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to determine, how many may be neceffary. This we know, that barbarous nations have but few ; that cultivated tongues, like the Greek and Latin, have a confiderable number, (the Latin upwards of eighty); but that of this number fome, being fynonimous with others, and introduced for the fake of variety, cannot be neceffary; though they are useful, because they may be ornamental.

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Yet from this laft circumftance it must not be inferred, that there is a redundancy of connectives in these languages. We fhall be inclined to think there is rather a deficiency, when we confider, that one and the fame conjunction has often feveral different fignifications. Thus, the Latin autem denotes, but, nay, befides, indeed, on the contrary; and has other niceties of meaning, to which perhaps there are no correfpondent particles in the English tongue. The true import of fuch connectives, as well as of other ambiguous words, can be ascertained only by the context. is a great fault, in teaching the Clafficks, when children are not inured to give to the conjunctions, which come in their way, that precife meaning, which an intelligent mafter will perceive that the context fixes upon them. For, if the fcholar is permitted invariably to render autem (for example) by the English but, he must often lofe the fense of his author; and, instead of being led by the connective to trace out the dependence of fentences, he will be more at a lofs, than if that particle had been omitted.

Plutarch, in his Platonick queftions, in order to account for that faying of Plato, that language is made up of nouns and verbs, has taken more

pains than was neceffary, to fhow, that the noun and the verb are of all parts of fpeech the most important. His reafoning, however, is rather too much in the way of allegory, to convey clear ideas and full conviction. True it is, as he fays, that nouns and verbs may form fentences, independently on prepofitions, articles, conjunctions, and adverbs; whereas thefe laft cannot form fentences, nor have any diftinct meaning, without nouns and verbs. It is also true, that, (as he proves by a quotation from Demofthenes), by leaving out conjunctions, one may fometimes join the more fignificant words in clofer union, and fo give energy to particular paffages: and that, from the want of articles, the Latin tongue is not the lefs perfpicuous; nor Homer's Greek the lefs elegant, for the omiffion of them. Yet if, in the ufe of fpeech, we were to confine ourselves to nouns and attributives; and never have recourfe to prepofitions, to mark relations of place, nor to conjunctions, to afcertain the dependence of one part of our difcourfe upon another, 1 apprehend, that we should be much at a lofs, even on common emergencies; and that, in matters of inveftigation and fcience, we must be abfolutely incapable of accurate expreffion.

There are two ways of thinking, and, confequently, of fpeaking, and writing. We fometimes think mifcellaneoufly, (as one may fay) when the prefent thought has little connection with what goes before, or follows. At other times, our ideas proceed in a train; and the fent is naturally introduced by the foregoing, and naturally introduces the fubfequent. This laft is no doubt the most rational, as it is the moft methodical, way of thinking; for in this way,

pre

many

many different ideas acquire one tendency, and are all employed for the fupport and illustration of fome one point, and of one another. In the one cafe, our thoughts refemble a multitude, in which are many individuals, but thofe are unconnected; and, therefore, though there be great number, there is not proportionable ftrength. In the other, our thoughts may be compared to an army in order of battle, where the ftrength is in proportion to the number; because the individuals are mutually dependent on, and fupported by one another; fo that the force of each may add to that of all the reft, and all the reft may be faid to fecond the efforts of each individual.

Now Conjunctions are thofe parts of language, that, by joining fentences in various ways, mark the connections, and various dependencies, of human thought. And therefore, if our thoughts be really connected and mutually dependent, it is moft likely (as every man in speaking and writing wishes to do juftice to his ideas) that conjunctions will be employed, to make that connection, and those dependencies obvious to ourselves, and to others. And where there is, in any discourse, a remarkable deficiency of connecting particles, it may be prefumed, either that there is a want of connection, or that fufficient pains has not been taken to explain it.

The style of the best authors of Greece and Rome abounds in conjunctions and other connecting words. Take any page in Cicero, efpecially where he speaks in his own perfon, and in the way of investigation, as in his books of Moral Duties; and you fhall hardly fee a sentence, that has not in, or near, the beginning, an autem, or

enim, fed, or igitur, or fome other connective: by which we may inftantly discover the relation, which the present sentence bears to what went before; as an inference, an objection, an illuftration, a continuation, a conceffion, a condition, or fimply as one fentiment fubjoined to another by a copulative. The ftyle of Seneca, on the other hand, and that of Tacitus, are in this refpect deficient. Their fentences are fhort, and their connectives few; fo that the mutual dependence of their thoughts is rather left to the conjecture of the reader, than expreffed by the author. And hence, we are told, it was, that the emperor Caligula remarked, (though we can hardly fuppofe Caligula to have been capable of faying fo good a thing) that the ftyle of Seneca was Arenam fine calce, Sand without lime; meaning, that matter, or fenfe, was not wanting, but that there was nothing to cement that matter into one uniform and folid mafs.

This uncemented compofition has of late become fashionable among the French and their imitators. One of the first who introduced it was Montefquieu, an author of great learning and extraordinary penetration; who, as he refembled Tacitus in genius, feems to have admired his manner, and copied his ftyle. Like him, and like Florus, of whom alfo he was an admirer, (as appears from his Effay on Tafte) he affects fhort fentences, in the way of aphorifm; full of meaning, indeed, but fo concife in the expreffion as to be frequently ambiguous; and fo far from having a regular connection, that their place might often be changed without inconvenience. This in philofophical writing has a difagreeable

effect,

effect, both upon the memory, and upon the understanding of the reader.

Firft, upon his memory. Nothing tends more to imprefs the mind with a diftin&t idea of a complex object, than a strict and natural connection of the parts. And therefore, when a difcourfe is not well connected, the fentiments, however juft, are easily forgotten; or, if a few be remembered, yet their general scope and tendency, having never been clearly apprehended, is not remembered at all.

And, fecondly, upon his understanding. To read a number of detached thoughts, although it may amufe the fancy, does not fufficiently exercife the rational faculties. Of fuch thoughts, that only which is prefent is attended to; and, if we understand it, we do all that is required of us. But when we perufe a regular investigation, wherein many fentiments are employed to illuftrate or evince one leading point of doctrine, we must attend, both to the prefent thought and to that which went before, that we may perceive the connection; we must also compare the feveral ideas together, in order to difcern their agreement or difagreement, as well as the influence of all the premises in establishing the conclufion. This is a moft wholesome intellectual exercife. It puts all our rational powers in motion, and inures us to a methodical way of thinking and fpeaking and fo quickens attention, ftrengthens memory, and gives direction and vigour to our inventive powers.

As the fashionable mode of unconnected compofition is lefs improving to the mind of the reader, fo it promotes a habit of inaccuracy and negligence

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