adverse parties threaten the peace of society, rights and pretensions are opposed to each other and mar the harmony of the state. Yet it must be acknowledged, on the other hand, that the Italian revolution has been conducted with singular temper and forbearance. The subversion of existing power has not been followed, as is too often the case, by an outburst of popular vengeance. The extreme views of democrats have nowhere prevailed. Public opinion has checked the excesses of the public triumph. The venerated forms of constitutional monarchy have been associated with the name of a prince who represents an ancient and glorious dynasty. Such have been the causes and concomitant circumstances of the revolution of Italy. Her majesty's government can see no sufficient ground for the | severe censure with which Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia have visited the acts of the King of Sardinia. Her majesty's government will turn their eyes rather to the gratifying prospect of a people building up the edifice of their liberties, and consolidating the work of their independence, amid the sympathies and good wishes of Europe."

It need scarcely be said that this despatch moved the gratitude both of Cavour and of Garibaldi, "who," as Earl Russell said in his subsequent account of it, "with the magnanimity of great men, instead of attributing to themselves the whole merit of rescuing Italy from her centuries of servitude and depression, and securing to her the blessings of independence and freedom, were ever willing to acknowledge, with gratitude, the efforts made by British statesmen to help on the good work." It may be mentioned that several gentlemen in Milan combined to send to Earl Russell a token of their appreciation in the shape of a beautiful marble statue, the work of Carl Romano, representing Young Italy holding in her hands a diadem embossed with the arms of the various Italian states thenceforward to be united in one kingdom.

The death of Cavour, and a change of ministry which brought the cunning Rattazzi into power, proved disastrous to Garibaldi. He had been elected to the Italian parliament as deputy for Naples, and on his recovery from

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an illness which followed his retirement to Caprera he appeared in the assembly and after some passages of words, in which he was no match for his opponents, retired from the contest, and allowed a reconciliation, or rather an expedient truce, to be effected. Rattazzi, crafty, designing, but not highly capable, nor possessing the confidence of either party, seems to have imagined he could follow the policy of Cavour, and to gain the support of the revolutionary party, or "the party of action,” allowed it to be understood that he would supply a million francs for an expedition to take Venice from the Austrians.

It need scarcely be said that this proposal was seized upon with alacrity by Garibaldi, who not unnaturally assumed that he might again raise volunteers for an enterprise in which he could count on the connivance, if not on the direct assistance of the government. But the attempt to make history repeat itself was too hazardous. It had been already distinctly declared by Victor Emmanuel that no attempt should be made against the Austrians at Venetia except by regular Italian troops, and in order to avert the suspicion of promoting the enrolment of volunteers for such a purpose, it was necessary to take decided measures to prevent Garibaldi from calling upon men to follow him. It would have been well if the general had submitted; but it was highly improbable that he would be satisfied to obey without bitterly complaining of having been deceived and betrayed. He abandoned the attack on Venetia, but at the same time proclaimed his disappointment, and at the instigation of the "party of action" landed in Sicily, and there raised a small undisciplined force. He had attended a rifle meeting at Palermo, where Prince Humbert, the eldest son of Victor Emmanuel, was present, and where Pallavicini, who had for years been an officer of the Piedmontese, was in command of the Papal troops. There he openly announced his intention of organizing a force for the purpose of taking Rome from the French who occupied it. Of course this avowal should at once have been denounced as illegal. It would have been monstrous for the king, who had acquired dominion over a whole territory, and whose

authority had been recognized and established, to sanction the attempt of a subject to levy troops or to commence a war, but it was almost as monstrous to permit any initiatory steps to be taken. No positive command was sent to Garibaldi to cease at once from any preparation for hostilities; and it was not till Rattazzi saw to what a fatal termination his former indirect encouragement was likely to lead, that the government found itself compelled to resort to force to prevent a calamity which would never have threatened but for the weakness and duplicity of the minister. At any sacrifice of feeling, and even at the expense of appearing dishonourable, it was essential that the followers of the "liberator" should not be suffered to come into conflict with the French troops. Garibaldi had crossed to Calabria, where he expected to raise a force large enough to march on Rome and expel the French garrison. Only a few weeks earlier, Victor Emmanuel had been expressing his gratitude to Napoleon III. for "a careful act of kindness" in sending a French fleet to Naples for his protection and for "sympathy for the cause of Italy." Prince Napoleon, too, had visited the king at Naples and had afterwards been to Sicily, where the troops at Messina had marched past his hotel and shouts were raised by the people of "Long live the defender of Italy! Long live France!" Shortly before that day 35,000 Italians had sent a memorial to the English government asking for its influence in inducing the French to relinquish the occupation of Rome. It was not till he reached Aspromonte that Garibaldi found himself opposed by the royal troops a battalion of Bersaglieri. Several officers of the army had thrown up their commissions rather than obey orders to fight against the chief who had done so much for Italy. It was necessary to take immediate measures, for the people were becoming excited and were clamouring against France. At the same time the true friends of Italian liberty saw how deplorable had been the error into which Garibaldi had fallen. Opinions were everywhere conflicting, but while Russia came in with an offer of “moral support" to Victor Emmanuel in the cause of order, Kossuth, the

Hungarian patriot, wrote a letter to the Italian journals strongly disapproving the attitude assumed by his brother patriot, and exhorting the Hungarians not to lend their aid to a movement which, by bringing Italy into collision with France, would tend to rivet afresh the manacles from which the people had been freed. But the mischief had been done so far as injury to Garibaldi himself was concerned. Cialdini had stipulated that he should be allowed to choose the troops who were to be sent against his former friend and comrade, and he intrusted the capture of the general to Pallavicini and his Bersaglieri or sharpshooters. It was believed that Garibaldi would lead his men to the mountains of the Tyrol rather than submit. As the regular troops advanced it became evident that they were in force, and that they had been so disposed as to endeavour to prevent his retreat, but it was equally certain that he had no intention of giving them battle. From the first moment while he was looking at them through his glass he repeatedly gave orders to his men not to fire, and the order was repeated by his officers and by sound of trumpet all down the line. The Bersaglieri, however, commenced firing, and Garibaldi himself was wounded in the thigh by a spent ball, and more seriously in the ankle by a bullet which struck with full force. He stood erect for a moment, shouted "Long live Italy!" again called out "Do not fire," and then was carried to a short distance, where he lay beneath some trees and began to smoke a cigar vigorously till his foot could be attended to by the surgeon. His son, Menotti, was brought in also with a wound in his leg, and several others were injured. In one part of the line the Garibaldians had returned the fire of the troops and a skirmish took place, which was, however, quickly ended. Friends, old comrades, relatives met as the two forces approached. It was a scene of regret and of mutual and sorrowful reproaches. Pallavicini came bareheaded and with every token of respect to the place where the wounded chief lay. For a very short time people wondered what would be done with Garibaldi. What could be done with him? He was carried to Spezzia to the

and appearing to restrain an insurrection. He had made an edge-tool of Garibaldi, and but for his own energy and adroitness his own hand would have been seriously wounded and Italy maimed. As it was, Garibaldi, first secretly encouraged and then ostentatiously checked, had added Southern to Northern Italy and united the kingdom for Victor Emmanuel. Cavour stopped short at Venetia and at Rome. Rattazzi, now that Venetia had fallen again into the lap of Italy, began to repeat the tactics which had before brought himself as well as Garibaldi to grief, and the victim of Aspromonte was again fired with ready enthusiasm at the cry of "Rome for Italy," was again caught in the net which cunning folly had spread for him. Rome had been relieved of the French garrison and was supposed to be comparatively defenceless. If the minister could only excite an attempt to seize upon the capital, and could at the same time appear to be strenuously opposing it, he might achieve the desire of the extreme party, and either deceive Napoleon III. or so awaken his sympathies for the Italian cause as to prevent his effectual interference. This was

Rattazzi's absurd attempt to imitate Cavour. There was no difficulty in raising volunteers, and arms were ready to be distributed. Menotti Garibaldi was on the borders of the diminished Papal States enlisting men. Garibaldi himself was at Genoa almost as soon as he heard that the farce of 1862 was to be forgotten in a repetition of the original drama of 1860. He went from Genoa to Florence, his addresses to the people were ardent and so imprudent as to be almost inexcusable if he remembered with whom he had to deal. The government, dissembling still in the eye of France, condemned his language, and affecting to be shocked at his attitude ordered his arrest and his removal to Caprera, where government cruisers lay off shore to watch him and prevent his escape till the time came for the blow to be actually struck against Rome. Then he was allowed to get off quite easily, to land at Leghorn, and to join the force mustered on the Papal frontier. It was too late the drama ended in a pitiful fiasco-in a wretched tragedy rather. When Garibaldi advanced with his followers he

found himself opposed not only to the much larger forces of the Papal army, but to French battalions sent for the rescue and protection of the pope and commanded by De Failly. All was over. Wounded alike in body and in soul and sick at heart, the hero went once more to his solitary island like a broken eagle to its eyrie, and again after three years saw Rome, to restore which he would have given his life,-taken after a brief struggle, by the Italian army and made the true capital of United Italy, while he had no hand in the achievement, and the French emperor who had so long prevented it was rushing on his fate at Sedan.

Reference has already been made to an Irish brigade formed for the protection of the Papal territory, and in this association the name of Mr. Pope Hennessey will occur to some readers. Mr. Pope Hennessey, who, with Sir George Bowyer, was an ardent supporter of the Papal authority in Italy, had occupied the office of a civil clerk in the council office, and was afterwards returned for King's County. As an Irish Roman Catholic of the extreme school-the Ultramontanists, as men of his way of thinking were then called he had been conspicuous in the formation of the Irish Brigade, which irreverent jesters had nicknamed "the Pope's Brass Band," and he was of course opposed to the course taken by the government in relation to Italian independence, since he sympathized with the King of Naples and regarded Garibaldi as a bandit and Victor Emmanuel as a robber. At all events he had the courage of his convictions, for in a well-arranged and well-delivered speech, which lasted two hours and a half, he denounced the conduct of the government, and delivered opinions which were directly opposed to those of the great majority of the house. As he was then only twenty-seven years old this was an achievement, and though he had very few supporters he was listened to with something like interest, or at all events without interruption; but when Mr. Layard rose to reply, the house rapidly filled, and it was evident from the cheering which accompanied his retorts, as well as the remarks of Mr. Edwin James and