Mind, without proceeding any farther, takes notice of the Impreffions that are made upon it, and views Things in order, as they prefent themselves one after another. This Attention of the Underfranding to the Object acting upon it, whereby it becomes fenfible of the Impreffions they make, is called by Logicians. Perception; and the Notices themselves, as they exift in the Mind, and are there treafured up to be the Materials of Thinking and Knowledge, are diftinguifhed by the Name of Ideas. VI. BUT the Mind does not always reft fatiffied in the bare View and Contemplation of its Judgment. Ideas. It is of a more active and bufy Nature, and likes to be affembling them together, and comparing them one with another. In this complicated View of Things, it readily difcerns, that fome agree, and others difagree, and joins or feparates them according to this Perception. Thus upon com B 2 paring paring the Idea of two added to two, with the Idea of four we at firft Glance perceive their Agreement, and thereupon pronounce that two and two are equal to four. Again, that white is not black, that five is lefs than feven, are Truths to which we immediately affent, as foon as we com pare those Ideas together. This is the first and fimpleft Act of the Mind, in determining the Relations of Things, when by a bare Attention to its own Ideas, comparing any two of them together, it can at once fee how far they are connected or disjoined. The Knowledge thence derived is called intuitive, as requiring no Pains or Examination; and the Act of the Mind affembling its Ideas together, and joining or disjoining them according to the Relult of its Perceptions, is what Logicians term Judgment. VII. INTUITION affords the highest degree of Reafening. Certainty, it breaks in with an irrefuftible Light upon the Understanding, and leaves no room for Doubt or Hefitation. Could we in all Cafes, by thus putting two Ideas together, difcern immediately their Agreement or Dif agreement, we fhould be exempt from Error, and all its fatal Confequences. But it fo happens, that many of our Ideas are of fuch a Nature, that they cannot be thus examined in Concert, or by any immediate Application one to another; and then it becomes neceffary to find out fome other Ideas, that will admit of this Application, that by means of them we may discover the Agreement or Difagreement we search for. Thus the Mind wanting to know the Agreement or Difagreement in Extent, between two inclofed Fields, which it cannot fo put together, as to discover their Equality or Inequality, by an immediate Comparison, cafts about for fome intermediate Idea, which by being applied first to the one, and then to the other, will difcover the Relation it is in queft of. Accordingly it affumes fome ftated Length, as a Yard, &c. and measuring the Fields, one after the other, comes by that means to the Knowledge of the Agreement or Difagreement in question. The intervening Ideas, made ufe of on thefe Occafions, are called Proofs; and the Exercife of the Mind in finding them out, and ap plying them for the Difcovery of the Truths it is in fearch of, is what we term Reasoning. And here let it be obferved, that the Knowledge gained by Reafoning, is a Deduc tion from our intuitive Perceptions, and ultimately founded on them. Thus in the Cafe before-mentioned, having found by meafuring, that one of the Fields makes threefeore fquare Yards, and the other only fifty-five, we thence conclude conclude that the first Field is larger than the fecond. Here the two firft Perceptions are plainly intuitive, and gained by an immediate Application of the Measure of a Yard to the two Fields, one after another. The Conclufion, though it produces no lefs certain Knowledge, yet differs from the ethers in this, that it is not obtained by an immediate Comparifon of the Ideas contained in it one with another, but is a Deduction from the two preceding Judgments, in which thefe Ideas are feverally compared with a third, and their Relation thereby difcovered. We fee therefore, that Reafoning is a much more complicated Act of the Mind than fimple Judgment, and neceflarilly prefuppofes it, as being ultimately founded on the Perceptions thence gained, and implying the various Comparison of them one with another, This is the great Exercise of the human Faculties, and the chief Inftrument by which we pufh on our Difcoveries, and enlarge our Knowledge. A Quicknefs of Mind to find out intermediate Ideas, and apply them skilfully in determining the Relations of things, is one of the principal Diftinctions among Men, and that which gives fome fo remarkable a Superiority over others, that we are apt to look upon them as Creatures of another Species. Method. VIII. THUS far we have traced the Progrefs of the Mind in Thinking, and feen it rifing by natural and easy Steps, from its firft and fimple Perceptions, to the Exercife of its higheft and moft diftinguishing Faculty. Let us now view it in another Light, as enriched with Knowledge, and ftored with a Variety of Discoveries, acquired by the due Application of its natural Powers. It is obvious to confider it in thefe Circumftances, as taking a general Survey of its whole Stock of intellectual Acquifitions, difpofing them under certain Heads and Claffes, and tying them together, according to thofe Connections and De pendencies it difcerns between them. It often happens, in carrying on our Enquiries from Subject to Subject, that we ftumble upon unexpected Truth, and are encountered by Discoveries, which our prefent Train of Thinking gave no Profpect of bringing in our way. A Man of clear Appre henfion, and diftinct Reafon, who after due Search and Examination, has mastered any Part of Knowledge, and even made important Discoveries in it, beyond what he at firft expected, will not fuffer his Thoughts to lie jumbled together, in the fame confused manner as Chance offered them; he will be for combining them into a regular System, В 3 where where their mutual Dependence may be eafily traced, and the Parts feem to grow one out of another. This is that Operation of the Mind, known by the Name of Difpofition or Method, and comes in the laft in order, according to the Divifion of the Logicians, prefuppofing fome tolerable Mea fure of Knowledge, before it can have an Opportunity of exerting itself in any extenfive degree. Perception and IX. WE fee then that this fourfold Diftinction of the Powers of the Mind into Perception, Judgment, Reasoning and Difpofition, as well as the Order in which they are placed, have a real Foundation in Nature, and arife from the Method and Procedure of our own Thoughts. It is true, there are many other Actions and Modifications of the Underftanding, befides thofe above-mentioned, as Believing, Doubting, Aflenting, &c. but thefe are all implied in the Act of Reafoning, in the like manner as Compounding, Abftracting, Remembering, may be referred to the firft Operation of the Mind, or Perception. This will appear more fully in the Sequel, when we come to handle the feveral Parts of Logick feparately; at prefent we fhall content ourselves with this general Account of Things; only it seems neceffary to obTerve, that Perception and Judgment, in the Propriety of the English Tongue, have a much more extenfive Signification than Logicians commonly allow them. We not only perceive the Ideas in our own Minds, but we are faid alfo to perceive their Agreement or Difagreement; and hence arife the common Phrafes of intuitive Perceptions, Perceptions of Truth, and of the Juftnefs of Arguments or Proofs; where it is manifeft, that the Word is applied not only to cur Judgments, but alfo to our Reafonings. In a word, whatever comes under the View of the Mind, fo as to be diftinctly reprefented and taken notice of, whether an Idea, Propofition, Chain of Reafoning, or the Order or Connection of Things, is thereby rendered an Object of Perception, and gives Employment to this firft and moft fimple of our Facultics. In like manner the Word Judgment is feldom in common Difcourfe confined to obvious and felf-evident Truths. It rather fignifics thofe Conjectures and Gueffes that we form, in Cafes which admit not of undoubted Certainty, and where we are left to determine by comparing the various Probabilities of Things. Thus a Man of Sagacity and Penetration, who fees far into the Humours and Paffions of Mankind, and feldom miflakes in the Opinions he frames of Cha Logick di vided into four Parts. Its Usefulness and Charaters and Actions, is faid to judge well, or think judicioufly, For thefe Reasons, it might not be improper to change the common Names of the two firft Operations of the Mind, calling the one fimple Apprehenfion, and the other Intuition; which two Words fecin better to express. their Nature, and the Manner in which they are converfant about their feveral Objects. This Accuracy of Diftinguifhing, where there is any the leaft Difference, is in a peculiar Manner neceffary in a Treatife of Logick, as it is the profeffed Defign of that Science, to teach us how to form clear and diftinct Notions of Things, and thereby avoid being mifled by their Similitude or Refemblance, X. HAVING thus given a general Idea of the four Operations of the Mind, and traced their Connection and Dependence one upon another, I would next obferve, that in confequence of this Divifion of the Powers of the Understanding, Logick is alfo divided into four Parts, which treat feverally of thefe Acts, and give Rules and Directions for their duc Conduct and Regulation. The Operations themselves we have from Nature, but how to exert them justly, and employ them with Advantage in the Search of Truth, is a Knowledge that may be acquired by Study and Obfervation. It is certain that we meet with falfe Reasonings as well as juft. Some Men are diftinguished by an Accuracy of Thinking, and a happy Talent of unravelling and throwing Light upon the most obfcure and intricate Subjects. Others confound the cafieft Speculations; their Understandings feem to be formed awry, and they are incapable of either conceiving clearly themfelves, or making their Thoughts intelligible to others. If then we fet ourlelves carefully to obferve, what it is that makes the one fucceed fo well, and how the others come to mifcarry, thefe Remarks will furnifh us with an Art of the higheft Ufe and Excellency in the Conduct of Life. Now this is the precife Bufinefs of Logick, to explain the Nature of the human Mind, and the proper Manner of conducting its feveral Powers, in order to the Attainment of Truth and Knowledge. It lays open thofe Errors and Mistakes we are apt through Inattention to run into, and teaches us how to diftinguish between Truth, and what carries only the Appearance of it. By this means we grow acquainted with the Nature and Force of the Understanding, fee what Things lie within its Reach, where we may attain Certainty and Demonftration, and when we must be contented with bare B4 Probability |