it fignifies neither the one nor the other, neither acting, nor being acted upon and percutiens, ftriking, denotes action; and vulneratus, wounded, denotes paffion, in the present sense of the word; and yet both are participles. Scaliger thought, that " things fixed, permanent, and lafting," are fignified by nouns, and " things tranfient "and temporary by verbs." But hora, ventus, amnis, hour, wind, river, fignify things tranfient, and yet are nouns: and many verbs there are, which denote permanency, as fedet, ftat, eft, habitat, dormit, obiit; he fits, he stands, he is, he dwells, he fleeps, he died, or ceafed to live,

SECT.

SECT. III.

The fubject continued. Of the Times or Tenfes of verbs. Tenfes, 1. Definite in time.-2. Indefi nite in time, or Aorist.-3. Complete, or Perfect, in respect of action.-4. Incomplete, or Imperfect, in respect of action.-5. Compound, uniting two or more times in one.-6. Simple, expreffive of one time only.-Remarks.

Hinted, that the attributes, which have a connection with number and perfon, and may be made the fubjects of affirmation, are reducible to one or other of thefe three heads, to be, to act, and to be acted upon; to which may be added a fourth, to reft, or ceafe, which however may perhaps be implied in the first. Verbs, therefore, there must be in all languages, to exprefs, firft, Being, as Sum, I am; fecondly, Acting, as Vulnero, I wound; thirdly, Being acted upon, as Vulneror, I am wounded; and fourthly, Being at reft, as Dormio, 1 fleep, Sedeo, I fit.

Now, without fome reference to Time, not one of these attributes can be conceived. For wherever there is existence, it must continue for fome time, how fhort foever that time may be: and whatever existence we fpeak of, we must confider, as paft (he was), as prefent (he is), or as future (he will be); or or as both paft and prefent (he was and is); or as both prefent and

future

future (he is and will be); or as extending through time future, as well as through that which is prefent and past, as, he was, he is, and he will continue to be. Further, wherever there is action either exerted or received, there must be motion; and all motion implies time. For when many contiguous places are gone through in a given time, the motion is fwift; and when few contiguous places are gone through in the fame time, the motion is flow. Reft, in like manner, implies duration: for if the want of motion did not continue for fome time, we fhould not know, that there was reft.

Time, therefore, must make a part of the fig nification of all verbs, and of every part of every verb, in all languages whatever. And this leads me to speak more particularly of the Times of verbs, which in English are improperly called the Tenfes; a word, whose apparent etymology would never lead us even to guess at its meaning; and which, if it were not explained to us, we fhould not think of confidering as a corruption of the Latin tempus, or of the French temps.

Time is naturally divided into Paft, Prefent, and Future. All paft time was once prefent, and all future time will come at laft to be prefent, If therefore we deny the reality of present time, as feveral philofophers both antient and modern have done, we must alfo deny the reality of paft and future time, and, confequently, of time altogether. Nay more: Senfe perceives nothing but what is prefent, Memory nothing but what is paft, and Forefight forms conjectures in regard to futurity. If, therefore, we fay, that there is no present time, nor confequently any future

or

or paft time, it will follow, that there are no fuch faculties in man, as fenfe, memory, and forefight.

The fundamental error in the reasonings of thefe philofophers, on the fubject of time, is, that they fuppofe the present inftant to have, like a geometrical point, neither parts nor magnitude; and that it is nothing more than the commencement of time future, and the conclufion of time paft; even as the point, in which tworight lines meet and form an angle, being itself of no magnitude, must be confidered as the beginning of the one line, and the end of the other.

But, as nothing is, in refpect of our senses, a geometrical point, (for whatever we fee, or touch, muft of neceflity have magnitude) fo neither is the prefent, or any other, inftant of duration, wholly unextended. Nay, we cannot even conceive an unextended inftant: and that which we call the prefent may in fact admit of very confiderable extenfion. While I write a letter, or read a book, I fay, that I am reading or writing it, though it should take up an hour, a day, a week, or a month; the whole time being confidered as prefent, which is employed in the prefent action. So, while I build a houfe, though that fhould be the work of many months, I fpeak of it in the present time, and say that I am building it. In like manner, in contradiftinction to the century paft, and to that which is to come, we may confider the whole space of a hundred years as time prefent, when we fpeak of a feries of actions, or of a state of existence, that is co-extended with it; as in the following exam

ple:

ple:

In this century, we are more neglectful of the antients, and we are confequently more "ignorant, than they were in the laft, or "than perhaps they will be in the next." Nay the entire term of man's probationary ftate in this world, when oppofed to that eternity which is before him, is confidered as prefent time by thofe who fay, "In this ftate we fee darkly as

through a glass; but in a future life our faith will be loft in vifion, and we fhall know, even "C as we are known.”

Time paft, and time future, are, in themselves, infinitely, and, with respect to man, indefinitely extended and, in fpeaking of time paft, or of time future, men may have occafion to allude to different periods or extenfions of past or future time. And hence, in all the European languages we know, and probably in many other languages, there are in verbs feveral preterites and futures. Thus, in English I did it, I was doing it, I have done it, I had done it, are plainly diftin&t preterites: and I fhall do it, I shall be doing it, I am about to do it, I shall have done it, convey different ideas in regard to the transactions of future time.

But, in defcribing the neceffary times or tenfes of verbs, which is a curious part of fcience, and the most difficult thing, perhaps, in the grammatical art, I must be fomewhat more particular.

As the verbs, that fignify to act and to be acted upon, are of all verbs the most complex, and must therefore have as great a variety of tenfes as any other verbs can have, I fhall confine myself to them in the following analysis of the tenfes,

And