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Probability. Thefe Confiderations fufficiently evince the Usefulness and Benefit of this Science, which ought to be established as the Foundation and Ground-work of all our other Knowledge, if we really wish to fucceed in our Enquiries. But we fhall now proceed to treat of its Parts separately, according to the Divifion given of them above,

THE

THE

ELEMENTS

OF

LOGIC K.

BOOK I.

Of SIMPLE APPREHENSION, or

PERCEPTION.

"T

CHAP. I.

Of the Original of our Ideas.

Simple Apprebenfion and

Ideas.

HE firft Thing we obferve, when we take a View of what paffes within us, is, that we are capable of receiving Impreffions from a Variety of Objects, that diftinct Notices are thereby conveyed into the Underftanding, and that we are confcious of their being there. This Attention of the Mind to the Objects acting upon it, is what we call fimple Apprehenfion, and is in Fact the Mind itself, taking a View of Things, as reprefented to it by its own Confcioufnefs. It is by this means that we come to be furnished with all thofe Ideas about which our Thoughts are employed. For being fenfible of the Impreffions made upon us, and attending to the Perceptions they bring, we can renew them

again

again upon Occafion, even when the Objects that first produced them are removed. Now our Ideas are nothing elfe but thefe renewed Representations of what we have at any time perceived and felt, by means of which, things are again brought under the View of the Mind, and feem to have a kind of Existence in it. It is true, we can upon many Occafions combine our Ideas varioufly together, and thereby form to ourselves Reprefentations of things that never had an Existence in Nature, as when we fancy a Centaur, or a Golden Mountain; but it is ftill certain, that the original Ideas out of which thefe are made, are fuch as have been conveyed into the Mind by fome former Impreffions. It remains therefore to enquire, how we came by our first Notions and Perceptions of things. Whence does the Understanding derive thofe original Impreffions and Characters, which it can combine in fo many different Ways, and reprefent to itself under fuch infinite Varieties? To this I anfwer, that if we attend carefully to what paffes in our own Minds, we fhall obferve two Inlets of Knowledge, from whence, as from two Fountains, the Understanding is fupplied with all the Materials of thinking.

All our criginal Id.as derived either

from Senfation:

II. FIRST, outward Objects, acting upon our Senfes, roufe in us a Variety of Perceptions, according to the different manner in which they affect us. It is thus that we come, by the Ideas of Light and Darkness, Heat and Cold, Sweet and Bitter, and all those other Impreffions which we term fenfible Qualities. This great Source and Inlet of Knowledge, is commonly diftinguifhed by the Name of Senfation, as comprehending all the Notices conveyed into the Mind, by Impulfes made upon the Organs of Sense.

III. BUT thefe Ideas, numerous as they are, Or Reflection. are wholly derived to us from without; there is therefore yet another Source of Impreffions, arifing from the Mind's Attention to its own Acts, when. turning inwards upon itself, it takes a View of the Perceptions that are lodged there, and the various Ways in which it employs itfelf about them. For the Ideas furnished by the Sentes, give the Mind an Opportunity of exerting its feveral Powers; and as all our Thoughts, under whatever Form they appear, are attended with Confcioufness, hence the Impreffions they leave, when we come to turn the Eye of the Soul upon them, enrich the Understanding with a new Set of Perceptions, no lefs diftinct than thofe conveyed in by the Senfes, Thus it is that we get Ideas of Thinking, Doubting,

Doubting, Believing, Willing, &c. which are the different Acts and Workings of our Minds, reprefented to us by our own Confcioufnefs. This fecond Source of Ideas is called Refiction, and evidently prefuppofes Senfation, as the Impelions it furnifhes, are only of the various Powers of the Understanding, employed about Perceptions already in the

Mind.

Rife and Pro grefs of human

Korge.

IV. THESE Confiderations, if we duly attend to them, will give us a clear and diftinct View of the natural Procedure of the human Intellet, in its Advances to Knowledge. We can have no Perception of the Operations of our own Minds until they are exerted; nor can they be exerted before the Understanding is furnished with Ideas about which to employ them; and as thefe Ideas, that give the first Employment to our Faculties, are evidently the Perceptions of Sente, it is plain, that all our Knowledge muft begin here. This then is the firft Capacity of the human Mind, that it is fitted to receive the Impreffions made upon it by outward Objects affecting the Senfes; which Impreffions thus derived into the Understanding, and there lodged for the View of the Soul, employ it in various Acts of Perceiving, Remembering, Confidering, & all which are attended with an internal Feeling and Consciousness. And this leads us to the fecond Step the Mind takes in its Progrefs towards Knowledge, viz. that it can by its own Conscioufnefs reprefent to itself these its feveral Workings and Operations, and thereby furnish the Understanding with a new Stock of Ideas. From thefe. fimple Beginnings, all our Difcoveries take their Rife; for the Mind thus provided with its original Characters and Notices of things, has a Power of combining, modifying, and examining them in an infinite Variety of Lights, by which means it is enabled to enlarge the Objects of its Perception, and finds itself poffeffed of an inexhauftible Stock of Materials. It is in the various Comparison of these Ideas, according to fuch Combinations of them as feem beft to fuit its Ends, that the Understanding exerts itself in the Acts of Judging and Reafoning, by which the capacious Mind of Man pushes on its Views of Things, adds Discovery to Discovery, and often extends its Thoughts beyond the utmoit Bounds of the Universe. Thus we fee as it were at one Glance, the whole Progrefs of the Soul, from the very firft Dawnings of Perception, till it reaches the Perfection of human Knowledge; nor fhall wc, among all its vaft Stock of Difcoveries, or that infinite Variety of Conceptions where

of

of they confift, be able to find one original Idea which is not derived from Senfation or Reflection, or one complex Idea, which is not made up of thofe original ones.

It

V. HAVING thus fhewn how the Mind comes Divifion of to be first furnished with Ideas, we fhall next our Ideas into proceed to the Confideration of the Ideas themSimple and complex. felves, and endeavour to give fuch an Account of them, as will beft ferve to explain their several Appearances, and the Manner in which they are formed. is evident from what has been faid above, that they all fall naturally under these two Heads. Firft, thofe original Impreffions that are conveyed into the Mind by Senfation and Reflection, and which exift there fimple, uniform, and without any Shadow of Variety. Secondly, thofe more complex Notions of Things that refult from the various Combinations of our fimple Ideas, whether they are conceived to coexift of themfelves in any particular Subject, or are united and joined together by the Mind, enlarging its Conceptions of Things, and purfuing the Ends and Purposes of Knowledge. These two Claffes comprehend our whole Stock of Ideas; and when confidered feparately in that Order, wherein they moft naturally feem to offer themselves to our Thoughts, will, I hope, give fuch a View of the Conduct and Manner of the Mind, as may contribute not a little to introduce us to an Acquaintance with ourselves, and make us fenfible of the Capacity and Extent of the human Intellect. We proceed therefore to a more particular Account of this Division of our Ideas.

Simple Ideas

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CHA P. II.

of fimple Ideas.

HE first Clafs of our Ideas are those which I diftinguish by the Name of fimple Perceptions; because they exift in the Mind under one uniform Appearance, without Variety or Compofition. For though external Objects, convey at once into the Understanding, many different Ideas all united together, and making as it were one Whole; yet the Impreffions themfelves are evidently distinct, and are Conceived by the Mind, each under a Form peculiar to itself.

Thus

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