a legislature; and when that legislature is composed of fit persons, that mode of electing the executive is the very best. It is a case of secondary election, under the only conditions in which secondary election is preferable to primary. Generally speaking, in an electioneering country (I mean in a country full of political life, and used to the manipulation of popular institutions), the election of candidates to elect candidates is a farce. The Electoral College of America. is so. It was intended that the deputies when assembled should exercise a real discretion, and by independent choice select the President. But the primary electors take too much interest: they only elect a deputy to vote for Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Breckenridge, and the deputy only takes a ticket and drops that ticket in an urn. He never chooses or thinks of choosing; he is but a messenger, a transmitter: the real decision is in those who chose him,-who chose him because they knew what he would do.

It is true that the British House of Commons is subject to the same influences: members are mostly, perhaps, elected because they will vote for a particular ministry, rather than for purely legislative reasons. But-and here is the capital distinction - the functions of the House of Commons are important and continuous. It does not, like the Electoral College in the United States, separate when it has elected its ruler it watches, legislates, seats and unseats ministries, from day to day. Accordingly, it is a real electoral body. The Parliament of 1857, which more than any other Parliament of late years was a Parliament elected to support a particular Premier, which was chosen, as Americans might say, upon the "Palmerston ticket."-before it had been in existence two years, dethroned Lord Palmerston; though selected in the interest of a particular ministry, it in fact destroyed that ministry.

A good Parliament, too, is a capital choosing body. If it is fit to make laws for a country, its majority

ought to represent the general average intelligence of that country; its various members ought to represent the various special interests, special opinions, special prejudices, to be found in that community. There ought to be an advocate for every particular sect, and a vast neutral body of no sect,-homogeneous and judicial, like the nation itself. Such a body, when possible, is the best selecter of executives that can be imagined. It is full of political activity; it is close to political life; it feels the responsiblity of affairs which are brought as it were to its threshold; it has as much intelligence as the society in question chances to contain. It is, what Washington and Hamilton strove to create, an electoral college of the picked men of the nation.

The best mode of appreciating its advantages is to look at the alternative. The competing constituency is the nation itself, and this is, according to theory and experience, in all but the rarest cases a bad constituency. Mr. Lincoln at his second election, being elected when all the federal States had set their united hearts on one single object, was voluntarily re-elected by an actually choosing nation,- he embodied the object in which every one was absorbed ; but this is almost the only presidential election of which so much can be said. In almost all cases the President is chosen by a machinery of caucuses and combinations too complicated to be perfectly known, and too familiar to require description. He is not the choice of the nation, he is the choice of the wirepullers. A very large constituency in quiet times is the necessary, almost the legitimate, subject of electioneering management: a man cannot know that he does not throw his vote away except he votes as part of some great organization; and if he votes as a part, he abdicates his electoral function in favor of the managers of that association. The nation, even if it chose for itself, would in some degree be an unskilled body but when it does not choose for itself, but

only as latent agitators wish, it is man with a small vicious mind, and heavily, but it moves at the intention; "it means little, but it ill."

like a large lazy it moves slowly bidding of a bad means that little

And as the nation is less able to choose than a parliament, so it has worse people to choose out of. The American legislators of the last century have been much blamed for not permitting the ministers of the President to be members of the assembly; but with reference to the specific end which they had in view, they saw clearly and decided wisely. They wished to keep "the legislative branch absolutely distinct from the executive branch": they believed such a separation to be essential to a good constitution; they believed such a separation to exist in the English, which the wisest of them thought the best constitution. And to the effectual maintenance of such a separation, the exclusion of the President's ministers from the legislature is essential: if they are not excluded they become the executive, they eclipse the President himself. A legislative chamber is greedy and covetous; it acquires as much, it concedes as little as possible. The passions of its members are its. rulers; the law-making faculty, the most comprehensive of the imperial faculties, is its instrument; it will take the administration if it can take it. Tried by their own aims, the founders of the United States were wise in excluding the ministers from Congress.

But though this exclusion is essential to the presidential system of government, it is not for that reason a small evil. It causes the degradation of public life. Unless a member of the legislature be sure of something more than speech, unless he is incited by the hope of action and chastened by the chance of responsibility, a first-rate man will not care to take the place, and will not do much if he does take it. To belong to a debating society adhering to an executive (and this is no inapt description of a

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congress under a presidential constitution) is not an object to stir a noble ambition, and is a position to encourage idleness. The members of a parliament excluded from office can never be comparable, much less equal, to those of a parliament not excluded from office. The presidential government, by its nature, divides political life into two halves, an executive half and a legislative half; and by so dividing it makes neither half worth a man's having, — worth his making it a continuous career,-worthy to absorb, as cabinet government absorbs, his whole soul. The statesmen from whom a nation chooses under a presidential system are much inferior to those from whom it chooses under a cabinet system, while the selecting apparatus is also far less discerning.

All these differences are more important at critical periods, because government itself is more important. A formed public opinion, a respectable, able, and disciplined legislature, a well-chosen executive, a parliament and an administration not thwarting each other but co-operating with each other, are of greater consequence when great affairs are in progress than when small affairs are in progress, when there is much to do than when there is little to do. But in addition to this, a parliamentary or cabinet constitution possesses an additional and special advantage in very dangerous times: it has what we may call a reserve of power fit for and needed by extreme exigencies.

The principle of popular government is that the supreme power, the determining efficacy in matters. political, resides in the people; not necessarily or commonly in the whole people, in the numerical majority, but in a chosen people, a picked and selected people. It is so in England; it is so in all free countries. Under a cabinet constitution, at a sudden emergency this people can choose a ruler for the occasion. It is quite possible, and even likely, that he would not be ruler before the occasion: the great

qualities the imperious will, the rapid energy, the eager nature-fit for a great crisis are not required, are impediments, in common times. A Lord Liverpool is better in every-day politics than a Chatham; a Louis Philippe far better than a Napoleon. By the structure of the world we often want, at the sudden occurrence of a grave tempest, to change the helmsman, to replace the pilot of the calm by the pilot of the storm. In England we have had so few catastrophes since our Constitution attained maturity that we hardly appreciate this latent excellence. We have not needed a Cavour to rule a revolution, a representative man, above all men fit for a great occasion, and by a natural, legal mode brought in to rule. But even in England, at what was the nearest to a great sudden crisis which we have had of hate years,- at the Crimean difficulty, we used this inherent power. We abolished the Aberdeen Cabinet, the ablest we have had, perhaps, since the Reform Act; a Cabinet not only adapted, but eminently adapted, for every sort of difficulty save the one it had to meet,-which abounded in pacific discretion, and was wanting only in the "dæmonic element": we chose a statesman who had the sort of merit then wanted, who, when he feels the steady power of England behind him, will advance without reluctance and will strike without restraint. As was said at the time, "We turned out the Quaker and put in the pugilist."

But under a presidential government you can do nothing of the kind. The American government calls itself a government of the supreme people; but at a quick crisis, the time when a sovereign power is most needed, you cannot find the supreme people. You have got a Congress elected for one fixed period, going out perhaps by fixed installments, which cannot be accelerated or retarded; you have a President chosen for a fixed period, and immovable during that period: all the arrangements are for stated times. There is no elastic element: everything is rigid,