The Principles of Biology. By HERBERT SPENcer, Author of "The Principles of Psychology," "Illustrations of Progress," "Essays, Moral, Political, and Esthetic," "First Principles," "Social Statics," "Education," etc. Principles of Geology; or the Modern Changes of the VII. HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY. Annals of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, A. D. 1598- VIII. THE SIEGE OF DELHI PAGE 377 423 445 465 501 543 568 594 1 IX. THE SPANISH GYPSY. The Spanish Gypsy. A Poem. By GEORGE ELIOT. The Myths of the New World, 636. Histoire du Droit dans les Py- rénées, 644.- Ten Years on the Euphrates, 648.- Modern Women, and what is said of them, 651.- Plumptre's Tragedies of Sophocles, 656. — Poems of John James Piatt, 660. — The Popham Colony, 663. Cape Cod and all along Shore, 674.- Hans Breitmann's Party, 675. 620 NORTH AMERICAN No. CCXXI. OCTOBER, 1868. REVIEW. 66 ART. I. The Principles of Biology. By HERBERT SPENCER, Author of "The Principles of Psychology," "Illustrations of Progress," " Essays, Moral, Political, and Esthetic," "First Principles," "Social Statics," "Education," etc. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1866, 1867. 12mo. 2 vols. pp. 475, 566. MR. SPENCER'S so-called "Synthetic Philosophy" is an attempt to generalize into a universal law the nebular hypothesis, the development hypothesis, and the theory of human progress, and thus to bring all phenomena, whether of the material universe, of organic life, or of human nature, under the unity of a single idea. Whether his formula is the last and highest of scientific inductions, and, if so, whether it is capable of application to the deeper questions of philosophy, there is now no occasion to inquire, the public having probably heard, at least for the present, sufficient criticism of "First Principles." The aim of this article is a limited one, namely, to ascertain whether Mr. Spencer, having taken the development hypothesis as the basis of his Biology, has met the logical necessities of the case, and thus accomplished the highly important achievement of putting the science of life into philosophical form. Our inquiry, therefore, concerns not so much the scientific value of his facts as the philosophical value of his system, not so much the intrinsic worth of the materials as the architectural excellence and practical usefulness of the NO. 221. VOL. CVII. 25 edifice. That this inquiry is a legitimate one will not tioned, when it is remembered that the two volum consideration are not intended to be a mere résum and laws empirically established, but rather an attempt alize these as elements of a coherent philosophical w his Preface to the English edition Mr. Spencer distin this as his main object: "The aim of this work is to the general truths of Biology, as illustrative of, and i by, the laws of Evolution: the special truths being i only so far as is needful for elucidation of the genera It is confessedly as philosophy, rather than as scienc work has its chief significance; and as such, th should be criticised.* "The Principles of Biology," being a simple ex the development hypothesis, with the design of cover facts of organic life, the whole of Part III. (Vol. I 475) is devoted to a comparison of the two rival concerning the origin of species, an elaborate ar favor of the "evolution hypothesis," and a very ing planation of what Mr. Spencer regards as the c methods of organic evolution. The "special-creatio sis" he pronounces to be "worthless by its derivati less in its intrinsic incoherence, worthless as absol out evidence, worthless as not supplying an intelle worthless as not satisfying a moral want"; and he izes it as a "mere verbal hypothesis," a "pseud-i believe that sooner or later all disciplined minds w this estimate of the "special-creation hypothesis," s *The idea may possibly be suggested by the passage above qu Spencer intends nothing more than to give in these two volumes, volumes to succeed them, a simple series of "illustrations" of the tion set forth in "First Principles," without undertaking the philoso zation of the sciences from which the illustrations are drawn. Bu evolution are already illustrated in "First Principles," even to redun would be inexcusable prolixity to fill nine additional volumes with a s ation of instances. Mr. Spencer's "New System of Philosophy," rate sketch of it given in his well-known" Prospectus," would th ridiculously insignificant proportions, and lose all claim upon the att ulative thinkers. If the present work have any philosophical valu must be as a philosophy of organic being, which is itself part of philosophy. may seem. Whatever shall be the final judgment passed upon the development hypothesis, it is the only hypothesis in the field, as to the origin of species, that can be understood, the only hypothesis, consequently, that fulfils the end for which all hypotheses exist. Development and decay are the universal marks by which we distinguish the organic from the inorganic; evolution and dissolution are the double process which constitutes the entire series of vital phenomena in all individual organisms. The development hypothesis, therefore, may be broadly stated as the provisional extension to species of a law which is known to be true of individuals; and although the analogy between individual and species will not admit of being pressed too far, it still yields, when properly qualified, a clear conception in harmony with the other conceptions of science. The hypothesis of special creations, on the other hand, is utterly unintelligible, the virtual negation of all hypothesis on the subject, the delusive substitution of words for thoughts. Its advocates, having no citadel of their own to defend, can only attack the imperfectly built citadel of their opponents, which falls but to rise in greater strength. It is certainly a most significant fact, that, whenever the development hypothesis is pronounced dead and buried, it soon revives in a less vulnerable shape. The supposition of special creations, for all those who have imbibed the spirit of modern thought, is no longer tenable, and the debate turns exclusively on the acceptance or rejection of the other supposition. Although it must certainly be considered as scientifically unproved, so long as intelligent scientific men are found to call the alleged proofs of it into question, it is not too strong a statement to say that the development hypothesis, under some form or other, will probably take rank in the end with the accepted truths of science. In any event, whether the development hypothesis is to wax or wane, and whether some other hypothesis, as yet unconceived, is destined to take its place or not, it is safe to say that the hypothesis of special creations, lacking the very first element of a scientific hypothesis, intelligibility, and resting on no more solid basis than the crude religious ideas of uncivilized man, will ultimately cease to be defended. A theory which denies the unity of the universe, and the order of Nature, cannot permanently hold its ground, even |