the prohibition, in the same clause, "to make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts," which means that no person shall be compelled to take in payment of a debt any thing tendered or offered but gold and silver coin.

§ 14. The states are forbidden also to pass any "law impairing the obligation of contracts." Laws that would weaken the force of a contract, or release men from their obligations, would be contrary to the principles of justice, and give insecurity to the rights of property: they are therefore with great propriety prohibited.

§ 15. The power to pass "bills of attainder" and "ex post facto laws," and the power to "grant titles of nobility," are among the powers prohibited to the states in this clause. These acts are in the preceding section prohibited to congress; and being in their nature objectionable, they are with equal propriety prohibited to the states.

§ 16. The exercise, by the states, of the powers mentioned in the two remaining clauses of this section, is incompatible with the exercise of the same powers by congress; and they are therefore properly prohibited to the states.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT. PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT; THEIR ELECTION, QUALIFICATIONS, &C.

§ 1. THE executive power is vested in a president of the United States, who holds his office for the term of four years. A vice-president is chosen at the same time, and for the same term. (Art. 2, sec. 1.) The general duties of these officers are similar to those of the governor and lieutenantgovernor of a state; and this department of the general government is constituted in a manner similar to that of a state government.

§ 2. The propriety of three separate and distinct departments of government, legislative, executive, and judicial, was so generally admitted, and the want of an executive power under the confederation was so sensibly felt, that

every plan of government introduced into the convention provided for an executive department. In regard, however, to its organization and the extent of its powers, there was a great diversity of opinion.

3. First, as to the number of persons of which it should be composed. An executive magistracy consisting of a number of persons, as some proposed, and divided in opinion as they would often be, could not act with the necessary vigor and promptitude. Measures involving the highest interests of the nation, and requiring speedy action, might be subjected to injurious delays, or be entirely defeated by divided councils. Unity in the executive, too, instead of tending to monarchy, as some apprehended, would rather be a safeguard against tyranny, by increasing the responsi bility of the office; for, where the whole responsibility of an act is thrown upon a single individual, it is impossible to shift any portion of deserved blame upon others.

§ 4. Secondly, as to the tenure of office. Specific terms of three, six, and seven years were proposed. It was also proposed to render the executive ineligible for a second term. A short term was considered necessary to insure responsibility; and reéligibility would furnish a motive to good behavior. Against a short term it was urged, that it might induce an executive to shape his policy with a view to a reëlection rather than to the public good. A long term, it was argued, would secure greater firmness and independence in the discharge of his official duties, and enable him to mature and carry out his system of public policy. Eligi bility for reëlection having been agreed on, the term of four years was adopted, as being most likely to secure, in an equal degree, the advantages of both a long and a short.

term.

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§ 4. Thirdly, the mode of election. Several modes were proposed (1.) Election by the national legislature. The main objection to this mode was, that it would render the executive too dependent upon the legislature. It would encourage bargain and intrigue. Votes would be given by members of the legislature, under promises or expectations of favors in return, either to themselves or their friends. (2.) Election by the people at large. Against this it was urged, that the people could not be sufficiently informed of the character of candidates; that they would seldom or never

give a majority of votes to any one man; and that it would be attended with dangerous commotions. (3.) Election by electors chosen for that purpose. For the election of the electors, however, various modes were suggested; namely, by the state executives; by the state legislatures; and by the people.

§6. The election of the president by electors was finally agreed to; and each state was allowed to appoint its electors in such manner as the legislature should direct. (Art. 2, sec. 1.) In pursuance of the discretion here given, dif ferent modes were adopted in different states. In some the electors were appointed by the state legislatures; in others they were elected by the people. Of the states which adopted the former mode, all but one have exchanged it for the latter. In all the states except South Carolina, presidential electors are now chosen by the people.

§ 7. These electors are, by the laws of the several states, to be chosen by general ticket. The names of two men, corresponding to the number of senators to which a state is entitled in congress, together with the names of as many others as there are representatives of the state in the lower house of congress, one to reside in each congressional district, are all placed upon the same ballot; and every voter votes for the whole number of presidential electors to be chosen in the state. And by a law of congress, the electors are required to be chosen in all the states on the same day, which is the Tuesday next after the first Monday of November.

§ 8. The electors so chosen in each state meet in their respective states on the first Wednesday of December, and vote for president and vice-president; and make and sign three certificates of all the votes given by them, and seal up the same. One of these certificates is to be sent by a person duly appointed by them, to the president of the senate at the seat of government, before the first of January next ensuing; another is to be forwarded by mail, also di rected to the president of the senate; and the third is to be delivered to the United States judge of the district in which the electors are assembled.

§ 9. On the second Wednesday of February, the president of the senate, in the presence of all the senators and representatives, opens the certificates from all the states, and

the votes are counted. The person having a majority of all the electoral votes for president is elected. If no person has a majority of the electoral votes, the house of representatives must choose the president from those candidates, not exceeding three, who had the highest numbers of the electoral votes. But in so doing, the members do not all vote together; but those of each state vote by themselves; and the candidate who receives the votes of a majority of the representatives of a state, has but one vote for each such majority; from which it appears that there are only as many presidential votes as there are states; and the person who receives the votes of a majority of the states, is elected.

10. Of this mode of electing a president, the election of 1825 is a practical illustration. The votes of the electoral colleges had in December, 1824, been divided upon four candidates: Andrew Jackson having received 99 votes; John Quincy Adams, 84; William й. Crawford, 41; and Henry Clay, 37. Neither candidate having received a majority of all the electoral votes, the election of president devolved upon the house of representatives. Of the three candidates having received the highest numbers of electoral votes, Mr. Adams received the votes of thirteen states, Gen. Jackson, of seven states, and Mr. Crawford of four states. Mr. Adams having received the votes of a majority of all the states, he was elected.

§ 11. The present manner of electing a president and vice. president, which is prescribed by the 12th article of amendment, has been substituted for the original plan. (See Art. 3, sec. 1, cl. 3.) This alteration was probably induced by the difficulty of electing a president in 1801. Under the mode then existing, the electors did not designate the office to which either of the persons voted for was intended to be chosen. Of the electoral votes given in December, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr had each 73 votes, the electors belonging to the same political party having unanimously voted for them both. The election must consequently be made by the house of representatives, where the balloting was continued many days, when, on the thirty-sixth ballot, Mr. Jefferson received the votes of a majority of the states. By the old mode, a tie must of necessity occur whenever the electors of the most numerous party vote unanimously

for the candidates of such party. By requiring the persons voted for to be named for the offices for which they are respectively designed, the chances of an equal vote for two or more candidates for the same office are greatly dimin ished.

§ 12. To be eligible to the office of president or vice-president, a person must be a natural born citizen of the United States, thirty-five years of age, and must have been fourteen years a resident within the United States. (Art. 3, sec. 1, cl. 5. Amend. art. 12, cl. 3.) The reasons for requiring long terms of citizenship and residence, and mature age and experience, in the case of senators, apply with at least equal force in the office of president.

13. The constitution properly provides for filling vacancies in the office of president, by devolving the powers and duties of the office upon the vice-president. The power of making further provision for supplying vacancies, is given to congress (Art. 1, sec. 1). In pursuance of the power here granted, it has been enacted, that in case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the presi dent and vice-president, the president of the senate pro-tempore shall act as president; and if he, too, should die, resign, or become incompetent, the speaker of the house of representatives would assume the duties of the office. Since the adoption of the constitution, two vice-presidents have succeeded to the office of president: the first, in consequence of the death of President Harrison, in April, 1841; the second, in July, 1850, on occasion of the death of President Taylor.

§ 14. The increase and diminution of the salary of the president, as in the case of certain other officers, is properly prohibited. Without such prohibition, the compensation of a president might be reduced to a sum insufficient to meet his necessary expenditures, and afford a just remuneration for the services rendered. It would be impolitic to make the executive entirely dependent upon the legis lature for his support. Control over his compensation would be little less than control over his will. On the other hand, if the emoluments of the office could be increased during his official term, he might be tempted to use undue influence to procure a needless augmentation of his salary.

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