1832)

such facilities as existed in 1841 for the retirement of officers of
rank less than that of post-captain, the active lists were still
choked throughout with old officers, survivors of the French
wars. Of this category, there were about 200 commanders and
1,450 lieutenants who had received no promotion whatsoever for
a period of twenty-six years or more.
One officer had been a
commander for forty-seven years; another had been а
lieutenant for sixty years; yet another had been a master for
sixty-one years; and there was a purser with sixty-four years'
service in that rank to his credit. All these officers, however,
were set down in the Navy List as being fit for duty.

Retire

ment.

It was the existence of this extraordinary state of affairs Naval that induced the Admiralty to adopt a more reasonable and comprehensive scheme of naval retirement than had previously been in force. As early as 1816, not to go farther back, 100 of the senior lieutenants who, owing to age and infirmities, were assumed to be incapable of further service, had been permitted. to retire with the rank of commander and a pension of 8s. 6d. a day; and in 1830 another Order-in-Council had authorised the retirement of lieutenants of sufficient seniority to be in receipt of half-pay at 7s. a day. But these measures had thinned the lower ranks only to a partial extent, and had left the equally crowded upper ranks untouched. A further step was taken in 1840, when fifty of the senior commanders were allowed to retire with the rank of captain and with half-pay of 10s. 6d. a day. Yet still the tension remained unrelieved until the elaboration of a more general scheme, which was published in the London Gazette of September 1st, 1846, and became part of the regulations under an Order-in-Council of April, 1847. This measure permitted the retirement, as rear-admirals, of captains whose seniority placed them on the 14s. 6d. half-pay list; the retirement, with increased pay, of certain other captains of not less than twenty years' seniority; and the reduction to manageable proportions of the active list. New Orders-inCouncil followed in 1851, 1856, 1860, 1864, and 1866; and in 1870 a complete fresh scheme for all ranks was at length adopted. This, although it has since been considerably modified, remains the basis of the present system of naval retirement. It may be said that the schemes, just and salutary upon the whole, which thus received, as it were, their

The Navy in the Crimean

War.

Rating

of Ships.

[1815

codification in 1870, were the direct outcome of the long and trying wars of the beginning of the century. Nothing, indeed, is more certain than that for successful commanders at sea in war-time the country must look chiefly to the officers who are still in, or below, the prime of life; and that the best interests of the service require that it should be possible for capable officers to reach flag-rank by the age of forty, as Nelson did.

Some of the evil consequences of the neglect and procrastination of the Admiralty in dealing with the situation. bequeathed to us by the war which ended in 1815 appear to have hampered the country when, nearly forty years later, war broke out with Russia. During that war the Navy, all things considered, effected remarkably little; and the expectations of the country were notoriously disappointed. The excessive age of many of the flag-officers and captains who were entrusted with commands may be accepted in partial explanation of the result. Both Napier and Dundas were nearly seventy; and Lyons and Price, though only rear-admirals, were sixty-six; while several captains, both in the Black Sea and in the Baltic, were upwards of sixty years of age. From officers of such advanced life, the energy, activity. and mental suppleness that distinguish capable younger men cannot be expected. The sea, moreover, is an exceptionally wearing calling, and was even more so in the first half of the century than it is now. This has since been to some extent recognised in our own and other Navies. A British admiral is now obliged to retire at sixty-five, and a rear-admiral at sixty. In Germany, even these ages are considered too great to admit of full efficiency. There, no officer can remain on the active list after he is fifty-six; and rear-admirals are perforce retired at fifty-three.

It is important for the student of naval history to understand the principles according to which British ships of war were "rated" at various times, and what, in the days of our wooden walls, was the real meaning of such expressions as "a 36-gun frigate," "a seventy-four," and so on. As a great and sensible, if not entirely satisfactory, change in the system of rating was introduced in 1817, immediately after the peace, the present seems to be a convenient opportunity for dealing with the subject.

In the seventeenth century, and in the first three-quarters of

1832]

the eighteenth, a vessel was rated and described according to what may be regarded as the natural plan; that is, if she actually carried 60 guns, she was known as a 60-gun ship. But in 1779, when the carronade was made a regular service weapon, nearly all vessels were given a certain number of these pieces of ordnance, in addition to their complement of guns. For instance, the 100-gun ships were given 10 carronades; 90- and 98-gun ships were given 10 also; 74-gun ships were given 8; 50-gun ships were given 10, etc. To put the matter more concisely for purposes of reference, the true gun strength of the chief classes of ships, as distinct from the conventional gun strength, became as follows:

Yet, in spite of these considerable alterations, ships continued to be officially classed as they had been classed before the change. Other changes in the armament of ships were effected subsequently, not only in consequence of Admiralty orders, but also to suit the theories or temporary wishes of individual captains ; so that in course of time the official classification came to be almost meaningless. Any addition of long guns to a ship raised her class in the Admiralty estimate; but no addition of carronades modified her status on the books of the Navy. Thus, when in 1780 the Canada received two extra 18-pounder long Anomguns, she rose from the position of a 74 to that of a 76; but alies of when in the following year the Goliath, 74, was given, as part of nication

Classi

[1815-1832

her extra armament, two 68-pounder carronades, she still remained a 74, although the additions made her probably a more powerful ship, especially at close quarters, than the Canada. When. therefore, in the history of the French wars, or of the war of 1812, we read that a British ship was officially classed as carrying a certain number of guns, we get little or no guide to her actual offensive strength. The inconvenience of this state of affairs was recognised when the recurrence of peace

enabled the Admiralty to consider the point; and efforts were at once made to remedy it. But the Order-in-Council of February, 1817, was after all only a half-measure; for it merely directed that in future all his Majesty's ships should be rated at the number of guns and carronades which they actually carried on their decks, quarter-decks, and forecastles; and it left out of account the carronades which, in the ships of the three higher rates in the Navy, were carried on the poop. Thus, the Superb, 74, though officially promoted to be a 78, should in reality have been promoted to be an 84. Indeed, all the first, second, and third rates, even after the new Order, and the accompanying

MEN-OF-WAR IN PORT, BY W. ANDERSON.

(Victoria and Albert Museum. By permission of T. Dyer Edwardes, Esq.)