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The
Indian

Mutiny.

The
Volunteer
Movement.

[1846

and butchered all the white women and children upon whom they could lay their hands. Happily for Britain the ranks just then were full, as the men who had enlisted during the Russian war were still with the colours. Many militia battalions were again embodied, and, by taking over garrison duty in various places, at once set many thousand soldiers free for active service in India. Strong reinforcements were hurried out to support the handful of white men, who, scattered in feeble garrisons throughout Bengal, with infinite heroism were holding their own against the overwhelming masses of the mutineers―veteran soldiers, who had been drilled and trained and disciplined in the same school as the British troops. In point of the calm and steadfast courage displayed, the campaigns of the Crimea and the Mutiny are alike; but in other respects the contrast was startling. In the Russian war the army was tied hand and foot by red-tape, and any exhibition of intelligence and of initiative was discouraged. In India, on the contrary, soldiers and civilians alike showed themselves full of initiative and of resource, and, above all, were ready to accept responsibility and its consequences.

Hardly had the Mutiny been quelled when the attitude of France towards this country became so threatening that the Volunteer force sprang into existence. To this movement the nation owes much. Opinions differ as to the fighting value of. men who, after having as recruits attended the regulation sixty lessons in drill, are only compelled to annually appear ten times on parade and to fire twenty shots at a target. But one thing is certain. The Volunteers have largely contributed to dispel the old dread of a standing army, the bugbear of the English people since the Restoration. They have familiarised the electorate with the idea that soldiers are necessary for the very existence of England. They have assisted to popularise the army among the classes from which its recruits are chiefly drawn. Above all, they have taught the practical lesson in patriotism that it is the duty of the citizen to be prepared, in case of need, to fight in defence of his country.

W. LAIRD SOON after the final adoption of the screw in the Navy, and even before the adoption of iron as the material for the hulls of British fighting ships, important improvements in entirely new

CLOWES.
The Navy.

1865]

directions became necessary. The power of the gun had begun to grow greatly, partly in consequence of the development of shell-fire; and the swift and tragic destruction, by shell-fire almost exclusively, of the Turkish squadron off Sinope by a Russian squadron on November 30th, 1853, demonstrated that the time had come for inventive genius to devise means for the protection of ships and human life from at least some of the effects of the incendiary missiles. The first result was the building, for the purposes of the war with Russia, of armoured

[graphic][merged small][merged small]

floating batteries. The credit of the invention is due to France; but plans of the vessels were sent to England, and in 1855 this country constructed the four wooden-hulled armoured batteries Trusty, Thunderer, Glatton, and Meteor, following them up in the succeeding year with the iron-hulled armoured batteries Thunderbolt, Terror, Etna, and Erebus. The earlier type was of about 1,540 tons, the later one of about 1,950 tons; and the speed was in the one case 4.5, and the other 5.5 knots. The smaller type carried 14, and the large 16 68-pounder smoothbore guns, 10 feet long, and weighing 95 cwt. France again led the way by laying down in March, 1855, the sea-going wooden armour-plated frigate La Gloire, the prototype of a class of four

Guns

versus

Armour.

[1846

sister ships; and Great Britain followed by laying down in 1859 the much larger and more powerful iron-hulled armour-clad Warrior. La Gloire was 252 feet long, and had a speed of little more than 12 knots. The Warrior was 380 feet 2 inches long, and had a speed of 14.3 knots. Each carried 4.5 inches iron armour. But it was presently found that such thin plating was of little or no value against the improved guns which were rapidly coming into use. Guns grew larger than they had ever been before; the rifling of them improved their accuracy, and, by reducing the windage between the projectile and the bore, gave them greater velocity, penetration, and range; the introduction of the various breechloading systems further advanced their powers; the new practice of building up guns, instead of casting or forging them, facilitated the creation of still heavier weapons; and finally the adoption of slower-burning powders allowed the charge to expend its full force in the most advantageous manner before the instant when the projectile quitted the gun. The effect, briefly summarised, of all these and other advances was that, whereas in 1860 the largest gun afloat was just equal to the penetration of 4 inches of iron at the muzzle, in 1885 the largest gun afloat was fully equal to the penetration of 34 inches of similar armour. The quarter of a century was naturally, therefore, one of continual struggle between gun and armour. In the course of the rivalry, there came a time when the thickness of iron armour needed to withstand a fair blow from the biggest gun of the moment was so great that for a ship to attempt to carry much plating of that weight was hopeless. Accordingly the attention of inventors was directed to the discovery of some process whereby the resisting quality of the plating might be improved, without unduly increasing the weight. This brought about the introduction of compound armour, i.e. of iron armour faced with steel; and then, as the gun again forged to the front, of solid steel armour; while, at last, even the solid steel had to have its face further hardened, by special treatment, until it became so intractable as to turn the edges of the best-tempered tools. It is probable that the finest armour existing in 1885 had, thickness for thickness, more than one and a half times the resisting power of the plain iron armour put upon our first sea-going ironclad, the Warrior; yet, upon the whole, victory remained with the gun. Armour

1865]

could be manufactured to keep out everything that could be thrown against it; but, if made of the needful thickness, so little of it could be carried by any ship of practicable proportions that it would be possible to protect only a very limited area. Keeping in view that armour in action is more advantageously situated than armour on the proving grounds, naval constructors compromised matters. They put exceedingly thick armour over a few vital or otherwise important places; they placed thinner armour on larger but less critical areas; and they left a considerable part of the ship without vertical armour of any sort, trusting to be able to assure the stability of that part by working into the ship's structure a curved steel deck, so arranged that its edges were well below the water-line, while its centre was above it. The theory was that a projectile striking a part thus protected would, if it encountered the curved surface, be deflected upwards, instead of passing right through the ship near or below the water-line, and that any water admitted above the still intact steel deck could be easily controlled by means of the pumps. The protective deck, as this device was called, was also employed in vessels which had no vertical armour whatsoever; but towards the end of our period the introduction of the quick-firing gun lent a renewed importance to vertical armour, even if comparatively thin: and in 1885 a tendency was visiblefirst abroad, and then in England-to revert to the practice exemplified in most of the earliest ironclads, of armouring vertically as great an extent of a fighting ship's side as could be armoured, not so much in order to prevent penetration by the few heavy projectiles as to cause the raining shells from the quick-firing guns to burst outside the vessel. But the carryingout of these principles had then barely begun.

HUTTON.

The

FROM 1846 the Tractarian movement was no longer most w. H definitely connected with Oxford. Some of its leaders had left the University, one had left the English Church, Pusey, though Church. he continued till the end of his long life to reside nearly the whole year in Oxford and to teach as an University Professor had an influence which extended far and wide over England while Keble, from the quiet country parsonage of Hursley exercised a power hardly less great.

"The Guardian."

The
Gorham
Case.

[1846

Among the earliest signs that the movement had taken root outside the place of its origin was the foundation of The Guardian newspaper in January, 1846. This was the work of Oxford men who were in general sympathy with the Tractarians: the chief of them were Frederic Rogers (afterwards Lord Blachford) and R. W. Church (afterwards Dean of St. Paul's). The aim of those who founded it was to represent the principles of orthodox Anglicanism, not only in theology but in politics and criticism. The paper soon worked its way to success and became the most popular "organ" of the English clergy. Through it the opinions of the careful, accurate students who sympathised with the movement became widely known. Through it began the influence of Church, whose knowledge and wisdom and strength came gradually to impress profoundly the most prominent of his contemporaries among statesmen as well as clergy. As parish priest and as Dean of St. Paul's he displayed the character of an English priest of the type of George Herbert or Lancelot Andrewes-learned, judicious, tolerant, saintlyin its most beautiful aspect. Firm in his convictions, filled with a noble enthusiasm for justice, and great in his quietness, no man ever represented more perfectly the characteristic excellencies of the Anglican Church.

From 1847 to 1851 the Church was agitated by a controversy on the doctrine of Baptismal regeneration as asserted in the Book of Common Prayer. In 1850 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, while declaring that it had no jurisdiction or authority to decide matters of faith, ruled that the doctrine held by a certain Mr. Gorham, and declared heretical by the Bishop of Exeter-the learned and combative Henry Phillpotts (1778– 1869) should be no bar to his institution to a benefice in that bishop's diocese. Phillpotts was a Tractarian before the Tractarians, a man of extraordinary polemic vigour and a ruler of indomitable determination and masterfulness, and he fought the battle, as he deemed it, of orthodoxy till the end. The decision of the lay court was regarded by many as a grievous scandal. It resulted eventually in the secession of several English clergymen to the Church of Rome, among them the learned Archdeacon Wilberforce, brother of the Bishop of Oxford, and his brother-in-law, Archdeacon Manning.

Manning had been an active supporter of the Tractarians,

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