THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN DIFFICULTY. clear to people who heard of them for the first time, nor was it by any means to be concluded that the King of Prussia had any just claim to make such an easy display of the growing power of his authority, by commencing hostilities against a small state in defiance of European opinion. He had become strong enough to refuse the urgent invitation of the Emperor of Austria to attend a congress of the German sovereigns at Frankfort for the purpose of forming a Bund or confederation of all their states. The dream of "United Germany" must be realized, if it were to be realized at all, by the domination of Prussia -and thus it was realized years afterward; but not till Austria had been temporarily crushed by a war which, for a time, crippled her resources and left her German scarcely even in name. There is no need to go into the remote history of the relations between the German states, the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and the kingdom of Denmark. The dispute which menaced the peace of Europe was, as the Times said, not calculated to inspire implicit confidence in the arrangements of governments assembled in congresses or in conferences. The chronic difficulty of the duchies attached to the Danish crown had been unexpectedly rendered urgent by the death of Frederick VII., the last king of the house of Oldenburg. As long as the kings were absolute in Denmark their ducal sovereignty in Schleswig and Holstein involved no subordination of their German subjects to the Danes of the kingdom. It was only when a representative constitution was granted in 1846 that the conflict of races seriously commenced, and in 1848 it produced civil war. With the aid of Prussia the Germans of Holstein and Schleswig expelled the Danish forces from both duchies, but on the withdrawal of the Prussian troops the Danes recovered the greater part of Schleswig; and finally, the authority of Frederick VII. was re-established in both duchies by various conventions in 1850 and 1851. Austria and Prussia, on behalf of Germany, assented to the dissolution of the ancient union between Holstein and Schleswig, and, in return, Denmark undertook to perform VOL. IV. 161 the federal engagements which were due in Holstein, and to maintain various privileges and immunities which were claimed by the German inhabitants of Schleswig. In 1852 the great powers thought it expedient, in anticipation of the extinction of the dynasty, to provide for the integrity of the Danish monarchy, including the ancient dependencies of the crown. By the Treaty of London, executed by the five powers and by Denmark and Sweden, the succession was settled on Prince Christian of Schleswig-HolsteinGlücksburg, whose wife became, by aid of certain family renunciations, the heiress of the royal crown of Denmark. The Duke of Augustenburg, who was heir of Holstein and claimant of Schleswig, was induced to relinquish his pretensions; and the King of Prussia, who was head of the ducal house of Holstein - Gottorp, agreed to postpone any hereditary claim which he might have asserted. All the principal German states, except Bavaria and Baden, afterwards adhered to the treaty; and on the death of Frederick VII. Prince Christian possessed an undisputed diplomatic title. In the interval, however, extreme irritation had existed between Germany and Denmark, especially when Frederick VII. was said to have encroached on federal rights by a patent establishing a constitution in Holstein, issued in the spring of the year 1863. Federal execution in the duchy was imminent, when the accession of King Christian IX. in Denmark afforded an excuse for opening the question of his right to the duchies. Prince Frederick, son of the Duke of Augustenburg, disputed the validity of his father's renunciation, and nearly every legislative assembly in the German states urged their respective governments to recognize his title. But the points actually in dispute, the concessions in regard to which Prussia and the diet had at one stage of the negotiations virtually agreed to accept, may be all summed up in a single question-that of the budget. The duchy and the diet had rejected any plan for a constitution of the whole monarchy by Frederick VII., and any reasonable plan for a provisional government of the duchy alone. As the government had to be carried 74 on, however, the only way that remained was through the King of Denmark as absolute Duke of Holstein and the old assembly of estates. It was quite obvious, also, that while any connection remained between the government of Denmark and Holstein, the latter must contribute to the expenses of that government. It was on the budget, therefore, that the dispute between the king and the duchy arose. The Holstein estates made the demand that they themselves should decide the amount of their contribution to the revenue, and that the budget of the duchy should be submitted to their consideration. This the Danish government had refused, but as the diet had actually urged the extravagant demand that the budget for the whole monarchy should be submitted to the deliberate vote of the Holstein estates, the three great powers-Russia, France, and England-had recommended Denmark to make concessions enabling the estates to deliberate on the budget for the duchy. In a new provisional constitution for the duchy these concessions were granted on the advice of the great powers who were parties to the original treaty, in order to preserve the peace of Europe; but the estates, supported by Prussia and the diet, continued to reject the proposals though they included the demands which had formerly been made. It was therefore not unnaturally concluded by Denmark that the great powers would address a firm, united, and urgent remonstrance to the diet and Prussia, and would support Denmark by protesting against any federal execution being attempted. But the very proposal of the constitution, in which the concessions were included, was resented as an unauthorized assumption of power. On the accession of King Christian IX. Austria and Prussia were for demanding the repeal of the constitution of the kingdom, which included Schleswig, and proposed to the diet that the duchy should be occupied till the concession was made. They did not desire to proceed to actual war, and the Prussian minister did not recognize the claims of the Duke of Augustenburg, while Austria was believed to be not unwilling to yield to "moral" intervention. Bismarck and the Prussian sovereign were pro bably averse to take a position in hostilities against a small state when they could only do so by acting in conjunction with those other German states, the congress of which, under Austrian influence, they had refused to attend. Austria had perhaps no relish for measuring her military efficiency with that of Prussia at such a time. But the minor states, under the direction of the Saxon minister, Baron Beust, outvoted Austria and Prussia in the diet, and insisted on immediate war. Not till the 2d of December, 1863, did the Prussian chambers, by a majority of 231 to 63, pass a resolution "that the honour and interests of Germany demand that all the German states should preserve the rights of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, that they should recognize the hereditary prince of Schleswig-Holstein - Sonderburg - Augustenburg as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, and should lend him assistance in vindication of his rights." Probably this was a timely diversion of the attention of the Prussian assemblies from the autocratic contempt which Count Bismarck and the king had constantly shown for popular demands and parliamentary representations. The King of Denmark declared that he would resist all revolutionary movements in Holstein. The Danish foreign minister afterwards addressed the ministers of Prussia, Austria, Saxony, and Hanover, pronouncing the decree of the federal diet for giving effect to procedure of execution in the duchies to be devoid of binding force because of the exclusion of the plenipotentiary of Denmark from the assembly. He also announced that the mediation which had been proffered by the British government had been accepted. His representations were made on the 19th of December. On the 23d a detachment of Saxon and Hanoverian troops entered Holstein. Of course neither Prussia nor Austria could hold back on an occasion when it was necessary for them to assert their importance as chief states in the German Confederation. Circumstances had imposed on them the condition that they should only be able to assert their rivalry by becoming allies. On the 16th of January, 1864, the federal commission FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND ENGLAND DECLINE TO INTERFERE. having supressed the administration of Holstein and established a ducal government at Kiel, Austria and Prussia demanded of Denmark that the constitution of November, 1863, should be suppressed within forty-eight hours. This was refused, and an Austro-Prussian army under Marshal Wrangel, entered Holstein on the 21st. England had remonstrated. Earl Russell had spoken with considerable plainness. On the 31st of December, 1863, he had addressed a note to the federal diet demanding in the interests of peace that a conference of the powers that signed the Treaty of London should, in conjunction with a representative from the German Confederation, meet in Paris or London to settle the differences between Germany and Denmark, and that the status quo should be maintained till the conference had concluded its work. The "status quo," as we have seen, had been changed before anything was done. Even if Austria and Prussia had been inclined to hold their hands after the serious representations of England, they were urged on by the smaller confederated states, by which Prussia had previously been accused of a want of a national spirit for hesitating to break the treaties which secured the Danish monarchy. It was a juncture when the state that must take the lead in a possibly united Germany of the future would have to sacrifice some scruples, and even risk the disfavour of the other powers of Europe. Was the risk so very great? The queen's speech at the opening of the English parliament in 1864 set forth that the death of the late King of Denmark brought into immediate application the stipulation of the treaty of 1852 which declared that it was conducive to the preservation of the balance of power and to the peace of Europe that the integrity of the Danish monarchy should be maintained; but this speech was delivered four days after Austria and Prussia had told the Diet of Frankfort that they should take the occupation of Schleswig into their own hands as parties to the treaty of 1852; and had summoned Denmark to annul the constitution by which Schleswig was incorporated with the kingdom, and to surrender the duchy which General de 163 Meza, the Danish commander, said he had orders to defend. The very day before the opening of the British parliament the Prussians had bombarded and begun to burn Missunde; three days afterward the Danes had retreated from the Dannewerke, leaving behind all the heavy artillery which defended the forts; in less than a week the Austro-Prussian army had occupied North Schleswig. Then the Danes quitted the place, declaring both duchies in a state of blockade, and before the end of the month (February, 1864) Denmark had first opposed the proposal of Earl Russell to leave the settlement of the question of succession to a conference of the powers concerned in the former treaty. It was not unnatural that Denmark should hope for material aid from England, or from England and France together; but the English government declined to enter into a conflict alone, with the probability of finding that their action had produced a war which would alter the relative disposition of all the powers of Europe. France, Russia, and Sweden showed no alacrity in joining to force the hand of Prussia and defeat the demands of the German Confederation. Denmark was obstinately deaf to the advice that by yielding to certain claims which had been interpreted into engagements to Germany, her own undoubted claims might be more effectually supported. Earl Russell argued that England was not bound to act alone while there were other parties to the treaty, and therefore the honour of England was not involved because the Danes had formed expectations of our assistance while refusing to accept advice. At all events the Emperor of the French did not seem disposed to propose any joint action with this country. He had been piqued at the refusals to join in a general congress of nations, and he had himself received no overtures from us when he was supposed to be willing to intervene on behalf of Poland. On the other hand, Russia was shy of both France and England. The Polish insurrection had been put down in fire, in carnage, and in banishment; and the element of religious persecution had been imported into it till the cruelties against the Roman Catholics of Poland had actually aroused the remonstrances of the pope, whose voice had not been heard in denouncing the cruelties of tyranny while it had the name of being merely secular. Russia, too, probably recognized its obligations to Prussia in this matter, and though willing to add grave remonstrances to the representations of other powers against the breach of treaty obligations and the duty of abstaining from demands which would imperil the peace of Europe, was not at all likely to repay aid against Poland by hostilities to preserve Denmark. It may have seemed good for Denmark that the conference in London was at length agreed to, but it is scarcely to be wondered at that Prussia and Austria, flushed with success and perceiving little probability of provoking hostilities by refusal, obstinately declined to accept the boundary line which was suggested as the reasonable division of the duchies from Denmark, and demanded the cession, not only of Schleswig and Holstein, but of Lauenburg, which had been an acknowledged part of the Danish monarchy. In fact no agreement was come to. Denmark had in effect accepted the concessions proposed, but Prussia and Austria, unwilling now to recede, and supported in their demands by the persistent and convenient agitation of Baron Beust, the envoy of the diet (who had no claim to be at the congress, since the diet had no hand in the treaty of 1852), refused to abandon their position. The conference broke up on the 22d of June; hostilities were resumed next day, and Denmark, finding that no support could be obtained, was obliged to end a brave resistance against vastly superior forces by retiring from the island of Alsen and abandoning further resistance. Overtures for peace were made and preliminaries signed. On the first of August a treaty was concluded; and the two powers, triumphant with military successes, enforced the cession of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, and the payment of a large proportion of the expenses of the war. There can be no doubt that during the period from 1864 to 1868 the opposition members of the chamber in France were utterly opposed to war, and that the whole country regarded the Mexican expedition as a disaster from which France had scarcely escaped with honour. In the course of a debate on supplemental credits, on the opening of the chamber in 1864, M. Berryer and M. Emile Ollivier spoke of the necessity of disarming; M. Berryer denouncing the idea of France, oppressed with financial difficulties, embarking needlessly in any European war. M. Ollivier, a distinguished leader of the opposition, said: "There are two modes of always endangering influence with other nations. The one is to be too weak, the other is to be too strong. The nation that is too weak is despised, and its opinion has no weight. The nation that is too strong is feared, and then those who would naturally be disunited, by a feeling of prudence approach each other and unite against those they fear. The danger of France in Europe at this moment comes from her being too strong. The consequence is that every time she treats, every time she acts, whatever proposal she makes, people suppose that she has personal objects in view, and they do not believe in her disinterestedness. Try to convince them of the disinterestedness of France, and all difficulties will vanish; our influence will no more encounter opposition, and, while you increase our prestige in the world, you will have found the only real remedy for our embarrassed finances. But I warn you, you will be condemned to a last sacrifice, for neither economy, nor grace, nor disarming will suffice if you do not grant liberty to France." These words were vaguely suggestive of the conditions that were soon to be experienced. The war between Prussia and Austria, which afterwards arose out of the dispute with Denmark and the seizure of Schleswig by Prussia, remained uninfluenced by French representations. In that tremendous conflict it was seen that Prussia, intent on internal development, and silently organizing resources and consolidating her national strength, had attained to a position previously unsuspected, with a great and perfectly appointed army and material of war, that gave her at once the rank of a first-rate power in Europe. GLADSTONE AND DISRAELI-A SHARP ENCOUNTER. There were indications in France by that time that the national expenditure was excessive, while the condition of the public finances was most unsatisfactory. Added to this there were symptoms of disaffection, which, while they did not reach to public disturbances, kept society in a state of subdued excitement, and made the demand for an extension of political freedom deep, if not loud. In England, parliament intervened to call ministers to account for their conduct in the Danish question. During the whole of the session there had been frequent interpellations and fragmentary debates upon this DanoGerman struggle; but in the beginning of July a simultaneous attack was made in both houses upon the policy of the government. In the House of Lords, a resolution against the government, moved by Lord Malmesbury, was carried by a majority of nine; and in the House of Commons Mr. Disraeli proposed a similar resolution:-"To thank her majesty for having directed the correspondence on Denmark and Germany, and the protocol of the conference recently held in London, to be laid before parliament; to assure her majesty that we have heard with deep concern that the sittings of the conference have been brought to a close without accomplishing the important purpose for which it was convened; and to express to her majesty our great regret that, while the course pursued by her majesty's government has failed to maintain their avowed policy of upholding the integrity and independence of Denmark, it has lowered the just influence of this country in the capitals of Europe, and thereby diminished the securities for peace." As an amendment to the last sentence of the resolution Mr. Kinglake proposed to substitute the words:-"To express the satisfaction with which we have learned that at this conjuncture her majesty has been advised to abstain from armed interference in the war now going on between Denmark and the German powers." "It is not for us," said Mr. Disraeli, "it is not for any man in this house, to indicate to the ministers what should be the foreign policy of the country. The most we can do is to tell the noble lord 165 what is not our policy. We will not threaten and then refuse to act, we will not lead on our allies with expectations we do not intend to fulfil. And, sir, if it ever be the lot of myself, and of those with whom I act, to carry on important negotiations of this country, as the noble lord and his colleagues have done, I trust we shall not, at least, carry them on in such a manner as that it will be our duty to come to parliament and announce that we have no ally, and then to declare that England can never act alone. Sir, these are words that ought never to have escaped the lips of any British minister. They are sentiments which ought never to have entered his heart. I repudiate them and reject them. I remember that there was a time when England had not a tithe of our resources, when, inspired by a patriotic cause, she triumphantly encountered a world in arms. And, sir, I believe, now, if the occasion were fitting, and our independence and our honour were attacked and assailed, if our empire were endangered, I believe that England. would arise in the magnificence of her might and struggle triumphantly for those objects. for which men live and nations flourish. But, sir, I for one will never consent to go to war to extricate British ministers from the consequences of their own indiscretion, and it is in this spirit that I have drawn up this address to the crown. I have drawn it up in the spirit in which the royal speech was delivered at the commencement of this session. I am ready to vindicate the honour of this country when it is necessary, but I have drawn it up in the interests of peace." Mr. Gladstone at once replied: "This is the very first occasion that the British House of Commons has been called upon, for the sake of displacing a government, to record the degradation of its country. Why cannot the right honourable gentleman speak plainly in his motion? Why does he not adopt the language of our forefathers, who, when they were dissatisfied with the government, addressed the crown, and prayed that the government might be dismissed? They said boldly that the conduct of the government was open to such and such charges, and they |