But relations something like these must subsist between the head of a finance committee in the legislature, and a finance minister in the executive: they are sure to quarrel, and the result is sure to satisfy neither. And when the taxes do not yield as they were expected to yield, who is responsible? Very likely the Secretary of the Treasury could not persuade the chairman; very likely the chairman could not persuade his committee; very likely the committee could not persuade the assembly. Whom, then, can you punish- whom can you abolish -- when your taxes run short? There is nobody save the legislature, a vast miscellaneous body difficult to punish, and the very persons to inflict the punishment. Nor is the financial part of administration the only one which requires in a civilized age the constant support and accompaniment of facilitating legislation; all administration does so. In England, on a vital occasion, the Cabinet can compel legislation by the threat of resignation and the threat of dissolution; but neither of these can be used in a presidential state. There the legislature cannot be dissolved by the executive government; and it does not heed a resignation, for it has not to find the successor. Accordingly, when a difference of opinion arises, the legislature is forced to fight the executive and the executive is forced to fight the legislature; and so very likely they contend to the conclusion of their respective terms. There is indeed one condition of things in which this description, though still approximately true, is nevertheless not exactly true; and that is, when there is nothing to fight about. Before the Rebellion in America, owing to the vast distance of *It is worth observing that even during the short existence of the Confederate government these evils distinctly showed themselves. Almost the last incident at the Richmond Congress was an angry financial correspondence with Jefferson Davis. — B. I leave this passage to stand as it was written, just after the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, and when every one said Mr. Johnson would be very hostile to the South.-B. VOL. IV-5 other states and the favorable economical condition of the country, there were very few considerable objects of contention; but if that government had been tried by the English legislation of the last thirty years, the discordant action of the two powers, whose constant co-operation is essential to the best government, would have shown itself much more distinctly. Nor is this the worst. Cabinet government educates the nation; the presidential does not educate it, and may corrupt it. It has been said that England invented the phrase "Her Majesty's Opposition"; that it was the first government which made a criticism of administration as much a part of the polity as administration itself. This critical opposition is the consequence of cabinet government. The great scene of debate, the great engine of popular instruction and political controversy, is the legislative assembly. A speech there by an eminent statesman, a party movement by a great political combination, are the best means yet known for arousing, enlivening, and teaching a people. The cabinet system insures such debates, for it makes them the means by which statesmen advertise themselves for future and confirm themselves in present governments; it brings forward men eager to speak, and gives them occasions to speak. The deciding catastrophes of cabinet governments are critical divisions preceded by fine. discussions. Everything which is worth saying, everything which ought to be said, most certainly will be said. Conscientious men think they ought to persuade others; selfish men think they would like to obtrude themselves. The nation is forced to hear two sides - all the sides, perhaps of that which most concerns it; and it likes to hear, - it is eager to know. Human nature despises long arguments which come to nothing, heavy speeches which precede no motion, abstract disquisitions which leave visible things where they were; but all men heed great results, and a change of government is a great result. It has a hundred ramifications; it runs through society; it gives hope to many, and it takes away hope from many. It is one of those marked events, which by its magnitude and its melodrama impress [es] men even too much. And debates which have this catastrophe at the end of them - or may so have it—are sure to be listened to, and sure to sink deep into the national mind. Travelers even in the Northern States of America, the greatest and best of presidential countries, have noticed that the nation was "not specially addicted to politics"; that they have not a public opinion finished and chastened as that of the English has been finished and chastened. A great many hasty writers have charged this defect on the "Yankee race," on the Anglo-American character; but English people, if they had no motive to attend to politics, certainly would not attend to politics. At present there is business in their attention: they assist at the determining crisis; they arrest or help it. Whether the Government will go out or remain is determined by the debate and by the division in Parliament; and the opinion out of doors, the secret pervading disposition of society, has a great influence on that division. The nation feels that its judgment is important, and it strives to judge; it succeeds in deciding because the debates and the discussions give it the facts and the arguments. But under a presidential government a nation has, except at the electing moment, no influence; it has not the ballot-box before it; its virtue is gone, and it must wait till its instant of despotism again returns. It is not incited to form an opinion. like a nation under a cabinet government; nor is it instructed like such a nation. There are doubtless debates in the legislature, but they are prologues without a play; there is nothing of a catastrophe about them, you cannot turn out the Government. The prize of power is not in the gift of the legislature, and no one cares for the legislature. The executive, the great center of power and place, sticks irremovable; you cannot change it in any event. The teaching apparatus which has educated our public mind, which prepares our resolutions, which shapes our opinions, does not exist. No presidential country needs to form daily delicate opinions, or is helped in forming them. It might be thought that the discussions in the press would supply the deficiencies in the constitution; that by a reading people especially, the conduct of their government would be as carefully watched, that their opinions about it would be as consistent, as accurate, as well considered, under a presidential as under a cabinet polity. But the same difficulty oppresses the press which oppresses the legislature: it can do nothing. It cannot change the administration: the executive was elected for such and such years, and for such and such years it must last. People wonder that so literary a people as the Americans -a people who read more than any people who ever lived, who read so many newspapers-should have such bad newspapers. The papers are not so good as the English, because they have not the same motive to be good as the English papers. At a political 66 crisis," as we say,- that is, when the fate of an administration is unfixed, when it depends on a few votes, yet unsettled, upon a wavering and veering opinion, -effective articles in great journals become of essential moment. The Times has made many ministries. When, as of late, there has been a long continuance of divided Parliaments, of Governments which were without "brute voting power," and which depended on intellectual strength, the support of the most influential organ of English opinion has been of critical moment. If a Washington newspaper could have turned out Mr. Lincoln, there would have been good writing and fine argument in the Washington newspapers. But the Washington newspapers can no more remove a President during his term of place than the Times can remove a Lord Mayor during his 66 The. year of office. Nobody cares for a debate in Congress which comes to nothing," and no one reads long articles which have no influence on events. Americans glance at the heads of news, and through the paper; they do not enter upon a discussion, they do not think of entering upon a discussion which would be useless. - After saying that the division of the legislature and the executive in presidential governments weakens the legislative power, it may seem a contradiction. to say that it also weakens the executive power; but it is not a contradiction. The division weakens the whole aggregate force of government, the entire imperial power; and therefore it weakens both its halves. The executive is weakened in a very plain way. In England a strong Cabinet can obtain the concurrence of the legislature in all acts which facilitate its administration, it is itself, so to say, the legislature; but a president may be hampered by the parliament, and is likely to be hampered. The natural tendency of the members of every legislature is to make themselves conspicuous. They wish to gratify an ambition, laudable or blamable; they wish to promote the measures they think best for the public welfare; they wish to make their will felt in great affairs. All these mixed motives urge them to oppose the executive. They are embodying the purposes of others if they aid, they are advancing their own opinions if they defeat; they are first if they vanquish, they are auxiliaries if they support. The weakness of the American executive used to be the great theme of all critics before the Confederate Rebellion. Congress and committees of Congress of course impeded the executive when there was no coercive public sentiment to check and rule them. But the presidential system not only gives the executive power an antagonist in the legislative power, and so makes it weaker; it also enfeebles it by impairing its intrinsic quality. A cabinet is elected by |