CHAPTER IX.

From the 21st to the 28th of May 1796.

Plan of the directors for dividing the army of Italy-Their probable and pretended motives-Remonstrance of Bonaparte-The plan of dividing the army abandoned-Good effects of Bonaparte's remonstrance-His authority enlarged-He renews military operations-Leaves Milan-Revolt of Pavia-He returns to Milan-Burns Binasco, and storms Pavia-The revolt suppressed-Moderation of Bonaparte-Sends hostages into France -The army reaches the Oglio-Uneasiness of Berthier-Bonaparte rejoins the army-Enters Brescia-His proclamation-Reception by the Venetian authorities—Instructions of the directory respecting Venice.

In his letters from Cherasco, as was before observed, Bonaparte had asked for reenforcements, and proposed, after expelling the Austrians from Italy, to force his way across the Tyrolian Alps; and, concerting operations with Moreau and Jourdan, to dictate peace under the walls of Vienna. A project so vast, and at that time unexampled, appears to have alarmed the directory; who, distrusting the prudence, or dreading the ambition of a general, whose plans were cast in a mould of such colossal enterprise, proposed, before his ascendancy should become uncontrollable, to turn his spirit into safer channels. Objects of an ostensible character readily presented themselves, as sufficient motives for the policy inspired by this timid design. Their desire to avenge upon the papal government the murder of Basseville, was naturally enough unextinguished; the King of Naples, whose officers had participated in the plunder and destruction of Toulon, had a contingent of cavalry in the army of Beaulieu; and they complained that the neutrality of Tuscany, either through the inability or the indisposition of the Grand Duke to prevent it, was abused by the English fleet in the harbour of Leghorn. Influ

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enced by these various causes, the directors, in their answer of the 7th of May to Bonaparte's letter, proposing the invasion of Germany, after declining his project as too extensive and hazardous, announced their intention of directing his course, as soon as the conquest of the Milanese should be effected, toward the states in the south of Italy, and to the collateral task of rescuing Corsica, and freeing Leghorn from the English (1).

With this view they resolved to divide their force in Italy into two armies. One, under General Kellermann, was to hold the ground already gained, reduce Mantua, and, by occupying the passes of the Tyrol, maintain the exclusion of the Austrians from the valley of the Po. The other, conducted by Bonaparte, after driving the English from Leghorn, and detaching an expedition against Corsica, was to march upon Rome and Naples. They determined further, for the alleged purpose of preserving correspondency of action and harmony of feeling between the two generals, to continue in force their decree of the 28th of April, which conferred on the executive commissaries, after the example of their predecessors, the deputies of the Convention, authority to require and control the movement of the troops. As the object assigned for insisting on this regulation was not of a nature to conceal the illiberality of its real motive, or to mitigate the mischief of its probable effect, it was not calculated to render the regulation itself acceptable to the judgment or the sensibility of Bonaparte.

This unwelcome despatch reached its destination just three days after Bonaparte, having crowned his astonishing career of activity and success by the victory of Lodi, had repeated to Carnot his magnificent design of penetrating into Germany, and signing a peace in the heart of "astounded Austria.” It was easy for a person of his penetration to perceive, that the military absurdity of the directorial plan involved not only dangers to the army, but injustice to himself; and that his well-earned conquests and brilliant hopes were about to be sacrificed, if not to the accomplishment of sinister schemes, at any rate without the slightest prospect of public advantage. This conviction must naturally have excited both his surprise and indignation; yet in his answer, which was prompt and firm, the feelings of the man disappear entirely in the anxiety of the general; and instead of a fiery expostulation in resentment of personal injustice, he addressed to the Directory a respectful remonstrance against the

mischief of their injudicious plan. After telling them that he has just that moment received their despatch, and that the conquest of Lombardy, the condition upon which they founded their project of dividing the army,-was already achieved, he says: "I think it very impolitic to divide the army of Italy into two corps; and equally contrary to the interest of the republic, to place in command of it, two different generals." He then adds, "the expedition against Leghorn, Rome, and Naples, is but a small affair. It should be made by divisions en echelon, so that on the least occasion we might return upon the Austrians, and envelop them at the first movement they made. For the conduct of such an operation, not only is it necessary that there should be a single general, but also that there should be nothing to restrain him in his march or his actions. I have made this campaign without consulting any one, and should have done nothing effectually, had I been obliged to reconcile my conduct with the views of another person. In complete destitution of supplies, I have gained advatanges over a superior force, because, persuaded that your confidence was fully reposed in me, my movements were as rapid as my thoughts. If you fetter me with all sorts of obstructions; if I must refer for the direction of all my steps to the commissaries of government; if they have a right to control my movements, to diminish or augment my force at pleasure, you may count on nothing good being done. If you weaken my means by dividing your force; if you break the unity of military thought in the direction of the army, I tell you, with pain, you will throw away the finest opportunity of giving law to Italy.

"In the present state of things in this country, it is indispensable that you should have a general in the full possession of your confidence. If he be not myself, I shall not murmur, but exert myself with redoubled zeal, to merit your esteem in whatever other post you may confide to me. Every commander has his own manner of making war; general Kellermann has more experience than I have, and will command better; but both of us together will only do mischief.

"Without being invested with your perfect confidence, I can render no essential service. I am sensible it is somewhat imprudent to write you such a letter as this, since it would be so easy to accuse me of ambition and pride. But I owe it to you, who hitherto have manifested for me an esteem which I ought never

to forget, to give you a frank expression of my sentiments. "The several divisions of the army are in the act of occupying Lombardy. When you receive this letter we shall be already in motion, and your answer will probably find us near Leghorn (2). Your decision on this occasion will have more influence on the operations of the campaign, than a division of fifteen thousand men, which the Emperor might send to Beaulieu."

In order to obviate the danger of exposing his language to undue construction, or the pride of the executive, to an untoward impression from it, he inclosed his public letter in a private one to Carnot, desiring him to guard the former against an unfair interpretation, and to "make such use of it, as friendship and prudence shall suggest to be proper."

In a style more unreserved he then continues, "Kellermann will command the army as well as myself, for no man can be better convinced than I am, that our victories are owing to the intrepid courage of the troops; but I am satisfied that to unite Kellermann and myself as generals in Italy, would ruin every thing. I cannot willingly serve with a man who thinks himself the first general in Europe; and I am confident you had better have one bad general than two good ones. War is like government; it is an

affair of tact.

"Unless I enjoy the same esteem which you testified for me at Paris, I can be of no use. It is a matter of indifference to me whether I make war here or elsewhere. To serve my country, to merit in the eyes of posterity a page in our history, and to give to the government proofs of my devotion and attachment, constitute the aim of my ambition. But I confess I have it deeply at heart, not to lose in eight days, the fruits of two months' toil, solicitude and danger; and to keep myself untrammeled by fetters."

This was the situation, and these were the feelings, under the pressure of which, when the disposition of the government and his own destination were utterly precarious; when in the next few days he might be constrained to separate from the army he had rendered victorious, to retire from the foe he was eager to encounter, and withdraw from a country which he hoped to regenerate, that he infused into this address to his troops, such unmitigated energy of thought, strength of purpose, and vivacity of expression.

That the ungracious communication of the government was

present to his mind when he wrote the address, is evident from the new direction in his military plans which it discloses. In his letter to Carnot, the day after the battle of Lodi, in which he described Milan as already taken and Lombardy subdued, the pursuit of Beaulieu and the invasion of Germany, appear as his immediate objects.

"The battle of Lodi, my dear director, gives to the republic the whole of Lombardy. In your calculations you may reckon me already at Milan. I shall not go there tomorrow, only because I wish to pursue Beaulieu, and take advantage of his consternation, to beat him once more. It is possible that I shall attack Mantua in a very short time, and if I carry that place, I shall not hesitate to penetrate into Bavaria. In three weeks I may be in the heart of Germany. If it enters into your intentions that the armies of the Rhine are to advance, I will pass the Tyrolian mountains before the Emperor can seriously apprehend it." In the address, although the plan of driving Beaulieu beyond the Adige and of attacking Mantua, is not abandoned, it is not mentioned; while, in conformity with the new intentions of the directory, the ardour and indignation of the troops are pointed against the English, against Rome, and Naples. "Let those who whetted the dagger of civil war in France, who basely assassinated our ministers, and who burnt our fleets in the harbour of Toulon, tremble,-the hour of vengeance is come."

If the fear of losing the services on this frontier, of so successful a general, by accepting his conditional offer to resign, had not been sufficient to deter the directors from insisting on the prosecution of their ill judged project, the commanding sense and disinterested feeling of Bonaparte's remonstrance, would, in all probability, have produced that effect. There could be no room for jealousy towards a commander, who, upon learning that he was likely to be defrauded of the fruits of a career which he had so gloriously opened, far from manifesting resentment, declared his readiness to resign to a rival general, his illustrious post, and to serve with redoubled zeal in a new one. Pertinacity with regard to the superintending authority of the commissaries, would have been unreasonable, after Bonaparte's avowal, that in a cam paign, every act of which both Salicetti and the directors themselves extolled, he had consulted no one, had preserved the unity of military thought, and had therefore been successful. The de