selves constituted an aggression. But they were never meant for acceptance: they were a mere imposture, sent in advance of an invasion. The seizure of the unhappy Principalities was already provided for: and even if Prince Menschikoff had been less rash and boastful, we could scarcely have been deceived about the real designs of his Imperial master. While his note was still under consideration, the bridge by which the Russians were to cross the Pruth was in the contractor's yard: and the concentration of troops and stores admitted of but one interpretation. There can be no doubt that at St. Petersburg the hour, so long hoped for, was supposed to have struck and the actors all stood ready to play out the catastrophe of the great historic drama. Yet with deplorable, though happily demonstrable, mendacity, the Emperor charges his own seizure of the Principalities on the provocation given by the Western Powers in ordering their fleets to "the waters of Constantinople!" the facts being, that the order to the fleets went from London on 1st of June, 1853, while the intention to seize the Principalities was announced at St. Petersburg the day before; and that while the naval force was sent only to the neutral waters of Besika Bay, two hundred miles from Constantinople-an anchorage as free to them as the Piræus-the battalions of Russia invaded a dependency of Turkey, in direct violation of specific treaties, as well as of the general law of nations, and without any formal declaration of war. Let any one compare the manifesto of Count Nesselrode (July 2, 1853), its studied moderation, its tortuous excuses, its unmistakeable insincerity, with Lord Clarendon's vigorous exposure of its mis-statements and hypocrisy (July 16, 1853), and he will be inclined to look for the true key of Russian policy anywhere rather than in the words that expound it and the sentiments it affects to express.

The theatrical character of the Russian Government, covering low arts beneath airs of magnanimity, and giving decency to the greediness of ambition by long" graces before meat," is apparent enough from the style of its political papers and court conversations. But if more palpable proof be wanted, it abounds in the history of the empire for the last hundred years. During that time the depredations of Russia have appropriated an area equal to all that yet remains unabsorbed of Europe, from Cape North to Crete, and from Constantinople to Connamara: and far from this plunder having especially favoured the East, every great capital of Europe finds the Czar a nearer neighbour by at least five hundred miles. Yet at this political banquet every dainty dish has been approached, and even every mouthful swallowed, with profuse disclaimer of any hungry appetite; the luscious Persian fruits have been tasted only out of compli

ment and the rich southern wines been tossed off merely to pledge "the word of a gentleman." The histrionic genius, we know, is apt to run in families; and if the family be autocratic, may become immortal in an empire, "refining as it runs." The stage-effects and attitudes by which we have been duped so long, and shall be duped again, are assuredly no new craft to the Romanoffs. All through, we observe the same charming offers of prompt sympathy to frightened neighbours or suffering malcontents, followed by permanent protectorate, and ending in annexation. We find the same readiness with the most frank assurances and satisfactory explanations; the same lifted eyebrows and start of astonished innocence at the slightest imputation; the same willingness to disown any proceedings and sacrifice any number of agents, provided the work of intrigue goes on, and smoke enough is raised to blind suspicious eyes and perhaps the only thing in which decided proficiency has been made in the last generation or two, is on the religious side; the air of special relation to heaven, of that peculiar and amphibious kind which reconciles piety and presumption, which kneels that it may dominate, and both giving and inviting worship oscillates between the mortal and the God. The language in which the late Emperor, both to Sir Hamilton Seymour, and more recently in public manifestoes, disclaimed all territorial ambition, and half-complained of his empire as too large, is the very same by which he practised on the credulity of Persia in 1828. He told her that he did not want land, but must have a well-marked boundary for the two countries, and so would set the Araxes to flow between them; and having thus got the provinces of Erivan and Nakhchivan on the left side of the river, where it was fordable, he refused to deliver up the provinces of Talish and Moghan on the right (or Persian) bank, where alone the water was deep enough to give a serviceable boundary at all. In fact, the established prelude to every usurpation is some profession of moderate counsels, the offer of some "Greek present," or the request for peaceful intercourse. In the interests of the Caspian commerce, the Russians modestly asked leave of Persia, in 1771, to open a "counting-house" near Astrabad. near Astrabad. Permission being given, they began to build a fortress, commanding the harbour, with eighteen guns:

"Whereof Aga-Mahmed (the Khan) being informed, resolved to give them a check. He came to look at the fortress, admired the building, praised the activity of the Russians, and invited himself to dine with his attendants on board the frigate of Voinovitch.

"Russia in the East," p. 81.

After having merrily spent the day, and testified great friendship for the Russians, the Khan engaged them in return to come and take a dinner at one of his country-seats among the mountains. Thither they repaired the succeeding day; but they had no sooner entered his house, than Aga-Mahmed caused them to be put in irons, at the same time threatening Voinovitch to have his head cut off, and serve all his officers in the same manner, unless the fortress was immediately razed to the ground."

"Voinovitch, who plainly saw that all resistance would be fruitless, signed an order, which was carried to the commandant of the fort. The cannons were re-shipped, and the wall broken down. This done, Aga-Mahmed ordered the Russian officers into his presence; and not satisfied with loading them with scornful and injurious language, he delivered several of them over to his slaves, who, after inflicting on them every sort of indignity, were commanded to drive them and their companions with scourges to their ships.*

This Muscovite interpretation of commerce appears to have undergone no change, for the quarantine establishments permitted by treaty near the Danube mouth, have been converted, it seems, into military posts; while, to force the corn trade from the Principalities to Odessa, the river has been permitted to lose some seven feet of depth. The frailty of treaties is unhappily proverbial, but there is a peculiarity about the Russian disregard of them which is morally significant. Other governments usually respect their engagements for a while, and the temptations which eventually lead them to slip the noose commonly arise from new events and combinations, giving some unintended tightness to the terms. But Russia seems justly chargeable with negotiating without even a momentary purpose of keeping her word. The very fortress of Anapa, just evacuated this very month, she was bound by the Treaty of Bucharest, in 1812, to surrender at once; but she preferred to retain it, and did so. The Treaty of Goolistan in 1814, by which she obtained her Trans-Caucasian possessions, was signed by the Persian plenipotentiary, to save the delay of reference to St. Petersburg, on the express condition that the province of Talish should be restored by a special act, which the Russian plenipotentiary promised to obtain. The promise, though pressed upon the Imperial Court by the British as well as the Persian minister, was not denied, but was never fulfilled. 1827, Russia was simultaneously a party in two treaties; that of London, by which she engaged with France and England to interpose in the Greek revolt, (which she had first excited

• "Russia in the East," p. 27.

In

and then had wanted single-handed to put down,) and reestablish peace at any cost; and that of Akerman, by which she bound herself to Turkey not to interpose in the Greek affair at all. Against such instances the favourite reply of real indifferentism and affected humility-that we have no right to cast the first stone-is of no avail. The argument, at best, is trumpery enough, that, guilty once ourselves, we must give the world and the devil carte blanche for ever after. But, much as we have nationally to answer for, we must emphatically deny that there is any real analogy between the general course of English policy and the mendacious rapacity of Russia.

66

What the protectorate" exercised by such a power over the subjects of a neighbouring state is likely to turn out, it is not difficult to conjecture; nor are examples wanting to convert the conjecture into an inference from experience. Russia has been a very protecting power, with sensitive and capacious wings, and fond of visiting any nest where there are eggs to hatch. The great object of her solicitude,-so she habitually phrases it,-is the "independence" of neighbouring people; and her method is, first to proclaim this independence; to emancipate them, that is, from a present allegiance which has its sensible burdens; and then, if their inexperience wants a little guidance, to step in and supply it in place of the superseded rule. In 1739, she established, by the Treaty of Belgrade, the "independence" of the Circassian Kabardas; though the Christian inhabitants were so insensible to her good offices, that they actually renounced their religion and embraced Mohammedanism in order to take refuge beneath the shield of Turkey. In 1774, the unhappy provinces were incorporated with Russia, by the Treaty of Kainarji. The same treaty which brought this business to completion, began upon the Crimea, and promoted it. to its "independence;" rescinded, that is, the tie that bound its khans to their suzerain at Constantinople. To wait till the next war and treaty for the succeeding step was now too tedious for Muscovite impatience. Yet the Tartar inhabitants were harmless and compliant, and afforded no pretext for interference. But a troublesome pirate or marauder having established himself on the Eastern side of the Straits of Yenikale, the Russian general, under pretence of protecting the neighbourhood from depredation, marched an army, not to Taman, where the freebooter was-but into the Crimea; distributed his troops through the peninsula, and annexed it to Russia: and when a show of indignant resistance was made to this abuse of the confidence natural to a time of peace, thirty thousand of the inhabitants were seized and massacred in cold blood! This is the title which France and England, with

their allies, are now disputing with the heir of Catherine around the waters of Sebastopol.

The whole course of Russian history, then, for the last hundred years, invalidates every profession of moderation and good faith which may issue from the Chancery of St. Petersburg, and reveals a persistent and aggressive ambition which it is impossible to mistake. The established signs of its immediate approach to the Bosphorus became conspicuous in 1853; and if there be such a thing as international morals at all, it was the duty of the Western States to bar the intended injury, and bid the Muscovite stand off. The obligation, implied in the whole system of modern political relations, becomes express by the Treaty of July, 1841, which mutually engages the Great Powers to co-operate in preserving the repose and consolidating the strength of the Ottoman empire. Unless it can be shown that a performance of the duty had become impossible, any argument for its evasion would be equally valid on behalf of any act of convenient desertion and pleasant perfidy. Whether prevention had become impossible or not, events will show better than discussion. But this at least was clear, that it was possible now or never; that whatever difficulties beset the enterprise of repulse, tenfold discouragement would attend an enterprise of rescue; and that to wait till the fleet of Sebastopol was at the Golden Horn, beneath the eyes of the Russian army on the southern slopes of the Balkan, would be to let the future of Europe go by default. For who can fail to see that the issue is of this magnitude, and that Russia, mistress of the Hellespont, sweeps at once with her influence, and ultimately with her dominion, the whole Old World from Japan to the Atlantic? The sequence of events, terminating in this issue, or in its moral equivalent, appears to us so simple and necessary as to remove the usual precariousness of political vaticination. An empire, won in Greek interests and by pretensions to a pontifical rule over Eastern Christendom, would first give Otho his passports back to Bavaria; and would meet its pilgrims at the Holy Places by way of the Archipelago and the Levant. The first moment of Pansclavonic triumph hands over to the conqueror the Dalmatian coast and the Sclavic populations of Austria. The empire of Vienna thus disintegrated, losing its most reliable military material, and being totally destitute of any moral cohesion, falls-in piecemeal, and the more surely because scarcely one of its races would have reason to regret the change. The feeble kingdom of Naples would be glad of an irresistible patron; nor is Western Catholicism anywhere,— in Spain, in Tuscany, in Bavaria,-in condition to present a front of political resistance to the inverted crusade advancing