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obeyed implicitly and unconsciously by reason of the splendor of those who eclipsed and preceded them.
It is quite true that this imaginative sentiment is supported by a sensation of political satisfaction. It cannot be said that the mass of the English people are well off, – there are whole classes who have not a conception of what the higher orders call comfort, who have not the prerequisites of moral existence, who cannot lead the life that becomes a man; but the most miserable of these classes do not impute their misery to politics. If a political agitator were to lecture to the peasants of Dorsetshire and try to excite political dissatisfaction, it is much more likely that he would be pelted than that he would succeed. Of Parliament these miserable creatures know scarcely anything, of the Cabinet they never heard; but they would say that “for all they have heard, the Queen is very good,” and rebelling against the structure of society is to their minds rebelling against the Queen, who rules that society, in whom all its most impressive part—the part that they know-culminates. The mass of the English people are politically contented as well as politically deferential.
A deferential community, even though its lowest classes are not intelligent, is far more suited to cabinet government than any kind of democratic country, because it is more suited to political excellence. The highest classes can rule in it; and the highest classes must, as such, have more political ability than the lower classes. A life of labor, an incomplete education, a monotonous occupation, a career in which the hands are used much and the judgment is used little, cannot create as much flexible thought, as much applicable intelligence, as a life of leisure, a long culture, a varied experience, an existence by which the judgment is incessantly exercised and by which it may be incessantly improved. A country of respectful poor, though far less happy than where there are no poor to be respectful, is nevertheless far more fitted for the
best government. You can use the best classes of the respectful country; you can only use the worst where every man thinks he is as good as every other.
It is evident that no difficulty can be greater than that of founding a deferential nation. Respect is traditional: it is given not to what is proved to be good, but to what is known to be old. Certain classes in certain nations retain by common acceptance a marked political preference, because they have always possessed it and because they inherit a sort of pomp which seems to make them worthy of it; but in a new colony - in a community where merit ma be equal, and where there cannot be traditional marks of merit and fitness — it is obvious that a political deference can be yielded to higher culture only upon proof, first of its existence, and next of its political value. But it is nearly impossible to give such a proof so as to satisfy persons of less culture. In a future and better age of the world it may be effected, but in this age the requisite premises scarcely exist; if the discussion be effectually open, if the debate be fairly begun, it is hardly possible to obtain a rational, an argumentative acquiescence in the rule of the cultivated few. As yet the few rule by their hold, not over the reason of the multitude, but over their imaginations and their habits; over their fancies as to distant things they do not know at all, over their customs as to near things which they know very well.
A deferential community in which the bulk of the people are ignorant is therefore in a state of what is called in mechanics unstable equilibrium. If the equilibrium is once disturbed, there is no tendency to return to it, but rather to depart from it. A cone balanced on its point is in unstable equilibrium; for if you push it ever so little, it will depart farther and farther from its position and fall to the earth. So in communities where the mass are ignorant but respectful, if you once permit the ignorant class to begin to rule, you may bid farewell to deference forever. Their demagogues will inculcate, their newspapers will recount, that the rule of the existing dynasty (the people) is better than the rule of the fallen dynasty (the aristocracy). A people very rarely hears two sides of a subject in which it is much interested : the popular organs take up the side which is acceptable, and none but the popular organs in fact reach the people. A people never hears censure of itself: no one will tell it that the educated minority whom it dethroned, governed better or more wisely than it governs. A democracy will never, save after an awful catastrophe, return what has once been conceded to it; for to do so would be to admit an inferiority in itself of which, except by some almost unbearable misfortune, it could never be convinced.
ITS HISTORY, AND THE EFFECTS OF THAT HISTORY. —
A VOLUME might seem wanted to say anything worth saying* on the history of the English Constitution, and a great and new volume might still be written on it if a competent writer took it in hand. The subject has never been treated by any one combining the lights of the newest research and the lights of the most matured philosophy. Since the masterly book of Hallam was written, both political thought and historical knowledge have gained much; and we might have a treatise applying our strengthened calculus to our augmented facts. I do not pretend that I could write such a book; but there are a few salient particulars which may be fitly brought together, both because of their past interest and of their present importance.
There is a certain common polity, or germ of polity, which we find in all the rude nations that have attained civilization. These nations seem to begin in what I may call a consultative and tentative absolutism. The king of early days, in vigorous nations,
* Since the first edition of this book was published, several valuable works have appeared which on many points throw much light on our early constitutional history, - especially Mr. Stubbs's “Select Charters and other Illustrations of English Constitutional History, from the Earliest Times to the Reign of Edward I.,” Mr. Freeman's lecture on “The Growth of the English Constitution," and the chapter on the Anglo-Saxon Constitution in his “History of the Norman Conquest"; but we have not yet a great and authoritative work on the whole subject, such as I wished for when I wrote the passage in the text, and as it is most desirable that we should have. Note to second edition, B. VOL. IV.-18
was not absolute as despots now are: there was then no standing army to repress rebellion, no organized espionage to spy out discontent, no skilled bureaucracy to smooth the ruts of obedient life.
The early king was indeed consecrated by a religious sanction, - he was essentially a man apart, a man above others, divinely anointed or even God-begotten; but in nations capable of freedom this religious domination was never despotic. There was indeed no legal limit: the very words could not be translated into the dialect of those times. The notion of law as we have it- of a rule imposed by human authority, capable of being altered by that authority when it likes, and in fact so altered habitually-could not be conveyed to early nations, who regarded law half as an invincible prescription and half as a divine revelation. Law “came out of the king's mouth"; he gave it as Solomon gave judgment, – imbedded in the particular case, and upon the authority of Heaven as well as his own. A divine limit to the divine revealer was impossible, and there was no other source of law. But though there was no legal limit, there was a practical limit to subjection in what may be called the pagan part of human nature, — the inseparable obstinacy of freemen: they never would do exactly what they were told.
To early royalty, as Homer describes it in Greece and as we may well imagine it elsewhere, there were always two adjuncts: one, the “old men," the men of weight, the council, the Bovin, of which the king asked advice, from the debates in which the king tried to learn what he could do and what he ought to do; besides this there was the dyopá, the purely listening assembly as some have called it, but the tentative assembly as I think it might best be called,- the king came down to his assembled people in form to announce his will, but in reality-speaking in very modern words — to “feel his way." He was sacred, no doubt; and popular, very likely: still, he was half like a popular premier speaking to a high-spirited