military plans, Bonaparte could not but feel satisfied with himself, as well as grateful to his troops, whose extraordinary courage and activity, had given full play to his spirit and his genius. In his report of the battle of Borghetto and the flight of Beaulieu beyond the Adige, the former sentiment is faintly perceptible; while the latter is expressed in a style so singularly familiar and dramatic, for the texture of an official despatch, as to show that he abandoned himself with real delight, to the duty of attesting the virtues of his army.

"Behold then," he writes, "the Austrians completely driven out of Italy, and our advanced posts planted on the mountains of Germany.

I shall not recount to you the men who have distinguished themselves by acts of valour. It would be necessary for me to name all the carabiniers and grenadiers of the vanguard. These fellows sport with danger and smile at death. They are now perfectly accustomed to contending against cavalry, whose charges they ridicule. Nothing can equal their intrepidity, but the cheerfulness with which they perform the severest forced marches, singing by turns, songs of patriotism and of love.

When, at, last they reach their bivouacs, you suppose no doubt they go to sleep. Far from it-every man has his story to tell, or to propose his plan of operations for the morrow. By the way, their views are often remarkably just. The other day, as a regiment was filing off before me, a private of the light infantry came close to me, and said. 'General, you must now do so.'-' Wretch !' replied I, will you be silent?' He instantly disappeared in the ranks, and it was in vain that I had him sought for. But what he recommended, was the very thing I had ordered to be done."

Far different were the feelings of Beaulieu, whose disasters, not yet relieved by the more glaring miscarriages of his successors, exposed him to a weight of censure, which he was unconscious of deserving, but unable to avert. In a state of mind between dignity and desperation, he thus recriminated in answer to a reproachful despatch from the Aulic council. "I asked you for a general, and you sent me Argenteau. He is a grandee I know, and I also know, that to atone for my arresting him, he is to be made a fieldmarshal. I now inform you that I have but twenty thousand men, and that the French have sixty thousand; that I shall retreat to morrow, next day, every day, even to Siberia,

198

THE LIFE OF THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

[CHAP. X.] provided they pursue me so far. My age gives me a right to speak out. In a word, make peace as soon as you can, and on any terms you can.”

Shortly after writing this uncourtly letter, the unfortunate veteran was recalled in disgrace by orders from Vienna; and Marshal Wurmser, who commanded on the upper Rhine, being appointed to succeed him and to conduct a new army into Italy, his broken forces were placed temporarily under the direction of General Melas; officers, who as they rose in distinction on Beaulieu's ruins, were destined, under the blows of the same antagonist, to sink into deeper misfortunes than even those by which he was overwhelmed (6).

CHAPTER XI.

From the 31st of May to the 5th of June 1796.

Bonaparte occupies Peschiera, and Verona-Posts his army of observation on the Adige-Features and strength of this line-The army of the siege commanded by Serrurier-Augereau cooperates with it-Neutrality of Venice-Transactions with that state-Threats of Foscarelli-Reply of Bonaparte-Proposes an armed neutrality to the Venetian commissioners -His proposition rejected-Prophetic remark of the commissionersAgreement for the supply of the army-Penury and inaction of the armies on the Rhine-Project of the directors for obtaining a loan from VeniceBonaparte promotes it—The senate recall Foscarelli, and appoint Battaglia— Louis XVIII.-Sentiments of Bonaparte on entering Verona-Importance of reducing Mantua-Its situation-Island of the Seraglio-Four suburbs taken possession of by the French-Prisoner in a convent-Bonaparte sels off for Milan.

The great objects of Bonaparte now were, with one part of his force to invest Mantua; and with the other part to cover the siege, by occupying strongly the line of the Adige.

Following the footsteps of the Austrian general, who had not hesitated to postpone to his military convenience the neutal rights of Venice, he took possession of Peschiera; and proceeding further on the trace of that example, he ordered Massena to enter Verona; an order which that active officer, who had moved up from Villa Franca to Castelnovo, carried into unresisted execution on the 1st of June (1).

With his own division and the principal part of the cavalry and light troops under Kilmaine, Massena, forming the army of observation, occupied the line of the Adige, from the upper

extremity of the lake of Guarda to the marshy plains bordering on the Adriatic, posting his centre at Verona, his left on Montebaldo, and his right at Porto Legnano. The mountains, which, shooting off from the Tyrolian Alps, block up the pass between the lake and the river, the walls and forts of Verona and Legnano, with the broad channel, deep dykes, and numerous branches of the lower Adige, give to this line, variety of aspect but uniformity of strength.

The division of Serrurier, reenforced by the grenadiers of Dallemagne and Lannes, composed the army of the siege, with which, for the purpose of establishing the investment, Augereau was directed to cooperate. On the 1st of June Serrurier took up his quarters at Roverbello, a village near to Mantua, and on the road to Verona. The next day Augereau moved lower down the Mincio, crossed the road from Mantua to Porto Legnano, and posted himself opposite to the suburb of Cerese.

For the first time, since the opening of the campaign, Bonaparte now found himself in contact with the authorities of a neutral state. In such a position, the duties of a commander under the most favourable circumstances, are sufficiently delicate, from the essential repugnance between belligerent necessity, and neutral independence. But where, as in this case, the neutral state is under the direction of an unfriendly government, the difficulty of the commander is greatly increased.

The Venetian senate, as soon as they learned that the French had forced the passage of the Mincio, had deputed Foscarelli a member of their body, to meet Bonaparte, in order to deprecate, and if possible to prevent, his taking possession of Peschiera. But finding that the Austrians had just been compelled to evacuate that place, Foscarelli could not persist in objecting to its mere occupation by the French. When, however, the engineer demanded the keys of the arsenal, with a view of mounting cannon on the ramparts, and of arming the galleys, which were intended to give to the masters of the fortress the command of the lake, he protested against the proceeding as a violation of the neutral rights of his state.

In a conference which took place at Peschiera, on the 1st of June, and in which he endeavoured to dissuade the French general from occupying Verona, he elevated his tone from remonstrance to menace, and declared that if it was attempted, he

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would cause the gates of the town to be closed, and the fire of the forts to be opened on the French. "Your resolution is too late," said Bonaparte, "my troops are by this time in Verona. I am obliged to establish my line of defence on the Adige, during the siege of Mantua. It is not with a force of fifteen hundred Sclavonians, that you could oppose the passage of the Austrian army. Neutrality consists in dealing out the same weight and measure to both parties. If you are not my enemy, you are bound to grant or allow to me, whatever you have conceded or permitted to my adversary." He complained of the Austrians having been suffered to enter Peschiera, which he alleged had, by increasing the difficulty of passing the Mincio, cost his army many lives, and after threatening to carry his complaints to Venice at the head of his troops, he set off on the morning of the 3rd to join Massena's division at Verona; a movement, which, although his real object was only to put that place, which commanded three bridges over the Adige, and was the key of his position on that line, under a proper state of government and defence, had much the appearance of carrying his threat into execution.

At Verona, two sages of the council who arrived on a special mission from Venice, attended his conferences with Foscarelli. To them Bonaparte renewed his complaints on the occupation of Peschiera by the Austrians, and on the more than hospitable reception which had been given to the count de Lille at Verona. He spoke in strong and even exaggerated terms, of the probable resentment of the directory, and under the impression created by this tone of menace, proposed to withdraw his army from the Adige altogether, provided the senate, assuming an attitude of armed neutrality, would engage to prevent the passage of the Austrians through that district, and confine their right of way for communicating between the Tyrol and Lombardy, to the road on the west bank of the lake of Guarda,-the sole route, which under the treaty between Austria and Venice, they were entitled to use. This proposition, which was calculated to place the two belligerents on a footing of perfect equality, and to avoid misunderstanding or dissension with either, was not suited to the enervate character or political prejudices of the senate, and was rejected by their commissioners (2). It was on this occasion that the Venetian deputies conceived those strong impressions of Bonaparte's tact and ability, which are expressed in the concluding passage of