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cient manners is, at the present moment particularly, one of the most important objects which our scholars can propose to themselves, we are glad to see both these pursuits engaged in with so much ardour. Yet we cannot but feel the deepest regret that that science, which is peculiarly, and by universal consent, our own, not only from the adaptation of our minds to its successful cultivation, but from the actual benefits which we have already conferred upon it, should have suffered amidst the ardour of our other pursuits, even a temporary loss of the attention which it deserved. The object of investigation presented to the attention of the philosophic world by what has been denominated the Philosophy of the Human Mind, is one of the most astonishing and attractive which it is possible to contemplate; all the wonders and glories of that internal world, from the reflected light of which the whole beauty, and grandeur, and interest, of the material scenery around us is derived, were here presented as the subjects of investigation, and mankind were permitted to see that their only satisfactory solution of all the mysteries which had formerly delighted and perplexed them, must be found in the exposition of those laws and processes of thought which constitute by far the highest wonder and glory of our condition. What had already been achieved in this great enterprise was also well adapted to sustain our hopes of future success; some of the most remarkable phenomena of this internal world had received a satisfactory and most engaging solution; appearances both in the material and intellectual system, which had puzzled the understandings of the finest spirits of antiquity, had suddenly been irradiated by a blaze of light; and, above every thing else which had been achieved, the limits and laws of the human understanding had been stated with a clearness which seemed effectually to preclude the hazard of our ever being far misled, in any subsequent speculations, into those visionary regions of hypothesis and absurdity in which the most enlightened inquirers of former days had wasted their exertions. As a process of discipline to the faculties of the understanding, nothing could be better adapted to give them vigour

and consistency than this course of study; and the fact accordingly has been, that, in the works of those who have been thoroughly embued with this superior philosophy, there is uniformly found not only a depth and illumination, but a richness and masterly beauty which we never perceive in the compositions of those who are less aware of the true rules of investigation, and who are incapable, therefore, of sustaining their efforts with the same majestic regularity and freedom.

It was to the author of the work which is now before us, that we have always looked, if not for the restoration of that love of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, the decay of which we have now been lamenting, at least for some such elucidation of its principles and objects as might furnish the most important facilities for the future investigations of a more philosophic generation. The metaphysical career of this writer was begun while he was yet a stripling of very slender growth, by a work in answer to the Zoonomia of Darwin, which at once stamped his character as not only a devoted admirer of the science, but the destined champion, by his unparalleled subtlety, of all its victories and honours with the generation that was arising. When, at a later period, he had obtained the situation for which this early indication of his talents had destined him, the hopes which had been awaked seemed to have acquired a right of being fulfilled, and though his public prelections have always been adequate to the early promise he had so auspiciously given, it was not without some disappointment that we have beheld him apparently more anxious to obtain the character of a poet or fine writer, than to promote the advancement of the science, he superintended, and rather amusing himself with the effusions of his fancy, than devoting himself to the rearing of a philosophic system with that singleness of purpose, and undiminished warmth of enthusiasm, which seemed necessary for the accomplishment of so great an achievement. We knew, at the same time, that a cultivated fancy, and an ac quaintance with the whole range of polite learning, were requisites of the most valuable importance to the suc cessful prosecution of the object which

we desired, and we were, therefore, willing to hope, that the present studies of this author (if they were indeed his studies, and not rather occasional relaxations from more serious pursuits) might eventually be found to be of great advantage in enabling him finally to rear not only a solid and well compacted edifice, but a temple, of which all the pillars should be of polished beauty, and all the decorations of surpassing workmanship.

It is a remarkable fact in the history of science, that most of the great works by which its boundaries have been extended, have originated rather in accidental thoughts which had struck the minds of their authors, and which they considered likely to afford materials only for an interesting essay, than in any premeditated design of finally extending their work to its ultimate proportions. If our recollection does not very much deceive us, Mr Stewart has hinted, in some one of his publications, that those many splendid speculations with which he has enriched his science, originated in hints struck out in an essay which, when a very young man, he had happened to read to a private philosophical society of this city. We know also, from the avowal of Dr Reid, that, after he had long been bewildered amidst the tangled metaphysics of his earlier days, he happened accidentally to ask himself what evidence he had for the existence of those ideas, species, or shadowy patterns of things, which were then regarded as having supplanted all substantial and permanent natures; and every person acquainted with his works knows, accordingly, that the whole superstructure, by the rearing of which he did so much to vindicate philosophy from the reproaches of the scornful, was completed by his successive efforts to solve the problem he had thus casually proposed to himself. Something of the same kind has happened in the case of the work which has given occasion to these reflections. The greatest debate which has taken place in this city since it ceased to be the capital of an independent kingdom, occurred, at the distance of but a few years, in discussing the question which forms the theme of the work under review; and no person who witnessed that debate will ever recollect it without a proud vene

ration for a country which was capable of assembling so much true talent as was then displayed on both sides of the question. Our author, who seemed called by his early proficiency to be no passive spectator of so important a contest, was induced, accordingly, to offer his exertions for enlightening the public mind on that occasion; and among the many able works which were then published, there was none which, for pure metaphysical ability at least, could be considered as equal to it. In a subsequent edition, this earliest work was extended to the discussion of some questions connected with the subject, which seemed worthy of being more fully and carefully considered; and at last, after several years of more matured examination, the work has taken the shape which it now bears, and may be considered as an exposition of the author's opinions on all the various topics which this subject embraces.

Of the work itself we will now say generally, that it appears to us to be by far the ablest, most original, and, so far as execution merely is concerned, the most noble performance that we have met with for a long time. As a proof of the author's metaphysical talents, it has fulfilled completely whatever we expected of him, and evinces, beyond all controversy, that his former productions were not the consequences of any extraordinary effort merely, but were the unforced effusions of a mind gifted with the talent of subtle discrimination above those of all his contemporaries. As a discussion, too, of the fundamental position which he has adopted, nothing, we apprehend, could be more masterly and ingenious; while the style of the work is at once pure and elegant, never deviating by any luxuriance of diction from the path leading most directly to the object in view, yet sufficiently adorned with all the ornaments of a chaste and classical taste; and sometimes rising into a philosophical sublimity that seems to exhibit the universe under an aspect different from any in which we had formerly beheld it. It is altogether, in short, a treat of the very richest kind to the lovers of metaphysical and analytical investigation; and, though we are very far from wishing that all our readers should forthwith purchase

and peruse this work, we think, undoubtedly, that every liberal scholar ought to be acquainted with it. While, however, we say thus much for the talent and manner of the work, we do it always with a reservation as to the fundamental tenet which it is meant to establish,-indeed, so utterly at variance does this position appear to us to be with all our essential feelings and most irresistible convictions upon the subject, that, notwithstanding all the earnestness with which it is stated by our author, and all the wonderful subtiety by which he has endeavoured to support it, we cannot bring our selves to believe that it is regarded by himself with that perfect confidence at least which his language and manner might seem to imply.

We do not think ourselves called upon, however, in consequence of these observations, to enter into any minute and detailed refutation of our author's opinions. Such a disquisition would obviously be unsuitable to the purpose and general plan of our work; and, fortunately, we are relieved from so irksome a task by the very satisfactory consideration, that what to us at least appears to be a successful refutation of it is already in the hands of every metaphysical reader. For it ought to be remarked, that the theory of Power or Causation here defended, is avowedly that which was long ago proposed by Hume, and which, from his days, till the period at which we ourselves live, has been a constant subject of dispute with metaphysical inquirers. In the pages of our author, indeed, this theory is delivered with a precision of language, and with a power of analytical research, which did not belong, in the same degree, to its original proposer. It is purged also from some erroneous views and solutions which the scepticism of Hume had intermingled with the speculation; and it is extended also to a variety of subjects of the very highest interest, which did not perhaps enter into the contemplation of Hume, or which he was incapable of reducing under the survey of his doctrine. Essentially and avowedly, however, the two speculations are coincident, and our author only professes to consider his work as reflective of the lights which Hume has given. Now, every reader of metaphysics knows, that the fundamental tenets of

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Hume's doctrine have already been ably and minutely examined by Dr Reid, and that the refutation given by that philosopher has ever been considered as a triumphant vindication of the common feelings of mankind upon this point. It is sufficient, therefore, for our purpose, to remark, that the great and pervading error of Dr Brown's book lies in the definition which he has given, first of Causation or Power, as signifying merely an invariable sequence; and, secondly, of Will or Volition, as being, in every respect, synonymous with simple desire. Now, we ask any man of an unprejudiced mind, and capable of reflecting upon the ideas which he entertains, to compare either of these definitions with the ideas which he feels to arise in his mind when the words Power and Will are employed · by him, and after such an examination to say, whether the definitions here given embrace all the elements of the notions he has formed. Is Power simply and exclusively an invariable sequence of events? or does it not rather (far more than this effect of its exertion) involve the idea of an active energy, which cannot indeed be defined, because our idea of power is essentially a simple idea, but which we feel to be necessary to the production of every sequence, and which that sequence, therefore, does not constitute, but of which it is only the effect and sign? And is Will, in every respect, the same, and synonymous with desire? In the vagueness of common language, indeed, we sometimes say, I desire to move my arm, or I will to move it. But when language is employed with metaphysical precision, do we not allow, and is it not expressly stated by our author, that Desire uniformly implies the existence of something pleasing or delightful, while the mere movement of my arm may be a matter of the utmost indifference, though I may yet be strongly determined, by an impulse of my will, to produce the movement which is thus indifferent? And does not the use of this term invariably imply, not merely that we are conscious of an intention of producing the action willed, and have a confidence that the action will follow our will, but that we are further conscious of a deliberate and mental effort made use of for this purpose? According to our

author, however, will is simply desire, and power or causation is simply uniformity of sequence, the most important part by far, therefore, of both ideas or processes is omitted in his definition, and this omission is that great fallacy which pervades and vitiates the whole theory.

We do not mean to enter upon an examination of the particular arguments by which our author has endeavoured to support his doctrines, because such an examination, we have already said, is unsuitable to the purpose of our Miscellany, and because we are persuaded that an attention to the hints we have already given will be sufficient to enable any careful reader to detect the subsequent fallacies for himself. There is, however, one view of the subject to which we are anxious, for a moment, to direct the attention of our readers,-we mean the different measures of satisfaction communicated to the inquisitive mind by the two different explanations which have been given of this intricate subject by the distinguished philosophers whose theories we have already opposed to each other. In perusing the account given by Dr Reid, we seem to feel, that the entire secret of our own mind upon this subject is revealed to us. There is not a position advanced by this philosopher which does not meet with our most ready assent, as a true exposition of our most familiar notions; and, while we admire the perspicuity and force of his argument, we have that pleasure in contemplating the results of his induction, which uniformly accompanies a masterly elucidation of our hidden thoughts. In perusing the theory of the still more acute metaphysician, whose work we are reviewing, we are struck, indeed, with the unrivalled talent for analysis which it displays, and we are probably overpowered and perplexed in our notions by the masterly skill with which he supports his position; but, if the minds of other men are affected, as our own has been, after a patient and repeated, and candid perusal of this volume, we are forced to foretell, that it will not be perused by one individual, who will not be staggered almost to stumbling, at the first annunciation of the propositions which it advances, and who, after the most careful examination, will not be more

disposed to pronounce it an ingenious theory, than a luminous and sound exposition of our inward thoughts. Nor are we employing any unfair argument against our author by this surmise; for the object of his work is plainly to afford an explanation and analysis of ideas and feelings, which are the common portion of the human race; and as it is always a great presumption in favour of a theory, when it accords with those feelings which are universally entertained, we are only following the authority of Dr Sinith, when we declare, that there must be something wrong in a metaphysical disquisition, which strongly wrenches our habitual convictions; and that, without further examination, that theory may be pronounced to be false, which offers violence to our most universal and fundamental ideas.

With respect, therefore, to the general complexion of this theory, we may further remark, that if not inconsistent with those principles upon which all languages, and the usual communications of mankind are formed, it is at least founded on views of our intellectual nature, different from those which language, that great expositor of human thought, would in all times and situations have led us to adopt. We do not say that the account of power or causation here given, is at variance with occasional forms of human speech, or with phrases, synonymes of which may be found in all languages. But what we assert is, that it is inconsistent with those ideas, and habitual and essential feelings of the human mind, which have given their form and structure, and particular and common character, to all languages that have ever been spoken. For perhaps the most universal feature of all languages, is that by which they discriminate between action and passion, regularity of sequence, however uniform, and causation or power. All languages in the same manner recognize the distinction between desire and will, and between a substance and its qualities. The whole system of human language, in short, is founded upon that view of the subject, which will be found explained in the writings of those metaphysicians, who have hitherto been considered as our guides in this study, and is at variance with that view of it which this new expositor embraces; and, surely, when an

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author pretends to tell us what ideas the human mind entertains upon any subject, and his exposition is yet contrary to all the forms of that symbol, which is the best index of human thought, we are entitled to consider ourselves as giving him a sufficient warrant for our dissent, when we point to this discrepancy between his theory, and the universal language of the human race.

While, however, we thus strenuously object to these parts of our author's doctrine, we do not see that we are bound to reject some other speculations which he has interwoven with the general texture of his argument, and which, though coloured and modified considerably by his peculiar views, respecting what he calls promiscuously the powers, qualities, or properties of natural bodies, yet seem to us to have no necessary dependence upon his peculiar ideas of volition or of power. We have at present particularly in view our author's speculation respecting the changes that are incessantly going on in nature, as unconnected with any efficient or living influence, which is supposed to be the immediate producing cause. In the system of Des Cartes, natural bodies were denominated occasional causes, as affording, by their presence, the occasions upon which the Deity, who is the grand producing cause, excites any particular feeling or idea, corresponding with these objects in our minds. This doctrine, or rather the nomenclature of this doctrine, was afterwards changed into what is now called the theory of physical and efficient causes; a theory which, equally with that other, supposes natural substances to be only the regular antecedents and consequents of sequences in which the Divine Being is the true and ever present efficient; and which, as seeming to afford an easy, elevated, and consolatory idea of the Divine Being, is now almost universally adopted as the creed of philosophers. According to Dr Brown, however, our notions of the Deity, as the Lord and Governor of the universe, are sufficiently pure, if we believe that he not only created this magnificent universe at first, and still regards its fate with interest, but is ready, whenever it shall seem better for his creatures, upon the whole, to suspend any effects which would otherwise have been produced, according to the established and known proce

dure of things. This theory, therefore, does not require us to believe that the Deity continues to interfere on every occasion, and we present our author's views upon this subject in his own words, as affording what we think one of the most beautiful speculations which the work contains, and a speculation which, though tinged with the author's peculiar notions, yet seems to us to be capable of being received, while we reject the definitions we have already noticed, as imperfect or erroneous elucidations of the ideas to be explained.

"That the changes which take place, whether in mind or in matter, are all ultimately resolvable into the will of the Deity, who formed alike the spiritual and material system of the universe,-making the earth a habitation worthy of its noble inhabitant, and Man an inhabitant almost worthy of that scene of divine magnificence in which he is placed.-I have already frequently repeated. That, in this sense, as the Creator of the world, and willer of those great ends, which the laws of the universe accomplish, God is himself the author of the physical changes which take place in it, is, then, most true; as it is most true, that the same Power, which gave the universe its laws, can, for particular purposes of his provident goodness and wisdom, suspend, if it be his pleasure, any effect that would flow from these laws, and produce, by his own immediate volition, a different result. But, however deeply we may be impressed with these truths, we cannot find in them any reason for supposing, that the objects without us, which he has made surely for some end, have, as made by him, no efficacy, no power of being instrumental to his own great purpose, merely because whatever power they can be supposed to possess

must have been derived from the fountain of all power. We have seen, indeed, that it is only as possessing this power, that they are conceived by us to exist; and their powers, therefore, or efficien cies, are, relatively to us, their whole existence. It is by affecting us, that they are known to us; and, if they were incapable of affecting us, or,-which is the same thing,-if we were unsusceptible of any change on their presence, it would be in vain, that the gracious benevolence which has surrounded us with them, provided and decorated for us the splendid home in which it has called us to dwell,a home, that may be splendid indeed, as planned by the Omnipotent who made it, but which must for ever be invisible, and unknown to the very beings for whom it was made. Such, reciprocally, is the nature of our mind, and of light, that light

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