Elgin passes day after day at Hong-Kong, stamping his foot and sighing; his anxiety is increased by the non-arrival of despatches from his government.' (Oliphant, vol. i. p. 143.)

The time was, however, at hand when a very different aspect was about to be given to affairs. Reinforcements at length arrived; Baron Gros, the French Commissioner, actively cooperated with Lord Elgin; an ultimatum was sent in; the bombardment of Canton opened on the 28th December; the Braves were routed and the walls carried by the allied troops; and on the last day of the year Lord Elgin himself ascended by a scaling ladder the south-east angle of the city wall, and entered the streets of that proud Canton which had never been trodden by an European. A few days later Yeh himself was seized, and the city was placed under the joint authority of its Chinese magistrates and a military commission. These events have already been narrated with so much spirit by another eye-witness, that Mr. Oliphant has passed over them with greater brevity than their importance would otherwise deserve; but, not to linger over a twice-told tale, we shall at once accompany him to the mouth of the Peiho, where the principal objects of the mission were to be attained.

No sooner had the blockade of Canton been raised and the trade re-opened, at the urgent entreaty of the Chinese authorities as well as of our own merchants, than a letter was despatched by Lord Elgin to Yu, the senior secretary of state. This communication, dated the 11th February, 1858, informed the Court of Pekin of the events which had occurred at Canton, and announced the intention of the Allies to continue the occupation of that city until their demands were satisfied. At the same time the Chinese were invited to send an Imperial Plenipotentiary to Shanghai before the end of March, and they were told that the non-arrival of such a negotiator would be held at once to justify the British Plenipotentiary to proceed nearer the capital, and to have recourse to such measures as he might think fit to adopt. Mr. Oliphant and M. de Contades were despatched with this mission and its French counterpart; and their successful expedition from Shanghai to Soochou for the purpose of delivering these despatches, is one of the most interesting chapters of the present work.

Soochou lies on the Imperial Grand Canal, which at the period of Sir H. Pottinger's expedition was the great artery of the internal commerce and navigation of the empire. But Mr. Oliphant speaks of it as that once celebrated channel of commerce.

"For since the bursting of its banks by the Yellow River, and the destruction in consequence of a section of this canal, it has not been

used for the last five years. The vast supplies of grain which were annually conveyed along it to the capital are now sent in sea-going junks from Shanghai, and other ports of the Yan-tse-Kiang, round the promontory of Shantung, and up the Peiho river. The expenses incidental to the rebellion have prevented the Government from spending any money in repairing this magnificent work. The consequence is, that the enormous imperial grain junks formerly employed now line the bank in a rotting condition.'

This sudden and extraordinary change in the line of communication of the grain fleet, on which Pekin depends for its subsistence, increased the importance attached by Lord Elgin to the command of the mouth of the Peiho, and he was especially anxious that a sufficient naval force should be assembled there to interrupt, if necessary, the junks which bring their innumerable cargoes to that stream immediately after the monsoon. With this view, as early as the 2nd March, he had called upon the Admiral to collect before the end of that month at Shanghai as large a naval force as possible, especially of gunboats drawing little water; and in the Admiral's reply to this requisition the Ambassador was assured that measures had already been taken to meet his wishes, and that Sir Michael Seymour himself would sail for Shanghai in the 'Calcutta' on or about the 16th March. On the 3rd April intelligence was received from the south that the Admiral had postponed his departure for ten days; but on the 10th April Lord Elgin, in company with Baron Gros, and such vessels as had been collected, resolved to proceed to the mouth of the Peiho, convinced that any appearance of wavering at so critical a juncture might entail the most serious consequences, and defeat the main objects of the Mission. The weather was lovely, and nothing impeded the advance of the squadron up the Yellow Sea, until it reached the bar at the mouth of the Peiho, which was scarcely within sight of land. Although at that time the British squadron had no less than eighteen gunboats in the Chinese seas, adapted for this particular service, and although the speedy appearance of Admiral Rigault de Genouilly with the whole French force demonstrated that the voyage 'could be made with ease and safety, it was not till the 20th May that Admiral Seymour had brought up his forces. Five weeks were spent by the Ambassador and by our allies in deplorable inaction at the mouth of the Peiho, in consequence of the non-arrival of the British gunboats; during the whole of this period the Chinese were actively engaged in constructing stockades and abattis to strengthen the forts which might have been taken in April without a blow. Nine hundred grain junks were computed to have passed the spot where the "Furious' lay, and to have entered the river; and at one time it

seemed probable the allied squadron might have entered the Gulf of Pechelee without an attempt to force a passage. As it was, although the blow was eventually struck and the treaty of Tientsin signed, yet the most favourable season for operations in China was lost, and it became impossible to complete the design of Lord Elgin by advancing to Pekin-a circumstance which has doubtless powerfully contributed to the renewal of hostilities by the Chinese, and the subsequent disastrous result of Admiral Hope's attack on the Peiho forts.

Mr. Oliphant has touched very lightly on these facts; and he has not made the remarks upon them which they are well calculated to call forth, probably from a laudable desire to bury in oblivion acts of misconduct, which must have occasioned the deepest annoyance to Lord Elgin. We think these acts have not yet been visited with the reprobation they justly deserve in this country. We are aware that Admiral Seymour, having been called upon to explain his conduct, did so in a despatch to the Admiralty, in which he alleges the dangers of navigating the Chinese seas in the monsoon, and similar excuses for his procrastination. This explanation was accepted by the Admiralty; but, having carefully weighed all these circumstances, we must be permitted to retain and to express our opinion that the unjustifiable delay of Sir Michael in bringing up the gunboats as he had promised to do, was in the highest degree detrimental to the objects of the Mission and to the public service, and that it placed our squadron in a position of humiliating contrast with that of our allies: we may add that the ulterior consequences of our apparent vacillation and weakness on that occasion, have probably contributed to encourage the Chinese to fresh acts of resistance, which will render necessary another campaign. We are the more desirous to call the attention of the country to this subject, because it is not the first time that the naval authorities at home have shown what we must consider a very culpable disposition to screen the shortcomings and misconduct of admirals employed on active service abroad; and more than one such officer has received a ribbon who would in former times have been arraigned before a court-martial. We hear, with great regret, complaints of the relaxed state of discipline in the British Navy; but that discipline' is nowhere so much at fault as when it fails to visit officers of the highest rank. To them, especially, several of the disappointments and reverses which the Navy has of late years sustained may be distinctly traced.

The principal concessions obtained by the treaty of Tientsin were, the right to send a Minister Resident to Pekin, and permission for British subjects to travel and trade in all parts of

the empire. The new ports of Teng-chow in the province of Shantung, and of New-chwang in Manchooria, were opened to foreign commerce, as well as the important trading posts on the Yang-tsi-kiang, after the rebels are expelled from its shores. The onerous transit duties on merchandise were commuted for a pass or certificate to be purchased once for all, by a payment of 21 per cent. ad valorem; and an indemnity of about 1,300,000%. sterling was stipulated for losses at Canton and the expenses of the war. These remarkable and satisfactory results, obtained within a year from Lord Elgin's first arrival in China, and obtained under many discouraging circumstances, were due in great measure to the spirit and judgment of the Ambassador; and although subsequent events have unhappily shown that our future prospects in China are less clear and brilliant than they appeared to be when this treaty was signed, it still remains the basis of the rights we may have to enforce.

We cannot, however, take leave of this part of the subject without remarking that there appears to be something radically erroneous in the attempt to place our relations with the Chinese on the footing of our relations with states which acknowledge the obligations of international law. Mr. John Stuart Mill observes, in the course of some pages on our foreign policy which have recently proceeded from his able pen, that to suppose the same rules of international morality, and the same reciprocity of international obligation, which obtain between one civilised nation and another, will also obtain between civilised nations and barbarians, is a grave error. The history of our treaties with the Chinese authorities demonstrates that the conditions we have attempted to impose on them by a diplomatic instrument have no binding force at all; and that they will be evaded and broken the moment it appears that their stipulations can be set at nought with impunity. Probably a Chinese statesman thinks that when concessions galling to the national pride, or adverse to the national policy, have been extorted by force of arms, and as it were under duresse, he is doing no more than his duty in regarding the treaty as a nullity, when the force that imposed it is removed. Accordingly, the more extensive the concessions are which we think we have obtained, the more certain is it that they will be violated, and the less practical benefit shall we derive from them: thus the opening of Canton promised in 1843 was never obtained till the place had been reduced and occupied by force; and the stipulation for sending a Resident Minister to Pekin will be either resisted or rendered nugatory, unless he be accompanied by an army. As for the engagements of Mandarins with blue buttons, or even the strokes of the

Vermilion Pencil, they are absolutely without binding force, and the formalities of diplomacy become ludicrous if they fail to constitute a substantial engagement. We find ourselves, therefore, in a vicious circle; for when one expedition has exacted and obtained certain concessions, another and more powerful expedition is required to enforce them; and our diplomacy stands for nothing when we have not a fleet on the spot to back it. The conclusion we draw from these facts is, that far from seeking to bind the Chinese government to greater concessions, and consequently to interfere still more directly in their internal affairs, the wiser course both for them and for us, in the interests of peace and commerce, would be to confine ourselves strictly to that superficial contact on certain points of the coast, which the trading propensities of both nations will keep up under any circumstances. Lord Elgin himself is known to have arrived at the conclusion that the principal value of the right of sending a British Minister to Pekin is the dread which the bare possibility of the execution of such a threat inspires in the breast of every thorough-bred Mandarin; and recent experience has proved that the presence of a permanent European corps diplomatique in Pekin would be a constant source of irritation and outrage; indeed, far from being a pledge of peace it would probably give rise to incessant disputes and hostilities. Although, therefore, it is probably necessary to avenge the recent defeat of the squadron at the mouth of the Peiho, we trust that we shall not find ourselves hereafter fettered by additional liabilities under the name of privileges and rights.

Notwithstanding the events which have occurred, we are by no means disposed to rely on force as the best, or the sole, mode of placing our relations with China on a more satisfactory footing. On the contrary, the destruction of semi-barbarous forts, and the discomfiture of Mantchou soldiers-nay, even the military occupation of great cities by a handful of troops, can have but a transient effect. The Chinese are a crafty and sagacious people, on whom a more lasting impression may be made by their interests than by their fears; and we believe that the opinion we express is precisely that to which Lord Elgin's own experience and good sense have led him, in deprecating any hasty and violent attempt to destroy what it would be impossible for us to restore, and scarcely less difficult for us to replace.

The spirits of Lord Elgin and his companions, both civil and naval, appear to have risen when a happy combination of circumstances, of which the Ambassador promptly availed himself, enabled the Mission to pass from the wearisome and oppressive