hypocrisy required by the time, is creditable to his hearers, and a proof of his consummate artistic capacity and taste.

His definitions of terms, critical investigations into the inner and essential signification of words, researches into human knowledge and consciousness, entitle him to some deference as an experimentalist in metaphysics, and an observer of the obscurer movements of the mental faculties. In these items he worked for the advancement of philosophy, and we shall not seek to derogate from the praise due to him on account of these meritorious exercitations in the region of thought and reflective being.

Protagoras was banished from Athens for atheism, and Prodicus was condemned to expiate the crime of demoralizing the youth of Athens.

Of the other persons, united in brotherhood of aim, usually classed together as Sophists, a few words may suffice to present an intelligible notion of their relationship to the philosophy of their own age, and to the theoretic speculations and practical arts of preceding and succeeding times.

Hippias, a native of Elis, was not only a statesman, but also a rhetorician, dialectician, grammarian, and artist. He professed himself capable of knowing everything, and doing it. He could speak for or against any opinion, and is reputed to have been the inventor of a system of mnemonics. He was vain and arrogant, a considerable braggart, and ostentatiously knowing. His speeches were, in general, carefully prepared, and often re-delivered. Of one of these, entitled "Troy," Plato preserves an outline, and he uses his name in the headings of two of his dialogues. Some of his moral maxims are singularly happy and sensible, e. g., “The envious are doubly wretched, they repine at their own misfortunes, and their neighbours' advantages." "Calumny ought to be a crime more penal than theft; for its perpetrators rob us of public estimation, which is man's great delight." He grew rich, and became famous; bore all before him at the Olympic games; but he is more memorable for his success than his philosophical tenets or position.

Diagoras, a native of the island of Melos, was, like Protagoras, a disciple of Democritus, and merits little mention from us. He was a bold and bravadoing sceptic, and openly taught a disrespect for sacred things, as mere conventionalities, and impostures of the wise upon the foolish. He scoffed at virtue and morality, disbelieved in Providence, and ridiculed the idea of a supervising power in nature, or in religion. He led a number of the profane young "fast" men of Athens into a practical joke against religion,-counterfeiting the Elusinian mysteries-which nearly effected their destruction. He was formally accused of impiety, and escaped death by flight. He died in Corinth; and on his tombstone the decree of condemnation was engraven.

Critias-though a pupil of Socrates, from whose teaching he hoped to learn the art of governing men, but who strove, though

unavailingly, to teach him, rather, the duty of governing himselfhas small claim to notice in a prelection on philosophy, but that one of the dialogues of Plato bears his name. He was banished from his country, as a contemner of its laws and gods; but on his return, with Lysander, was nominated one of the ten tyrants. He exceeded his colleagues in revengefulness, cruelty, and greed. He was a poet and an orator, and the father of the comic dramatist Plato. His skill was ill used; and he practically illustrated the sophistical doctrine that laws are made by the strong for the weak. Callicles is only known to us by the " Gorgias" of Plato, in which he figures as a man thoroughly interpenetrated with the doctrines of the Sophists, but not as using his so-thought wisdom for personal enrichment. Schleiermacher supposes this to be a pseudonym for Aristippus, of Cyrene, who, like the Callicles of the "Gorgias," believed justice and injustice to be the inventions of statesmen.

Euthydemus, surnamed the handsome, appears in one of the most lively and comic of Plato's dialogues, and is mentioned by both Xenophon and Aristotle. Xenophon informs us that "he had collected many extracts from the writings of the most celebrated poets and Sophists, and imagined that by these means he would outstrip his contemporaries in accomplishments, and had great hopes that he would excel them all in talent for speech and action." His opinions had a close affinity to the Megaric school, and he rested many of his sophistical problems on the distinction between relative and contingent truth, and existent reality. Schleiermacher supposes that this name is used for Antisthenes, whom Plato was afraid to attack openly; but we are scarcely inclined to believe that the vis comica and verve of Plato were restrained by such a paltry fear as that. Besides, Xenophon speaks of them as different persons, and as both being friends of, and friendly to, Socrates.

Polus, Theramenes, Antipho, Thrasymachus, Dionysodorus, brother of Enthydemus, &c., are other names belonging to that indefatigable class who darkened knowledge by the excessive brilliancy of their wits and talents; who taught and practised manage ment as the noblest of arts, regarded tongue-fence as the chief of merits, and elevated tact into a science.

Experimental science was not then existent, either in physics or metaphysics. No laws of investigation had yet been formally and acceptedly incorporated into a systematic, and so a useful unity. One mode only seemed valid-the combat of reason against itselfa controversial strife of mind against mind. Not in mere captiousness, or in frivolous play-not as mere exercise of mind, indifferent to results,-but as an earnest and vigorous discipline, ought this to have been set about; and so, by many of the earlier Sophists, it really was. But all human efforts have a tendency to misconstruction and misdirection; and instead of striving after the

• Xenophon's "Memorabilia," b. iv. chap. ii.

establishment of a principle, and of endeavouring to gain a knowledge of the conditions of proof-a science and art of reasoningmany of the thinkers of this age sought merely to confuse the sense of right and wrong, and to deceive the judgment.

This, as we have said, and, we hope, shown, was the natural and necessary result of the concurrence of affairs in morals, religion, politics, and philosophy, during the latter part of the fifth century. In philosophy, scepticism was imminent, unless a further passage was opened up to thought. It was impossible to accept and homologate systems so plainly opposed in their doctrines and methods as those which then chiefly prevailed, one of which denied the trustworthiness of sense, the other that of reason. If sense is the measure of truth, as the Ionic school affirms, all is uncertain; for not only are outward objects in a continual flux, but the state of the senses is daily changing: where all is changing, all must be uncertain. If, again, the one is the all, as the Eleatics aver,-then the all is in all-the all resembles itself; and so the true and false, good and evil, are, in essence, the same, though in appearance they differ.

It is unjust to deny the services the Sophists did render, or to misconstrue the ultimate results of their efforts. Through their culture of speech, as the instrument of power over minds, language was enriched and improved; by their dexterous and ingenious inver sions-let us say nothing of perversions of forms of phraseology, and their copiousness and fluency of utterance, literature was advanced. Rhetoric, as it was the engine of political success, was sedulously adapted to every exigency, and fitted for all possible purposes. Logic, even though looked upon only as an alluring, juggling trickery, gained a great development of power and perspi cuity, as well as a large collection of forms and modes, out of which to choose the best, because the truest. Philosophy, which had previously been shut up in schools, and held within the narrow enclosures of sects, to whom, as disciples, confidential communications had been made, was brought by a number of adepts out of the bondage in which it had been held, and was familiarized to the people. An interest was excited in the discussion and determination of the true and the false, and the foundations of thought in general; and if knowledge was not popularized, at least the love of knowledge was professionally praised, and professedly acted upon. Their most important office, however, was to stimulate, improve, and employ Socrates, to engage the attention of Plato, and afford material for the acute intellect of Aristotle to operate upon, and to give scientific form to. Though their sad and unblushing pandering to expediency, and the means of gain, seemed to threaten the destruction of philosophy, it rather led to its reconstruction; and, from a new point of departure, metaphysics set out on a voyage of greater interest and wider import than before. The good as well as the true were now to be sought for ;-Socrates becomes the pioneer, of whom and of his system, life, and labours, more anon.

S. N.

Religion.

IS THE BIBLE ALONE A SUFFICIENT RULE OF FAITH?

AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.-V.

POPERY or infidelity ?-which will you have? Such is the alternative offered by the authors of each of the four negative articles on the sufficiency of the Bible as our Rule of Faith. If any of our readers ever thought harshly of the remark of Bishop Sherlock, "that from Popery to no religion, and from no religion to Popery, there is but a step," let him carefully examine the aim of those articles. From a desire to avoid unnecessary offence, we abstained, in a former article, from pointing out the animus of these productions. All our scruples have, however, disappeared, since we read in the last number of the Controversialist that, "to be consistent, a man must either be a Catholic or an infidel" (page 239). Hence Gregory" has laboured to represent Scripture as obscure, in order to reduce it to the level of absurd and conflicting traditions. He has recklessly attempted to sap the very foundations of Christianity, in order to build up Roman Catholicism. "Ignatius" has endeavoured to nullify the authority of the Bible, in order to strengthen the authority of "the church." The external evidence on which the canon is determined, and the internal evidence on which the inspiration of the separate books of which it is composed is ascertained, are slighted, with a view to substitute ecclesiastical traditions and decrees, which are artful and flexible contrivances for the introduction of anything which may accord with priestly designs. "A Layman" follows with insinuations that Protestant writers are not to be credited for controversial honesty. We have already shown the nature and value of " Gregory's" paper. “Theophylact," in his masterly article, has prostrated "Ignatius," but not to the satisfaction of J. H. We propose, therefore, to reply to his question-"How do Protestants know what books make up the Bible?" (page 241).

The fundamental article in the creed of "Ignatius" is, that "the canon and inspiration of Scripture cannot be proved without reference to the traditions and decrees of the Catholic church; at least, there must be some infallible authority to reveal to us which are the books that have been written under divine inspiration" (page 100). This foundation is a veritable quicksand. You can lay your foot nowhere without instantly sinking. The "canon" is determined by one species of evidence, and "inspiration" by totally another. "Tradition," when worth anything, is testimony; and ecclesiastical

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decrees," pretensions, which prove nothing but arrogance. It is evidence, historical and internal, which reveals the inspiration of particular books. To talk of "authority," in such matters, is to be ridiculous. To make "infallible authority" requisite, is to make the proof of inspiration impossible; for no "infallible authority" exists. If there did, on the principle of "Ignatius," it would be useless, without another infallible authority to prove that the first authority was really infallible, and so on, ad infinitum. The same absurdity is repeated on page 101-"Nothing less than a divine witness is required for the fact of inspiration.' On such a principle the Bible could never be proved to have proceeded from God. "No proof," we are told, "can be drawn from the New Testament, since it cannot give witness to itself" (page 101). Each witness must, therefore, be backed by another witness, to show that it is divine, and this ad infinitum, which is absurd in the extreme. It is by internal evidence and by our reason that we are to determine the fact of inspiration. If "Ignatius" could advance such an argument without instantly detecting its absurdity, it is no wonder that he seems incapable of appreciating the value of different kinds of evidence. Observe the following sentence:-Protestants "know what books are inspired, by what they are pleased to call internal evidence,' which is equal to saying that they have, in their own minds, a rule whereby to test all books for which inspiration is claimed," &c. (page 101). Here internal evidence, which is external to the mind of an inquirer, is confounded with intuition. The subjective and the objective are one and the same thing with "Ignatius."

It is absurd, again, to say that "the decrees of the Catholic Church" determined the canon. A council, whether provincial or general, could do no more than take the evidence of competent witnesses, and ascertain what was already and generally acknow. ledged by the churches which were represented. The authority of the canon could not rest on their declaration, for the validity of that declaration itself depends upon the antecedent evidence upon which it was grounded. The declaration was not a "decree.' It was simply the embodiment of the prevailing belief. Upon the strength of that belief, adoption or rejection was determined; and the result of testimony, not authority, was promulgated, not decreed. A host of decrees will go for nothing in a question of facts. If the genuineness and authenticity of the New Testament were unknown before they were "decreed" by Rome, it follows that the whole Christian world was, for at least three centuries, in that very predicament which is attributed to us Protestants. Christianity managed to exist and prosper during that period without such decrees, and would have continued to exist had no such decrees ever appeared.

The idea of decreeing the inspiration and canonicity of Scripture, is not only an inversion of common sense, but it is notoriously belied by history. This would have appeared in a glaring light, if "Ignatius," in talking of "decrees," had told his readers when the