Изображения страниц
PDF
EPUB

Now, all fimple ideas, that is, all our notions. of fimple objects, are derived from experience; and cannot be defcribed in words, fo as to be understood by thofe who never perceived them. A man born deaf has no conception of found; nor he who is born blind, of light or colour. And if we were to attempt to convey by defcription thofe fimple ideas, to which nature has not opened an inlet by fenfation, we should labour as ineffectually, as did that philofopher, who undertook to give a blind man a notion of fcarlet. He told him, that it yielded a fenfation at once lively and agreeable, that it was an emblem of courage, and ornamental to princes and great men; and, after fpecifying fome of its other qualities, afked him, whether he had not now fome idea of it. Yes, replied the other; Scarlet muft be, from your account, the likeft thing in the world to the found of a trumpet. Men born blind do, indeed, talk of things vifible, and often with propriety, But this muft be, either the effect of Memory, when they say of colours and light what they have heard faid by others or it must be with fome figurative allufion; as when they fpeak of having feen fuch a perfon, or fuch a book, which, in their mouth, means no more, than their having been in company with the perfon, or heard the book read. For of the peculiar fenfations conveyed by fight they must remain as ignorant, as we are of the phænomena of a world of fpirits. Their dreams prefent them with nothing but different arrangements of thofe ideas which they have acquired by means of the other four fenfes. Even when they dream of light, which from their unhappy circumftances it is natural they fhould often do,

as

as there is nothing they fo earnestly defire, they still fancy, that it is audible, or tangible; they never can conceive what it really is. For the wildeft of our dreams are fo far conformable to nature, as to be wholly made up of thofe fimple or complex notions of things, wherewith experience has made us acquainted. Memory fupplies the materials: all that fancy does in fleep, or can do, is variously to arrange them, fo as to form new combinations, whereof fome are lefs, and others more extravagant.

Of the fimple or complex ideas derived from experience, the mind, when awake, as well as in fleep, frames, as I obferved already, or may frame, innumerable affemblages different from thofe that really exift. He who has feen ivory and a mountain, may conceive the colour, fimoothness, and substance of the former, united with the fhape and fize of the latter; and fo have a notion of an ivory mountain. The monftrous picture defcribed by Horace, in the beginning of the Art of Poetry, with the head of a man, the neck of a horse, feathers of different birds, limbs, of different beafts, and the tail of a fish, it is easy for us to conceive, and, if we know a little of drawing, to make vifible in a picture. In fact, nothing is more eafy than to form new combinations of this fort: the great, and the difficult, X bufinefs of invention is, to make them agreeable and useful, confiftent and natural.

This capacity of framing new affemblages is referred, as I faid before, to the Imagination. Memory prefents nothing to our view, but what we have actually perceived; fo that a being endowed

dowed with Memory, but deftitute of fancy, whatever knowledge he might acquire, would be incapable of invention. For all invention implies novelty; and that things or ideas are put together, which were never fo put together before.

And, that the powers of invention and remembrance are different, fo as that a perfon may poffefs the one in a high, and the other in a low degree, is almoft too obvious to require proof. Shakespeare and Aaron Hill were poets, and men of genius. The latter was a traveller, and wrote the hiftory of his travels, and had enjoyed, befides, the advantage of a liberal education: the former had little learning, was never out of England, and paffed a great part of his life in needy circumftances. From this account one would think, that Hill must have poffeffed a greater fund of ideas, than Shakespeare: and that he had more knowledge of books, of countries, and of other things which occur in reading, admits of no doubt. But Hill's inventive talent was not extraordinary; we find little new in him; and we fay, without impropriety, that he had no great powers of Imagination. Whereas Shakespeare, with far lefs erudition, was in fentiments and images incomparably more abundant; and has indeed difplayed a variety of invention, as well as a knowledge of nature, that is almoft without example. We every day meet with perfons of good fenfe and clear apprehenfion; who can diftinctly tell a ftory, or give an account of a book they have read, or of business they have been engaged in; but, whose converfation, though it befpeaks a good Memory, fhows

no

no inventive talent. And others may be met with, who are witty and humourous, and strike out in their difcourfe many new ideas, who yet have no great ftrength of Memory, and little of that clearness of head, which is requifite to form a man of business.

CHAP.

CHA P. II.

Of the Affociation of Ideas.

SECT. I.

Principles of Affociation.-First, Refemblance.-Secondly, Contrariety.-Thirdly, Nearness of Situation.

HE human foul is effentially active; and

TH

none of our faculties are more restless, than this of Imagination, which operates in fleep, as well as when we are awake. While we liften to a discourse, or read a book, how often, in spite of all our care, does the fancy wander, and prefent thoughts quite different from those we would keep in view! That energy, which lays a reftraint upon the fancy, by fixing the mind on one particular object, or fet of objects, is called Attention: and most people know, that the continued exercife of it is accompanied with difficulty, and fomething of intellectual wearinefs. Whereas, when, without attending to any one particular idea, we give full fcope to our thoughts, and permit them to fhift, as Imagination or accident

fhall

« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »