CHA P. I. Difference between Memory and Imagination. SON HOME philofophers refer to Memory all our livelier thoughts, and our fainter ones to Imagination and fo will have it, that the former faculty is distinguished from the latter by its fuperiour vivacity. We believe, fay they, in Memory; we believe not in Imagination: now we never believe any thing, but what we diftinctly comprehend; and that, of which our comprehenfion is indiftinct, we disbelieve.—But this is altogether falfe. The fuggeftions of Imagination are often fo lively, in dreaming, and in fome intellectual diforders, as to be miftaken for real things; and therefore cannot be faid to be effentially fainter than the informations of Memory. We may be confcious too of remembering that whereof we have but a faint impreffion. I remember to have read books, of which I cannot now give any account; and to have seen perfons, whofe features and vifible appearance I have totally forgotten. Nor is it true, that we believe, or difbelieve, according to the vivacity, or the faintness of our ideas. No man will fay, that he has a distinct idea of eternity; and yet, every rational being must believe, that one eternity is past, and another to come. I have a live lier idea of Parfon Adams, than of the impoftor Mahomet; and yet I believe the former to be an imaginary character, and the latter to have been a real man. I read, not long ago, Vertot's Revolutions of Sweden, and the Adventures of Tom Jones: I believe the hiftory, and I disbelieve the novel; and yet, of the novel I have a more lively remembrance, than of the hiftory*. Memory and Imagination, therefore, are not to be distinguished, according to the liveliness or faintnefs of the ideas fuggefted by the one, or by the other. The former may be faint, while the latter is lively nay, a great Poet has obferved, that, Where beams of warm Imagination play, A maxim, which, though not always, will fometimes be found to hold true. Befides, belief may be faid to imply difbelief. If I believe the existence of Julius Cefar, I difbelieve his nonexistence. If I admit the hiftory of that commander to be true, I reject every fufpicion of its being falfe. And yet, of Julius Cefar, and his actions, my ideas are equally clear, whether I believe or difbelieve. The faculties in queftion I would therefore diftinguifh in the following manner: "I remember to have feen a lion; and I can "imagine an elephant, or a centaur, which I "have never feen :"-he, who pronounces. these words with understanding, knows the difference * See an Effay on Truth, Part I. Chap. ii. Sect. 4. † Pope's Effay on Criticism. B 4 between between the two faculties, though perhaps he may not be able to explain it. When we remember, we have always a view to real existence, and to our paft experience; it occurs to our minds, in regard to this thing which we now remember, that we formerly heard it, or perceived it, or thought of it; "I remember to "have feen a lion:"-When we imagine, we contemplate a certain thought, or idea, fimply as it is in itself, or as we conceive it to be, without referring it to past experience, or to real exiftence; "I can imagine fuch a figure as that "of the elephant, though I have never seen one; or a centaur, with the head and fhoul"ders of a man joined to the body of a horse, though I know that there is no fuch animal "on earth." I remember what has actually happened, and what, in confequence of my remembering, 1 believe to have happened: I can imagine a series of adventures, which never did, or which never can, happen. He who writes the history of his own life, or who compiles a narrative from the books he has read, is guided by the informations of Memory: he who compofes a romance, puts thofe things in writing, which are fuggefted by his Imagination." A friend defcribes an adventure, in which he fays that he and I were engaged twenty years ago, and informs me of what I faid and did on the occafion: I tell him, that I can distinctly imagine every thing he relates, but that I remember nothing of it. He mentions a circum 14 Αει γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν ὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ότι πρότερον το το ήκουσεν, ή ήσθετο, ἡ ἐνόησεν. Ariftot. de Memoria et Reminifcentia, cap. 1. stance, stance, which on a fudden brings the whole to my memory. You are right, I then say; for now I remember it perfectly well. At first, I could only imagine the facts he spoke of: but, though I might believe his word, I could not recal any experience of mine, by which, in this particular cafe, it might be verified. But now, my memory informs me, that the adventure was real, and that I was an agent in it, and an eye-witness. Hence it appears, that in fome cafes Imagination may become Remembrance. And it may be further obferved, that Remembrance will fometimes decay, till it be nothing more than Imagination as when we retain the appearance of an object, without being able to affirm with certainty, where we perceived, or whether we ever perceived it: a state of mind, which one is confcious of, when one fays, "I "either faw fuch a thing, or I dreamed of it." ઃઃ СНАР. CHA P. II. Phænomena and Laws of Memory. SECT. I. General account of this Faculty.-Whether we have reafon to think that it is connected with the Brain. I PROCEED, in the fecond place, to take notice of some of the more remarkable phænomena of Memory. This is a faculty, which, if it were lefs common, and we equally qualified to judge of it, would ftrike us with aftonishment. That we fhould have it in our power to recal paft fenfations and thoughts, and make them again prefent, as it were that a circumstance of our former life fhould, in respect of us, be no more; and yet occur to us, from time to time, dreffed out in colours fo lively, as to enable us to examine it, and judge of it, as if it were still an object of fenfe :-these are facts, whereof we every day have experience, and which, therefore, we overlook as things of course. But, furely, nothing is more wonderful, or more inexplicable. If thoughts could occupy space, we might be tempted to think, that we had laid them |