commander in charge of the 'Lettish eagles,' issued an army order with the general approval of Lettish officers and soldiers, in which he said: Our country expects victory from us. • Without discipline victory cannot be won and is never won; 'offences against discipline will be punished severely, but in ' accordance with the law, and courts-martial will continue to 'be held.' This order produced good results. In spite of the mistakes of the Provisional Government no serious disorganisation occurred in the Lettish regiments. Even the disappearance of discipline in Petrograd had not a disintegrating effect on the Lettish army, while the relations between the officers and soldiers continued good. Strong measures were, however, necessary in a few instances to counteract the restlessness of aggressive spirits and to damp their rising ardour for revolt. Frequent raids on German trenches were undertaken, which put a stop to attempts on the part of the Germans to fraternise with the Letts.

The first protests against the activities of Lenin and the pacifists came from Riga. The Press inveighed against this activity which troubled the mind and destroyed organisation.' The Army wrote entreating Petrograd not to tolerate demonstrations, which were destructive of the unity and power of Russia. As for liberty of speech, the message declared that the public expression of political opinions should be confined to political meetings, and should not be tolerated in the market-places and streets. Violent resentment of attacks against the prestige and greatness of Russia was a feature on the Lettish front.

This protest reveals two tendencies in the Lett-a fanatical devotion to Lettish nationality and a loyalty to the Russian State difficult to equal in any other part of Russia. The interests of Lettonia are in the opinion of the Lett more bound up with a free Russia than with a despotic Germany.

On the Riga front the struggle against German agitators was very active. Any soldier who ventured to express himself in a disrespectful manner about his superior officer was at once excluded from the Army and handed over to the courtsmartial; the pacifist organs were severely boycotted, while the high command, after overcoming certain difficulties created by the Central Government, felt itself strong enough to deal with deserters. No humanitarian idealism marked the pro

ceedings of these courts-martial, as was the case in Petrograd. Meanwhile, the conduct of the Lettish army met with the approval of the whole Lettish population, who are persuaded that until they are freed from the Germanophile and German agents they will not be able to develop unhindered. Some of their projects may be called irrational and unconsidered, but the cool, critical mind of the Lett will, in the end, correct what is exaggerated and mistaken.

The unanimous desire of the people is, naturally, to have a large share of autonomy. Divergence of opinion, however, does exist about the relations of Lettonia with the Central Power of the Empire, and also as regards the best form of internal government. But the wish for an understanding with the other nationalities of the Empire, and the anxiety not to create difficulties for the Provisional Government during the War, are dominant factors. The addresses presented to the Prime Minister express an absolute loyalty, a generous faith. in the political honesty of new Russia, and willingness to forget the bitter experiences of the past.

C. HAGBERG WRIGHT.

A

WHAT IS AUSTRIA ?

T the end of November the Emperor Charles will complete the first year of his reign. His accession brought into the Austrian problem-that crazy puzzle of countervailing instabilities-a factor of unknown quantity and quality but, at all events, different from the jaded cynicism of Francis Joseph. To ignore this new factor would be impolitic; to predict its influence would be foolish. It is a factor to be studied and analysed-always remembering that the injunction, Put not your trust in princes,' applies especially to the Hapsburgs. Nothing has yet shown the Emperor Charles to be an exception to the general rule laid down by the shrewd Austrian critic, Hermann Bahr, who wrote in his booklet 'Wien,' eleven years ago (pp. 18-19): Among Hapsburg 'Princes there have been simpletons and geniuses, men turbulent and tranquil, jolly fellows and curmudgeons, victors and vanquished, companionable souls and recluses, men of 'all sorts, but one trait is common to them all-they have 'lacked the sense of reality.' This does not mean that their personal action, however heedless of facts, may not, at a given moment, set the whole mechanism of the State working in a direction unforeseen. It means only that those who deal with them will be wise not to base plans or forecasts upon the Hapsburg 'personal equation.'

With every month of war it grows plainer that peace must bring a drastic change in the position of the Hapsburg dominions. This is recognised in Germany and Austria even more clearly than by some of the Allies. The Emperor Charles is certainly convinced of it. The controversy in Allied countries upon the dismemberment' of Austria is in itself a sign that the Austrian question is forcing itself upon public attention. The difficulty is to determine what changes would connote a German victory and what the Allies require as a guarantee that there shall in future be in Central Europe itself such a grouping of ethnic, economic, and political forces as to preclude German mastery over the Continnt.

This weighty matter cannot be judged offhand or settled

by likes and dislikes. It is in part a question of facts already known, and in part a question of facts and tendencies in the making, and therefore open to varying interpretations. In the EDINBURGH REVIEW for January 1917, I attempted to show how the gradual rise of the Slav nationalities in the Dual Monarchy had become a potential menace to the twin bases of the State laid down in 1867-the preponderance of the German minority in Austria and of the Magyar minority in Hungary-with the result that the Germans of Austria and the Magyars of Hungary, under the guidance of the German Empire, had driven the Hapsburgs into an anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav policy, so as to preclude such a solution of the Southern Slav question as might have made the Hapsburgs masters in their own house, and have enabled them once more to play an independent part in Europe. The turning point in this process was the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in October 1908. Aehrenthal, who carried it out, thought he was pursuing an independent Hapsburg policy. He presently saw his error and sought, too late, to retrieve it. Then Germany hounded him to death. With his death, as was pointed out last January, disappeared the only potential obstacle to a continuance of the policy which the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had originally been intended by the partisans of Germany to promote-the overthrow of Serbia, as a preliminary to the opening of the German road to the East. I added that:

'Having secured for Austria (in 1878) the fatal gift of BosniaHerzegovina, and having shrewdly limited her title to an " occupation" so that eventual annexation might always be held as a bait before her, Germany could be quite sure that Austria would never turn her attention again to Europe, at least so long as her internal affairs were controlled, under the Dual System, by the Germans in Austria and the Magyars in Hungary. This was long the somewhat negative aim of Prussian diplomacy in regard to Austria. But, with the growth of the pan-German spirit and the strengthening of the German influence in Turkey, Austria wandered, or was driven more and more in the direction marked out by German ambitions-that of being a pioneer of Germanism in the Balkans.'

From the moment when Austria picked her quarrel with Serbia at the instance of Germany, it was evident to those familiar with the elements of Hapsburg politics that the Dual Monarchy was signing its own death-warrant. In the event of

The exact dere if Gama spushing be the AustroHungarian ultimatum : Seria has not yet been proved by documentary endate Bitz the German and the AustroHungarian Governments have renly vanned from publicaDo whatever correspondence passed between them during the first three weeks of July rate the revelation in 'The James' off for 28th last that a densre Austro-German conkrente was neidat Potsdam in the be accepted as substammalt arurate as tear that the decisions then ten wold bave obviated the need for detailed despatches. Al the emdenre available prints to the modasin that during the first hub of folk rote the Austro-Hunan Government and Coed Sud received export assurances of German support in case the Dual Monarchy sbrold make up its mind to serde accoms with Serbia On this store, the force of combozative testmony is overwhelming. The well-known fact that to the path of Jayron the late Baron von Wangenheim, the German Ambassadirat Constantiorple informed his Italian collage, the Margus Garron to ths efect, is but one link in the charm of evidence. It is kwa for instance, that on the sume day a prominent Austro-Hungarian ex-ambassador told the representative of a Great Power in Vienna that, on the prevnt as day Jay 14th the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office was already in possessin of such assurances of support in all Greco, as from Germany, that it had decided to ‘go ahead.' Further, there is in this country a communication written by a well-informed German to a British sympathiser on the 16th of Jely rozu. to the effect that the Austrian Emperor was about to sign the ultimatum to Serbia after having received from the German Emperor an encouraging letter which a well-known friend of the writer and of the recipient of the communication had been allowed to read. Since the importance of establishing beyond question the responsibility of Germany for the war makes it incumbent upon those who have any direct or indirect knowledge of the facts to say what they know, I venture to add some account of my own experience to the common stock information.

returned to England in October 1913, after having worked